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Preface 
Discussion and objective debate is an important and necessary 
ingredient of social decision-making in a democracy. Only thus can the 
public, legislators, administrators and special interest groups inventory 
and understand the complete range of phenomena relevant for public decision. 
Discussion and analysis is a method of measurement, for a more complete 
inventory of goals and sub-goals of public policy and for expression of 
hypotheses and predictions in respect to outcomes of various policy means. 
Discussion is the most ancient and universal process for reasoned calcula-
tion in social policy, whether this be at the program committee of the 4-H 
Club or in presidential elections. 
This workshop was called accordingly. Its purpose was to provide a 
forum wherein the goals and efficient means for farm policy might be dis-
cussed in objective fashion by persons and groups highly responsible in 
policy formulation. The workshop was initiated as the first one of an 
annual series of such conferences. Since discussion and exploration of 
alternatives and hypotheses in policy are best conducted through examina-
tion of factual information which might exist or be generated, the workshop 
also included a summary analysis of the current status of agriculture in 
respect to major commodities. Examination was then made of the nature 
and magnitude of existing farm problems, of the near-at-hand goals which 
are relevant and acceptable for solving these problems and of some means 
for attaining these goals in problem solution. 
It is expected that the workshop reported in the following pages can 
serve as the first of several designed for these purposes: (1) to agree, as 
nearly as possible in a diverse society, on the goals of farm policy; 
(2) to specify means of attaining these goals, and (3) to make an annual 
appraisal of policy legislation enacted during the year, to determine 
whether it has taken the nation closer to, or further from, acceptable goals 
which can be crystallized. The current plan is to continue this framework 
in the following year, with the 1961 workshop to be held at North Carolina 
State College. 
Persons invited to participate in this workshop included educational 
and research personnel from Land Grant Colleges and the U. S. D. A.; 
members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives; 
officers and staff members of farm organizations; public administrators and 
other interested groups. It was a hope of the conference planning committee 
that objective analysis and discussion among these individuals and groups 
could have beneficial effect in an annual appraisal of farm policy--and lead 
to policies which provide efficient solution to the nation • s major farm prob-
lems. 
Earl 0. Heady 
Executive Director, Center for 
Agricultural and Economic Adjustment 
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Chapter 1 
Goals and Values in 
Agricultural Policy 
Earl Q,. Heady 
Iowa State University 
This paper summarizes and expands certain presentations and propositions 
made at the conference "Goals and Values in Agricultural Policy .. , sponsored by 
the Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment in June, 1960. The conference 
was held at the suggestion of numerous persons who indicated that solutions to 
major farm policy problems have their roots largely in goals and values. The con-
ference was called accordingly; to bring the problems of goals and values explicitly 
into focus 1 in order that scientists, administrators, farm leaders and eventually 
the public would better understand the nature and importance of the complex issues 
involved. It was not the expectation that this conference would •provide all an-
swers", but that it might cause greater thought, analysis and discussion to center 
objectively on the phenomena concerned. The conference was successful in this 
sense. Participants generally were stimulated because the conference theme not 
only provided a relaxed setting for discussion but also a relatively unexplored area 
for analysis • 
Papers and discussion by specialists from numerous fields of social sciences 
were included on the program. Similarly, persons with a wide range of interests 
were invited to participate. Nearly 300 persons attended the three-day session. 
Many pRrticipants suggested that the subject matter should be pursued further o in 
order that certain topics can be analyzed more deeply. 
There was general consensus in these areas: (1) The broad social goal of 
productivity in agriculture has been well attained, and the industry has capacity to 
produce at levels beyond national food requirements and whic:fi will provide most 
farmers with resource earnings comparable to those of other major industries; (2) Solu-
tions. to price, surplus and income problems stemming from this capacity rest on 
differences of goals and values among various groups, rather than on absence of 
economic and public mechanisms for solving the problems; (3) Value differences rest 
less in the area of broad overall goals relating to long-run national interests and 
more on short-run means for solving surplus and income problems, with the means 
taking on the immediate character of ends or goals; (4) Value a'nd goal differences 
for agriculture in these respects exist among income, commodity, regional, age and 
size groups within the agricuiture. Some conflict 1 especially of economic interest, 
in farm solutions, also exists between agriculture and sectors which process agri-
cultural commodities and inputs or. represent local business and social institutions; 
(5) The various goals which can be used to judge agricultural policies are not all 
complementary. It is sometimes or partly necessary to sacrifice attainment in the 
area of one policy goal in order that attainment of another goal be increased. 
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STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIES AND SOCIAL VALUES 
A review of farm policy attempts over the last several decades and the 
conference papers emphasizes the variance which has existed in the goals of farm 
policy and the goals held by different groups with interest in agriculture. For ex-
ample, papers emphasizing interests of farmer groups suggested a different short-
run orientation for policy than those emphasizing the interest of the general consuming 
public. However, discussions of these papers suggested that this conflict of pro-
ducer or industry interest against general consumer interest is no greater, and sometimes 
less, than that between other major industries and the consuming public. Numerous 
discussants pointed out that the contribution made by agriculture to national economic 
progress, in producing more food at lower prices or in producing food with fewer re-
sources, has been of particular gain to the consumer and of less direct, short-run 
benefit to the aggregate farm industry. Some suggested that the pricing and production 
policies of major sectors such as steel, petroleum and labor have been those aimed 
at benefiting the particular group. The existence of surplus or unused capacity or 
resources along side with "maintained prices" in the latter sectors were cited as illus-
trations that self-administered or publicly facilitated policies in these strata of the 
national economy are not aimed solely at immediate consumer benefit. It was pointed 
out, however, that while the conflict of interest between industry, producers and the 
society of consumers may be greater in some of these areas, it is not so apparent as 
in agriculture where the number of producers is much larger and policies must be im-
plemented more directly through public legislation. Too, it was suggested as unlikely 
that the general public holds different values in respect to production and price pol-
icies for agriculture as compared to other economic sectors, but it simply lacks the 
knowledge that comparable policies are pursued in numerous economic sectors. 
A paper and a discussion on economic organization suggested that increased 
competition in the national economy would promote greater efficiency and a greater 
national product. These presentations were general and concerned themselves mainly 
with decreasing monopolistic pricing and product control in non-farm industries. Con-
ference participants suggested that society has actively reacted against pure monopoly 
in anti-trust legislation 8 but that it has not gone so far as to reduce the production 
and pricing policies prevailing in major non-farm sectors which do compete with each 
other, but not under the status of the pure competition model which characterizes 
agriculture. If society has a dominate goal of maximum efficiency 8 to which all other 
goals are subordinate, then it has the choice of either (1) converting the production 
and pricing policies or methods of all non-farm industries and organizations to those 
of agriculture or (2) finding effective means whereby agriculture can manage its out-
put and prices to the degree of other major industries which are not pure monopolies, 
which do compete with each other but which also do not operate in the unrestricted 
atmosphere of agriculture•s purely competitive model. Either could be more effective, 
in promoting a use of resources consistent with consumer desires and preferences and 
in an economy where full employment of resources can be attained 8 than a dual system 
wherein a major industry such as agriculture operates under pure competition and 
absorbs excess resources while other major industries possess short-run power to 
establish a desired level of price and manage output against it 8 with resource employ-
ment curtailed accordingly. Discussions suggested that efficiency, in relation to 
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rate of progress and magnitude of national ~conomic producto is a long-run goal of 
paramount importance and an intermediate goal standing at a level of other important 
national goals. However, it is not a goal which stands entirely above. all other goals 
and the problem is to find mechanisms which contribute to an acceptable combination 
of alternative and even competing goals for relevant periods of planning. 
For example, the production and pricing policies employed in industries such 
as those mentioned above 1 which are competitive. but not in the pure competion sense, 
may provide greater stability of production and security of income than would firm 
and industry structures which coincide with those of agriculture and the pure competi-
tion model. The public has allowedo if not fostered o self-administered pricing and 
production policies in non-farm sectors which allow an acceptable degree of efficiency 
and progress; perhaps because stability of production, prices and income is now 
valued at a level paralleling that of efficiency. Stability, efficiency. and progress o 
like other major national goals such as distributive justice and freedom of choice, 
are neither entirely complementary nor independent. To obtain more of one it often is 
necessary to substitute some of one for another. The task is to identify the optimum 
mix or combination of these several goals or ends. · 
VALUE DIFFERENCES AND RESOLUTIONS OF POLICY 
Several papers and discussions emphasized that American society is now 
composed of millions of persons with identical tastes I preferences and values; this 
was not always so. Accordingly, it is necessary for this balance in goal attainment 
to be decided in the political process o with appropriate consideration for the values 
and preferences of the many groups which make up the society. In few cases is one 
group allowed to impose or dictate its goals entirely over another. Examples cited 
where differences were so different and discrete that one sector of American society 
absolutely and completely imposed its values and preferences over other sectors were 
slavery and prohibition. But it also was mentioned that most value and goal differences 
are not this extreme. Hence, methods of resolving conflicts are possible over time 
and through less violent political means and mechanisms. Groups with conflicting 
interests have 1 in American soc.iety, been able to use time and the bargaining process 
to better understand each other• s position and to finally agree on policy which is 
mutually acceptable. Along this same line, several papers pointed out that as a 
society we seldom articulate a single valued long-run policy and immediately adopt 
it. Instead o we formulate a broad general concept of long-run goals and move in its 
direction, away from structures existing at the moment, through a succession of short-
run improvisions upon which agreement can be obtained. While this process is less 
spectacular and revolutionary than those political mechanisms which allow or force 
sudden and discrete breaks from the present or past I or which force a violent break 
between alternative sets of values o it is more consistent (a) with social mechanisms 
which recognize the acquired values of individuals and groups and (b) with the demo-
cratic process. 
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It was indicated that conflict or disagreement in respect to farm policy mainly 
grew out of (a} basic or "ideological type" values of people and groups with interest 
in agriculture, (b) competing economic interests in respect to the effect of farm poli-
cies and (c) differences in, or lack of o knowledge about the consequences of different 
programs. In respect to basic values o Brewster suggested four creeds which were 
important early in guiding public policy. These included the~ ~o the judgment 
that one fails to deserve the esteem of others if he .. places easy ways above love of 
excellence .. in any useful employment of his choice; the democratic creed which in-
cludes the two central judgments that all men are of equal worth and dignity and none o 
however wise or goodo is good or wise enough to have dictatorial power over any 
other; the enterprise creed that the individual ought to be responsible for his own 
economic security; and the creed of ~integrity whose central judgment is that in 
case of conflict, both the individual and group are responsible for seeking a new mode 
of thought that will unify conflicting views. He and others suggested o however, that 
whi.le these basic values or creeds harmonized well with the premachine economy of 
agriculture, they are less consistently held with respect to the current capacity and 
structure of agriculture and with respect to the economic social and power structures 
of other industry and resource groups. Perhaps the main problem for agriculture and 
the public in general is to more specifically spell out consistent values and ends for 
farming o against the backdrop of a wealthy and progressing society where neither pure 
competition aside from agricultureo or pure monopoly is typical or prevalento the popu-
lation is no longer dominantly agricultural and other segments of society have adopted o 
either by self-administration or public legislationo mechanisms which lead to greater 
stability of production o employment, pricing and income or profits. Several persons 
suggested that farm people while retaining some values dissimilar to those of society 
in total o now have the same general desires o goals and aspirations as the rest of 
society. This condition holds true because (a) agriculture currently has a small pro-
portion of the total population o (b) communication media are widespread and effective 
and (c) income, at least of commercial farmers o has risen to levels which cause rele-
vant goals to no longer be oriented directly towards overcoming the arduousness of 
farm life o isolation o inadequate nutrition and substandard shelter o It was recognized o 
however o that income and well-being do differ greatly within agriculture and the 
values o goals and needs of the low income portion differ from those of commercial agri-
culture. Two facets of policy are needed accordingly; one in economic growth and 
employment opportunity to accommodate persons of genuine poverty in the .. forgotten 
half'' of agriculture and one in positive price and production structures for those in 
the commercial portion of the industry. But even for commercial agriculture it was 
suggested that the goal of farm families is for something more than relief programs o 
More particularly o commercial farm families desire an economic environment and 
pricing policy which gives them a chance to succeed if they are efficient in their 
businesses; just as businesses do not want a relief program to dampen losses in a 
recession but prefer positive monetary and fiscal policies which maintain full employ-
ment and economic growtho or labor does not want unemployment compensation during 
a depression but desires economic stability and growth in job opportunities. Also o 
in the realm of consistency among goals of farm and non-farm sectors o it was suggested 
that the consuming society has not especially complained of the investment involved 
in attempts at solving the farm surplus and income problems o but has become somewhat 
impatient with the fact that little progress has been made in actual solutions. The 
latter sentiment prevails widely within agriculture. 
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GOAL AGREEMENT AND MEANS CONFLICT 
Agreement exists that the massive productive capacity of· agriculture must 
be brought under control and size and costs of surplus storage must be reduced. 
Disagreement rests not so much on these int~rmediate goals but more on the means 
to attain them. Conflict in means arises evidently because various groups have 
different values in respect to what "is right" or "what ought to prevail" as methods 
of accomplishing these goals. Also some groups have a different economic stake 
in the method used and its result. Kaldor, Hines and Bauder pointed out that some 
groups, businesses or institutions stand to gain more if one method is usedu but 
less if another means is employed; for example, industries which sell inputs such 
as fertilizer to agriculture or store surplus grain. Similarly, programs which cause 
a small amount of land to be withdrawn from all farms over the entire nation impose 
less economic burden or trade losses on urban business in certain agricultural areas 
than would programs which cause large blocks of land to be withdrawn or shifted in 
particular communities. Regional adjustment, with concentration of land withdrawal 
in particular communities o by whatever means, would result in surplus control at 
lower cost than a program which takes a similar proportion of land out of production 
over the entire nation •. While this accomplishment may be consistent with the goals 
of the general consuming society, it conflicts with the economic well-being of par-
ticular local segments of society and is opposed accordingly. 
VALUE DIFFERENCES AND EDUCATION 
Resolving policy conflicts which stem from value differences can be aided 
by objective education. The purpose of such education in a democratic society is 
not to impose values or value judgments on people, or to cause the values of one 
group to prevail over others. Instead, its purpose is to provide objective facts and 
intelligent discussion so that individuals can better identify alternative goals and to 
understand the conflict between goals held by themselves; or to better understand 
the competition between goals and values held by themselves and other persons or 
groups. Given more information and education, people can better formulate their 
goals and values relative to those of others; can better evaluate the consequences 
of following different policy ends; can better understand· conditions of conflict and 
complementarity among various goals as ends; and can even make improved distinction 
between means and ends. · 
Some u but not all, of the conflicts in farm policy arise because information 
is lacking before action programs are put into effect. In important cases, the public 
is unaware that two policy elements, existing side by side, are in ()pposition in 
respect to attainment of particular goals or objectives. Often it does not realize 
that greater attainmel)t of one goal requires sacrifice in another. Present food and 
agricultural policy structure abounds with elements which conflict as ends or as 
means of attaining a particular objective. On the one hand we have programs which 
pay farmers for the use of inputs which increase production. On the other hand o we 
use direct payments to farmers to lessen land and related inputs, as a means of de-
creasing output. Other conflicting policy elements and short-term goals. are less 
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apparent or arise unwittingly. An example may be the desire for abundant and low 
cost food for consumers. A century back, with higher demand elasticities for foodo 
this goal may have been entirely consistent with improved income for farmers o But 
at a different stage of economic development and per capita wealtho demand elasti-
cities for food are extremely low and the goals of low cost food for consumers and 
higher incomes for farmers are not entirely consistent. 
GOAL COMBINATIONS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Conference papers and discussions illustrated that goal and value problems 
can revolve around two general types of phenomena or considerations mentioned 
earlier. One is more unique and less commono where the consideration is largely 
ideological or the choices are discrete o and it is impossible to combine two goals in 
any proportion. One goal must be selected at complete exclusion of the other. The 
question of slavery fell in this category o just as does the world wide conflict over 
Communism and Democracy. But most goals are not of this discrete fashion and the 
public decision is one of deciding the proportions in which they will be combined o 
While there are ideological differences in respect to farm policy~ most de-
cisions fall in the category of ends or goals which have beeno or possibly can beo 
combined in non-zero proportions; rather than in the framework of one entirely at 
the expense of the other. Apparently ideological differences are greatest in respect 
to the means. Hence o given some agreement on goals o it should be possible for 
groups with different views to lay aside means for which ideological differences 
exist o and explore the many other possible means which can contribute to the same 
goals but which do not give rise to such sharp value conflicts. A positive approach 
would be for interested groups to explore {a} the range of immediate and remote goals 
on which there is agreement and (b) the means upon which there is ideological or 
discrete value differences. Then they could invest their energies o resources and 
imaginations in developing or proposing new means for which ideological differences 
are lacking and general value orientations are more consistent. Given agreement on 
selected goals o this would appear to be the positive hope for future farm policy. 
Agreement on the need for some positive attainment evidently exists in respect to 
{1) bringing our large production capacity under control (2} lessening the size of 
surplus stocks and their treasury costs (3} providing some stability and support for 
farm prices {4) causing farm policy to be more consistent with our broad future re-
sponsibilities in foreign policy and (5) providing information and education of a type 
for farm youth which allows them to have favorable employment opportunity in a society 
whose shape is increasingly that of non-farm activity. This writer believes that all 
interested groups agree on some level of positive attainment for these goals, although 
the optimum amount of each has not yet been decided. Ideological differences o where 
one goal must be selected at the complete exclusion of another o does not prevail 
for this collection of goals. The "either or" conflicts arise mainly in respect to how 
particular goals of this group should be attained. But again o it would seem that we 
must possess the imagination and facilities to "dream up" new means for which 
ideological differences are either less or non-existent. The general public would be 
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pleased if we did so. Ito too, agrees generally on the above goals; but it must 
"pay the bill" for non-attainment as long as debate continues and the farm problem 
grows in magnitude. The cost to the public would be considerablyless over a number 
of years, if means could be developed which are "tolerably agreeable" and which 
allow us to "be on our way" in solving our problems and attaining the goals on which 
there is quite general agreement. 
To be certain I the degree to which a particular goal is to be attained . allows 
some room for debate o even though there is broad agreement that it should prevail 
in non-zero quantity. But as pointed out previously and as emphasized in several 
papers, America was never motivated by a single inspirational conviction of a single 
goal and purpose. These differences have always existed, and they have been re-
solved by time and the political process. Our society has made progress because 
national interest does. transcend that of special interest groups. The purpose of pub-
lic policy is precisely to reconcile conflicting interests and points of view and to 
establish some harmony of purpose amidst a welter of interests. This process is 
possible in a democratic society only to the extent that government officials who 
formulate policy and the individuals comprising the competing interest groups are 
capable of being influenced by conceptions of national interest transcending their 
particular interests. It is not likely that Demeter, Goddess of agriculture o will wave 
her wand over the countryside; providing immediate insight and agreement on areas 
where national interest transcends group interests for agriculture. No sil:'lgle "round 
package of farm legislation as a once and for all cure all" for farm problems is in 
sight or necessary. As bleak as it may appear, the differences in farm policy are no 
sharper than for other policy problems of the past which were eventually resolved 
outside the framework of discrete ideological choices and violent subordination of 
one set of interests and values by another. In these cases where group values and 
interests have led to conflict in choice of means or goal mixes, but have eventually 
been transcended by national interests o the process has not been accomplished in a 
lightning-like flash. Instead some broad, general national goals have first been arti-
culated. Then starting from where it was 1 the society composed of various groups .has 0 
through the process of bargaining and re-examining positions o taken gradual steps 
from the prevailing conditions in the direction of broader and more ultimate goals. 
And while the general movement has almost always been in the direction of national 
purposes which could be articulated, not every step was so; a few being sideways 
and occasionally one backwards, as time and the bargaining opportunity of the 
political process were exercised in resolving special interests in behalf of national 
interests. Compared with most other nations and social institutions over the past 
200 yearso the process has been extremely successful as evidenced by the stability 
of this bargaining political institution itself and by the stability and continuance of our 
democratic form of government. Several papers emphasized that this process could be 
equally successful in resolving farm policy probl~ms, particularly in light of active 
attempts .to (a) spell out long-run national goals and the relevance of agricultural 
poHcy to them (b) study and understand the value orientations which give rise to 
preferences for particular goals and means in policy and (c) agree on goals which· 
have general acceptance and (d) collectively analyze means which not only are con-
. sistent with these goals, but also which do not give rise to sharp value and ideological 
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differences. It would appear that goals of relevance and agreement can be listed, 
although the final amount of each is yet to be determined through the political proc-
ess. Momentarily, we perhaps can only agree on which goals should be attained 
in positive quantity, without specifying the exact quantity of each. Bnt even though 
we need time and the bargaining or political process to determine the final optimum 
mix of the various goals, we might try and specify a minimum restraint for each, 
suggesting the smallest amount of any one which we would like to attain. Thus, 
rather than saying how far we should go in the direction of any one goal, we would 
only specify the minimum direction which we need to go. We would leave room for 
some •slack variables•, allowing them to take on various. magnitudes now and con-
verting them more specifically to other goals at a later point in time. This approach 
could add to agreement and consistency in respect to goal attainment. 
The most important remaining task is to come up with some agreeable means, 
and then try them in respect to their contribution to these acceptable and minimum 
ends or goals. Some means can take us several steps forward. Frequently, one may 
take us a step backward. But this is the. hope of the present conference; namely that 
we can select some goals relevant to both the economic environment of agriculture and 
our national purposes, then select some policy means which contribute to their attain-
ment. Using these goals as criteria, we might come back each year and pose these 
questions: Which means have taken us towards our goals and which have led us in 
other directions? Of the former, which have been most effective? Should we devise 
new methods? 
Personally, I should like to see such an annual policy appraisal. I have no 
doubt about the possible positive contribution. I would not hope that all persons 
attending be converted immediately to complete agreement and one mode of thought. 
To do so would suggest individual intellect and imagination had been stifled and that 
human progress in general, which has always been based on new and different ideas, 
has been stopped. I would only hope that that approach could be intellectual and 
objective. 
IN SUMMARY 
In origin, American society was largely rural, and its values and policy con-
structs were oriented towards an arduous and isolated country enterprise. With the 
development of industrialization, a set of unique values continued to prevail for 
agriculture, with a somewhat different set emerging for the urban sector. But with 
attainment of rapid economic progress and hiqh levels of per capita income, values 
peculiar to agriculture have rapidly been disappearing, just as agriculture. as a ma-
jority in population and political strength has been disappearing. Evidently, and to 
an extent which can reasonably be expected, the main policy goals of commercial 
agriculture are the same as those for the rest of society. Too, society evidently has 
no major policy goals for agriculture which are distinguishable from those for society 
as a whole. Non-farm sectors of society have concerned themselves particularly 
with positive policy in respect to growth in employment, investment and income 
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opportunities. Hence, industry and business prefer emphasis on monetary and fiscal 
policies which promote economic growth, rather than those which combat recession. 
Laborers and salary workers prefer emphasis on policies which provide national eco-
nomic growth and greater employment opportunities, rather than those which provide 
them with unemployment compensation during depression. It is suggested that com-
mercial farmers no longer are in search of relief policies aimed at protecting their 
incomes during depression, but likewise seek economic policy leading to production 
and price environments that allow them successful business ventures if they are effi-
cient in their businesses. Aside from growth in opportunity, business, industry and 
labor also prefers security from sudden fluctuations in competitive structure and 
employ self-administered and publicly legislated means for doing so. It is suggested 
that stable prices, with output and employment curtailed to maintain them, are such 
a security mechanism employed in selected major industries as a self-administered 
mechanism to lessen the vicissitudes of competition, minor recessions and surplus 
capacity. Public legislation has provided similar means for labor groups. It does 
not appear that society's value system will cause it to abandon these policies for 
positive expansion or the mechanisms for security. While the latter undoubtedly 
lessen competition, they evidently allow a workable degree of competition and an 
acceptable degree of security and progress. It also is doubted that society in general 
prefers less business opportunity and security for agriculture, the industry most 
deeply affected by the violent fluctuations of the pure competition model. 
American society has never been motivated by a single inspirational national 
purpose but has always been composed of groups with conflicting values, goals and 
economic interests. These differences are resolved only by the political process; 
the continued process of bargaining and re-evaluation of position over time, with a 
succession of steps and policies which moves from a current situation to one which 
is more distant and often broader and nebulous in national purpose. But this process 
does take place, even though imperfectly, because certain national interests trans-
cend group interests. It is possible in a democratic society because government 
officials who formulate policy and individuals making up competing interest groups 
are capable of being influenced in terms of national interests and those of other 
groups. The process has been singularly successful, given the stability of the sys-
tem and the democratic institutions which allow it, in comparison with the violence 
and fluctuations in national choices and political system displayed elsewhere over 
the world in the last 200 years. It is expected that it can be equally successful in 
respect to resolving farm policy problems over the next decade. 
The technical and social revolution of agriculture is causing values to be 
juggled. Farm policy orientation partly reflects this change as the farm population 
continues its shift from one with values of agrarian origin to a set of values melded 
with those of industrialization and urban communication. This process will continue 
and the farm policy which is temporarily considered to be consistent with the value 
constructs of agriculture is not likely to be entirely so in another decade. But along 
with some variance in values of farm groups, industrial groups surrounding agri-
culture also have some preference for certain farm policies contributing to their own 
particular interests. It is likely that creation of a workable and acceptable farm 
policy depends more on resolving differences between general society and agriculture 
in total. Society has evidenced both willingness and patience in investment to help 
solve the major farm problem. 
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It is believed that both society and all major groups within agriculture 
generallyo agree with some variation in extent o on these goals for the industry: 
(1) The excessive productive capacity of agriculture needs to be brought 
into line with demand to check the surplus buildup and its burden on prices. 
(2) Current excessive stocks should be eliminated to reduce the treasury 
costs of carrying them. 
{3) Mechanisms are needed to provide stability in production and pricing of 
agricultural commodities. 
(4) Agriculture should reap some rewards for the contribution it makes to 
national economic progress and the social costs of the adjustments which are so 
required should not fall entirely or too rapidly on the industry. 
(5) The supply of food should be ample and certain o but not at economic 
sacrifice in farm families. 
(6) Farm families are no less important than those of other economic sectors 
and are entitled to comparable modem day living standards and conveniences o as 
well as equivalent divices of the market and public legislation. 
(7) Policy should not be aimed mainly at providing relief consistent with 
major depressions of the past o but in providing an economic atmosphere favorable 
for a chance to succeed by farmers who are efficient in their businesses. 
(8) The two major problems of agriculture o surplus capacity and genuine 
povertyo differ largely in origin and needed solution and policies should be desigrted 
accordingly. 
(9) Farm born children should have an opportunity for useful citizenship and 
gainful employment equal to those prevailing elsewhere in society. The promising 
economic opportunity for an important portion of farm born children in a society ot 
wealth and further progress is outside of agricultureo and education and auxiliary 
facilities should be provided accordingly. 
(10) The goals and mechanisms for farm policy desired by the older and less 
mobile strata of current farm population for themselves are not necessarily those 
which they hold for their children and grandchildren, and flexibility in policy should 
be provided accordingly. 
(11) Farm people are similar to non-farm society in respect to agreement on 
certain long-run national goals and purposes o and farm policy should detract no more 
or less from these broader more distant goals than do the policies provided to or 
allowed for business o industry, labor and other major sectors of society. 
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While these goals might be worded differently o or the list might even be 
extended, it is my interpretation of goals upon which there appears to be an impor-
tant or general degree of agreement, both within agriculture for groups which may have 
different value orientations and between these groups and others attached to agricul-
ture which have different economic interests. Means to these goals can be many. The 
challenge for the next decade is to specify such a list of means o then put the most 
promising ones to trial. The means need not become institutionalized and inflexible o 
but should be considered replaceable,, depending on the extent to which they (a) annu-
ally take us towards or away from agreeable goals for agriculture or longer-run national 
purposes or (b) need to be shifted in line with changing urgency attached to different . 
goals. 
This is the immediate task .. Less concentration momentarily needs to be given 
broader national goals and purposes. But the latter should not be ignored. Again it 
is possible to specify such broad national goals or purposes upon which there is gen-
eral agreement o particularly if we place their "complete attainment" sufficiently far in 
the future and concern ourselves only lightly with the optimum proportioning or mix 
of them. The list is rather common place, but appropriate for mention at a conference 
such as this. It includes: (1) Progress in the availability of goods and services or 
real income o {2) Equity in the sharing of this progress o especially among those who 
contribute to it, (3) Security and stability of national economic enterprise, not in the 
sense of absence of progress but in minimization of fluctuations in output, employment 
and income o (4) Opportunity for upcoming generations consistent with progress and 
individual abilities o (5) Maintenance of an internally and democratically selected 
social system and protection of it from competing external systems and (6) Freedom 
of choice in the degree consistent with progress, equity, stability, general oppor-
tunity and social system. 
These more generalized societal goals have wide acceptance by the diverse 
publics of our society. They serve as relevant criteria for agricultural or other econom-
ic policy. But they are perhaps too broad and general for the immediate farm policy 
problems at hand, such as surpluses and excess capacity. They do, however, provide 
targets extending beyond the next decade and should be kept in mirid accordingly. 
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Chapter 2 
The Contemporary Farm Problem 
J. Carroll Bottum 
Purdue University 
We are 11 ving in a rapid! y changing world o a changing national economy, 
and a changing agriculture. No part of society has escaped it. Improved technology 
has been the major driving force behind these changes. The agricultural problem is 
so closely interwoven into the framework of our national economy that our overall 
setting must be recognized and considered in the beginning. 
Since the tum of the century o we have more than tripled per capita real in-
come in the United States. At the same timeo working hours have declined one-third. 
The significant feature of the present period is not that we have had economic 
growth and progress but rather the nature and the rate at which it is now taking place. 
Growth and progress o however, do not come without their costs. Many painful ad-
justments are necessary. We used to assume when progress came more slowly that 
these adjustments WOUld take Care Of themselves 0 but Since the rate Of progreSS has 
been speeded up o they have not, particularly in agriculture. . 
Agriculture has been in the forefront in this march of progress. It deserves 
much credit for this higher standard of living we all enjoy. If it took 70 percent of 
our people to produce our food as it did in the early days of this country, or as in 
India today a we would not have many people free to produce automobiles o television 
sets o and air conditioning. 
It is my judgment that our society and agriculture will continue to insist on 
high rates of progress for three reasons: 
(1) Because our people like the fruits of progress. 
{2) We are engaged in a struggle to prove that our system has more to give 
to man than that system espoused by the Soviet Union--both from the standpoint of 
physical output and from the standpoint of the dignity of man. 
{3) Because of the universal urge within man to find an easier and a better 
way to do things. 
If this assumption is valid o then we must recognize that new knowledge knows 
no boundaries, either industrially or geographically, and that the direction our edu-
cational efforts and the direction our farm programs should take is one of helping agri-
culture to adjust to this progress. And agriculture has been adjusting at a tremendous 
rate but not fast enough to avoid low incomes. Agriculture has not fully shared in the 
fruits of the progress in agriculture. 
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THE PROBLEM 
There are two types of income problems in agriculture: (1) the income problem 
of the small farmer who lacks resources and who has such limited output that an im-
provement in prices has little effect on his income; and (2) the commercial family 
farmer whose income problem is largely one of price relationships. The two problems 
are interrelated, but solving the small farmer's inadequate resource problem would 
not solve the commercial family farmer's problemu nor would solving the price problem 
of the commercial family farmer solve the small farmer's problem. 
Today I shall deal largely with the price and income problem of the commercial 
family farmer, even though the plight of both has largely resulted from technical prog-
ress. 
During the past decade, agricultural output has increased at .the rate of 
approximately 2. 5 percent per year. Because of our growing population and improved 
diets, the domestic demand has increased slightly less than two percent per year. 
Neither has the increase in foreign exports nor the new industrial uses for farm products 
grown sufficiently to take up this gap. This leaves us at the beginning of the decade 
of the '60s with an agricultural plc;mt geared to produce from four to nine percent more 
farm products than the present market will take at acceptable prices as expressed by 
Congress on numerous occasions. I use the range of four to nine percent because 
this covers the results of most all studies. And the amount of the surplus depends to 
some degree on the level of prices and the volume of exports assumed. 
The real problem of agriculture is not the $9 billion worth of agricultural prod-
ucts in storage although this aggravates the situation 1 but rather that we have a plant 
geared to produce four to nine percent too much with reasonable prices. 
Two events occurred in United States agriculture in recent years which have 
been largely responsible for bringing about this problem. 
Near the close of World War I the rate of gain in agricultural output per farm 
worker began to exceed the rate of gain in population, making possible for the first 
time an absolute decline in the number of farm workers. The rate of gain in agricul-
tural output per worker relative to the growth in the population has continued since 
that time at an accelerated rate during the 1950s. It continues to result in surplus 
human resources in agriculture despite the rapid flow of human resources out of 
agriculture. 
At the beginning of the 1950so the rate of increase in yields of crops per acre 
began to exceed the rate of increase in the population. During the decade of the '50so 
yields of all crops per acre increased one-third o while demand for food to. feed our 
growing population increased about one-fifth. It takes less acres to feed the popula-
tion today than in 1950, therefore we now have a second resource 1 cropland o in 
surplus. 
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This situation holds true for each of these resources when improvement in 
levels of diets is added to the growth in population. This means that now unless new 
outlets are found for farm products, the optimum combination of resources at any rea-
sonable level of prices involves both less human resources and less cultivated land 
than are now committed to agricultural production. 
Because these resources have not moved out of production, the output of 
agriculture has tended to outrun demand for farm products at prices socially accept-
able. Because the demand for total agricultural production is very inelastic, farmers 
are penalized severely when supplies exceed a level which reasonably meets re-
quirements. This tendency for agriculture to overproduce since the 1920s o except for 
the war and postwar periods o is the heart of the agricultural price and income problem. 
With present expected trends in the adoption of new technology o this situa-
tion appears likely to extend through the '60s unless through our education or action 
programs o we modify this situation. 
This substitutability of resources in agriculture is sufficiently great that the 
reduction of output of one commodity or even several commodities results in the re-
sources being transferred to the production of the nonlimited commodities. Thus the 
farm income and price problem is an aggregate problem. Attempting to solve it on a 
partial basis simply results in it being transferred from one group to another group of 
commodities. 
POSSIBLE APPROACHES 
There are three possible approaches that might be taken to aid in solving 
the farm problem: (1) Expand the outlets for farm products o {2) storage and payments 
to farmers to relieve the income situationo and (3) adjust the output. 
Nearly everyone would like to solve the farm problem by expanding foreign 
outlets o using more farm products in industry n and by expanding the food consumption 
at home. If this could be doneo then agriculture would not have to adjust its outputo 
and we could continue full production with reasonable prices. However o while nearly 
all analysts of the farm problem believe we should continue to work vigorously for 
the expansion of the market for farm products both at home and abroad o they see expan-
sion of the market as only a partial solution of the farm problem in the immediate period 
ahead. In the longer runo these possibilities may become more important. 
By putting commodities into storage o and by making payments to farmers for 
shifting productiono or for other purposes associated with productionu we may ease 
the current income situation of farmers. However o unless these payments are made 
in a manner which brings about adjustments in supplyo they simply relieve the income 
situation for the moment and continue the maladjustment problem. In fact they tendo 
if too large operations are undertakeno to increase the imbalance problem. This is 
what we have been doing, and the .imbalance in agriculture has continued to increase o 
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even though many necessary adjustments have taken place. I mention this alternative 
because it is the one that we have followed u and we may continue to follow this to a 
degree. 
The third possibility is one of attempting to adjust supply and the resources in 
agriculture while maintaining the current income situation. This is where the greatest 
interest in farm programs is now centered. 
Here four approaches may be taken or some combination of them: (1) The use of 
quotas or supply management control on all commodities u (2) allow free prices to oper-
ate u ( 3) compulsory or mandatory land retirement u and ( 4) voluntary land retirement or 
land retirement where payments are made for the retirement of land and the choice of 
participating is left to the individual farmer. The limitation on capital inputs has been 
also proposed, but no serious program has been developed along these lines because 
of the difficulty and implications of limiting the various capital input items. 
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If any of the above four approaches are used for adjusting supply a they result 
in reducing both the manpower and the cultivated land used in agricultural production. 
If quotas are imposed on part of the commodities o then the surplus resources are 
transferred to other commodities and necessitate quotas on these commodities. If 
commodity quotas are imposed on all commodities and production is reduced, this 
means less human resources and less land used in crop production. If free prices are 
allowed to operate u then agricultural prices will fall to the point where the marginal 
land and the marginal producer will be forced to shift out of agriculture and it will re-
duce the use of these resources. If compulsory or mandatory cropland controls are 
usedu it means less land will be under cultivation and it means less human resources 
will be needed. Even if the land is taken out on each farr.1, it will speed up the re-
combination of farms, and the reduction of both of these resources. If voluntary land 
retirement is used either on a partial or whole farm basis, it u too u will reduce the 
land under cultivation and the amount of human resources needed in agriculture. I 
want to point out that any of the supply adjustment programs seriously proposed rlo not 
escape the reduction of land and human resources. The problem0therefore, is how to 
most sensibly bring about a reduction of these resources. 
Therefore 1 we need to give attention to programs which assist farm youth and 
farm labor to shift to other occupations with the least pain because it is the farm youth 
and the younger farmers who will make this adjustment. In most cases 1 those who 
have reached middle age will continue to find their best opportunities in agriculture. 
We need to develop programs which most sensibly shift some of our surplus 
cultivated land from crop production into other uses such as timber productionu pulp-
wood production u parks and recreational uses u grass, and conservation and watershed 
development. In appraising these shifts in land use u we must consider the short run social 
impacts and also the longer run interests of the community and the nation. 
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The United States has a total land area of approximately 1, 904 million acres. 
Of this 450 million acres are in plow land. Approximately 965 million acres are in 
permanent hay and pasture. The remaining acreage is. in non-pasture forest land, 
waste and non agricultural uses. Our present agricultural needs could be met with 
something like 60 million acres of the 450 million acres in plow land shifted to other 
uses. This indicates the magnitude of the adjustment needed in land use. Of course, 
how many acres would need to be shifted out would depend on the type of program 
adopted. 
As I look ahead to the decade of the '60s, I see the likelihood of the following 
changes in agricultural resources regardless of the type of farm program: 
(1) Cultivated land will continue to move out of crop production, perhaps. to 
the extent of 40 to 80 million acres. 
(2) Labor will continue to flow out of production into other occupations, 
perhaps at the rate of three-fourths or more of the youth. 
(3) Capital used will increase. 
(4) Capital inputs purchased outside of agriculture will increase. 
(5) The management level will increase. 
These are adjustments that technology is necessitating but which have not 
been taking place as rapidly as they should to avoid an income penalty for agriculture. 
Our problem is to develop programs which speed up these adjustments but which do 
not hold them in status quo. 
SUMMARY 
Technological advances in agriculture have created agricultural surpluses 
because of the failure of the human and land resources to adjust rapidly enough to 
offset the supply increasing effects of these advances. The government has spent 
vast sums for programs to protect farm incomes from the effects of these excessive 
supplies. It appears likely such programs will be continued. If they are, they 
should be directed toward the twin goals of not only protecting farm incomes but also 
bringing about the land and human resource adjustments that are necessary to bring 
the size of the agricultural plant into better equilibrium with the agricultural needs 
of society. 
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Chapter 3 
Basic Commodities Other than Com: A Situation Paper 
J. Murray Thompson, CSS, USDA 
Oris V. Wells, AMS, USDA 
This paper outlines the current price support program with respect to the 
basic commodities other than com. These are the commodities which are currently 
covered by the marketing quota-acreage allotment-mandatory price support pro-
visions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as variously revised and amended 
through the last session of Congress. 
For wheat and upland cotton, this statement includes material on the 
following items: 
1. The current legislation with respect to the levels of price support, 
acreage allotments and marketing quotas , 
2. Price support operations during the fiscal year 1959-60, 
3. The 1960-61 situation with respect to production, supplies, and 
utilization, and a projection of what the situation may be in the immediate years 
ahead, assuming no legislative changes, and 
4. Some discussion or comments on the impact of the program on producers, 
consumers, and the foreign market. 
Considerably more material is included for wheat and cotton than for the 
other commodities--rice, peanuts, and tobacco. This was done because these two 
commodities, along with com, represent so large a proportion of price support 
activities. Some notes on price support levels and marketing quota-acreage allot-
ment arrangements for rice, peanuts, extra long staple cotton, and tobacco are 
included. There is a table for each commodity giving historical detail with respect 
to production, disappearance, price support activities, prices, support levels, and 
related data as well as a summary table showing the realized costs primarily for 
stabilizing farm prices and income during each of the past two fiscal years. 
We hope that this material will provide the appropriate background informa-
tion for the committee discussions at this conference. No attempt has been made, 
nor is any implied, as to what might or might not be desirable program changes. 
Our task, as we understand it, is to simply outline for the commodities covered, 
as accurately and briefly as possible, the current commodity situation and the exist-
ing price support program. 
We are especially indebted to Messrs. Roland 0. Stelzer of the Price 
Division of the Commodity Stabilization Service and Robert E. Post and Frank 
Lowenstein of the Agricultural Economics Division of the Agricultural Marketing 
Service, for helping select and arrange this material. 
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WHEAT 
Price support 
Under current legislation, the support price level is required to be between 
75 and 90 percent of parity, depending upon the relation of total supply to normal 
supply. With supplies being well in excess of normal, the 1960 support level of 
$1. 78 per bushel represents the minimum permitted. The minimum announced level 
for 1961 is also $1.78 per bushel, and also reflects 75 percent of parity (as of the 
date it was announced) • 
Marketing quotas and acreage allotments 
Legislation provides that the acreage allotment cannot be less than 55 million 
acres and marketing quotas are not applicable to producers having 15 acres or less 
of wheat. Compliance is primarily determined on a harvested basis. As a result of 
these provisions 1 production in recent years has exceeded requirement~, and year 
end stocks have increased. 
For acreage allotment purposes the normal supply for 1961 (previous 10-year 
domestic consumption and exports adjusted for trends, plus 30 percent) was computed 
to be 1,347 million bushels. This was below the estimated July 11 1961, carryover 
plus estimated imports and therefore, in the absence of the minimum acreage pro-
vision the 1961 allotment would have been zero. 
When the 55 million acre provision was first adopted, yields of wheat were 
around ll to 12 bushels per seeded acre. On this basis it could be anticipated that 
the minimum allotment would produce about 600 to 650 million bushels, well below 
anticipated domestic and export requirements. The 1958-60 yields however, averaged 
23. 2 bushels per seeded acre (24. 8 bushels per harvested acre) or about double 
earlier yields. 
In addition, there has been a material increase in the number of farms pro-
ducing 15 acres of less of wheat which are exempt from the marketing quota penalty. 
Producers who exceed their allotment or 15 acres, whichever is larger, are subject 
to a penalty on the excess production equal to 45 percent of May 1 parity price 
($1. 08 per bushel for the 1960 crop). In 1959 there were over a million farms that had 
allotments ranging from 0.1 to 15 acres •. In addition 1 there were 201 thousand farms 
classed as wheat farms which had a zero allotment. The total farms classed as 
wheat farms in 1959 was 1. 8 million. Of the 702 thousand farms which exceeded their 
wheat allotment, nearly 99 percent had allotments of 15 acres or less. These small 
farms not complying with their acreage allotments had approximately 4. 5 million acres 
in excess of their allotments. The excess acreage on noncomplying farms with 
allotments in excess of 15 acres amounted to approximately 450 thousand acres. These 
overruns mean that harvested wheat acreage in recent years could have run close to 58 
million acres (considering underplantings) had it not been for the soil bank program. 
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Under the 1960 conservation reserve programu about 3 million acres of wheat 
were diverted. Under the acreage reserve program 1 about 5. 6 million acres were 
diverted in 1956, 12.8 p1illion acres in 1957 8 and 5.3 million acres in 1958. 
Supplies and utilization 
The total U. S. wheat supply for the marketing year which began July 1 u 1960 u 
is estimated at 2 u 690 million bushels u ll percent above the previous record a year 
ago. This gain results primarily from the 240 million-bushel increase in production. 
Analysis of supply and distribution by classes shows a further substantial 
increase in the prospective carryover of hard red winter wheat next July 1 when such 
stocks will constitute about 80 percent of the total carryover of over 1 billion 500 
million bushels now in prospect. Some increases may be expected on hard red 
spring and durum stocks but little change in stocks of soft red winter. Because of 
very heavy exports from the Pacific Northwest expected in 1960-61, stocks of white 
wheat may be down by around 35 million bushels by July 1, 1961. 
From time to time it has been suggested that acreage reduction be handled 
separately by classes of wheat. Actually however, there has never been any acreage 
allotment differences by classes except for the relaxation of controls in some recent 
shortage years on durum wheat. 
Exports in 1960-61 are now estimated at 550 million bushels, compared with 
the 512 million exported in 1959-60. This would equal the all-time record reached in 
1956-57. An increase is expected in sales to the traditional dollar markets of Western 
Europe. 
Domestic disappearance is expected to total about 610 million bushels, slightly 
above 1959-60. On the basis of these figures a carryover on July lu 196lu of about 
1. 5 billion bushels is in prospecto an increase of more than 200 million bushels over 
this year. 
With the minimum allotment in effect for 1961, it is estimated that about 
53 million acres may be harvested (some acreage in the conservation reserve. Should 
the 1956-60 average yield of 23.3 bushels be obtained, a crop of about 1,235 million 
bushels would be produced. 
A crop of 1 u 235 million bushels would be about 10 percent below the 1, 368 
million indicated for this year but 13 percent above the 1950-59 average of 18 095 
million. Domestic disappearance will undoubtedly continue at about 610 million 
bushels. Exports might be down from the 550 million bushels estimated for this year 1 
assuming normal growing conditions in Europe. If exports are assumed to be 525 
million bushels 1 an increase in the carryover July 1 u 1962, of about 100 million bushels 
is indicated. 
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As we look beyond 1961 0 if legislation is not changedo production could well 
continue to exceed domestic requirements and probable exports, always of course o 
barring the recurrence of widespread drought over the Great Plains. This would mean 
further increase in wheat carryovers. Yields in recent years have increased 1 and with 
wider acceptance of improved technology yields will likely continue an upward trend. 
Export programs 
The current export level for wheat is in large part the result of government 
programs, particularly those under P.L. 480. For the 1960 fiscal year, 73 percent 
of all wheat exports (including flour 1 grain equivalent) exports were made under 
government export programs. Sales for foreign currency under Title I of P. L. 480 
during fiscal year 1960 amounted to 301 million bushels. Title II and Title III under 
P. L. 480 exports for emergency relief and donations, and under other foreign assist-
ance programs amounted to 48 million bushels. An additional 25 million bushels was 
exported under barter (Title III) programs. The remaining sales, or 138 million bushels, 
were for dollars , most of which were under the International Wheat Agreement. 
The total payments and allowances under the IWA for the 1960 fiscal year 
totaled $65. 3 million on the exportation of 104 million bushels of wheat and flour, 
at an average export payment cost of $0.63 per bushel. In addition, export payments 
totaling $11 million were made .from section 32 funds on about 19 million bushels of 
wheat or wheat equivalent exported to agreement countries on sales registered during 
the interim period before the new agreement was approved by the Congress. The cur-
rent International Wheat Agreement was ratified by the United States in the form of a 
treaty on July 16, 1959, and continues in effect to July 31, 1962. 
CCC stocks 
Practically all of the July 1, 1960 1 carryover stocks were in Commodity Credit 
Corporation inventory, under loan in the process of being taken over 1 under reseal, or 
stored by farmers to avoid payment of penalty for overplanting acreage allotments. 
The sum of these quantities represented all but about 23 million bushels of the total 
carryover stocks on July 1, 1960, of old crop wheat. 
The Corporation inventory of 1,195 million bushels represents an investment 
of slightly more than $3 billion and was about 42 percent of CCC •s total inventory 
investment for all commodities on June 30, 1960. Estimates indicate that, after allow-
ing for carrying charges 1 donations, export payment 1 including payment-in-kind, etc. 1 
the net recovery to the U.S. Government will run only about one-half of this current 
CCC investment. 
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CCC operations 
With respect to CCC 's operations 1 a total of nearly 318 million bushels or 
28 percent of the 1959 crop was placed under price support compared to 610 million 
bushels or almost 42 percent of the 1958 crop. 
Through September 30 o 1960 o farmers placed 324 million bushels of the 1960 
crop under price support. This compares with 235 million bushels of the 1959 crop 
and 382 million bushels of the record 1958 crop placed under price support for the 
same period. 
During the fiscal year 1960 o CCC incurred a net loss of $110 million in dis-
posing of about 145 million bushels of wheat 8 and over 1. 5 billion pounds of flour. 
This $ll0 million does not include the costs of the export payment program for which 
the CCC is reimbursed. {See tables 3. 20 and 3. 21). 
The direct acquisition and handling of wheat by CCC have been materially 
reduced due to the now current policy of requiring exporters to obtain the bulk of 
their supplies from the commercial market rather than acquiring such supplies from 
CCC at reduced prices. During 1954-55 and 1955-56 0 prior to the inception of the 
payment-in-kind programo about 80 percent of all exports were made out of CCC 
stocks. For the 1959-60 yearu only 30 percent of all exports were out of CCC stocks. 
·On this analysis 8 CCC 's acquisitions and dispositions during 1959-60 were reduced 
by about 25 0 million bushels as a result of the program which requires commercial 
exporters to obtain the bulk of their supplies from the market. 
Impact on producers 
U.S. wheat prices have been substantially higher under the price support 
program than would otherwise have been the case. In 17 years out of the 22 years 
since 1938 0 prices to growers have averaged fractionally over a cent a bushel above 
the effective support. In the other 5 years {1943-47), prices were well above support 
levels influenced by exceptionally heavy feeding of wheat and industrial use of wheat 
{subsidized for both uses) and by heavy exports as a result of World War II. 
In return for the higher prices o producers have had o with the exception of the 
war and immediate post war years o to accept acreage limitations which meant that 
they have had to look for other uses of their excess wheat land. The 53 million acres 
of wheat harvested in 1960 compares with an average of over 7 4 million acres for the 
three record years o 1947-1949. 
As wheat {and in the Southern Great Plains 1 cotton) acreage has come down, 
other acreages have gone up, especially acreage of sorghum for grain and of barley. 
Grain sorghum averaged close to 16 million acres over the last three years as compared 
with an average of about 6. 5 million acres for the years 1947-49. The harvested 
acreage of barley increased from less than 11 million acres in 1947-49 to an average 
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of 14. 6 million acres over the last three years. This in turn has meant more feed, 
probably an additional 450 million bushels annually or a total of 1. 3 billion bushelg 
of sorghums and barley over the last three years, 1958-60. 
Impact on consumers 
The price impact on domestic consumers has been small. With the domestic 
price of wheat averaging about 60 cents above the competitive world export level as 
evidenced by the average rate of wheat export payments in recent years the price of 
bread should not have risen much more than one cent because of the programs. This 
is on the basis that a price rise of one cent per pound loaf of bread is associated with 
an increase in the price of wheat of 60 cents per bushel. 
Per capita consumption of wheat for food has steadily declined, but the in-
crease in population has resulted in maintaining the annual quantity used for food 
at slightly less than 500 million bushels during the past 25 years. 
The quantity of wheat used for feed has been relatively small during the past 
several years and probably will average around 50 million bushels so long as the 
price received by farmers for wheat is in excess of its relative feed value compared 
to prices of corn and other feed grains. 
Impact on the foreign market 
This is an area of some controversy. But it appears to us that the price 
support, or storage and acreage control activities for wheat prior to P. L. 480, had 
the general effect of strengthening wheat prices in the foreign market and that the 
P.L. 480 programs have also in fact not changed this situation. 
UPLAND COTTON 
Price support 
Under current legislation, if growers have not disapproved marketing quotas, 
price support must be made available to cooperators at one price not more than 90 
percent of parity nor less than 70 percent of parity for 1961, and 90 to 65 percent of 
parity for 1962 and subsequent years, as deemed appropriate in consideration of the 
eight factors specified in section 40l(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended. 1 
1 Section 40l(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, provides that the 
Secretary in setting price support levels for agricultural commodities, unless there are 
other rules specifically provided, shall take into consideration: (l) the supply of the 
commodity in relation to the demand therefor, (2) the price levels at which other commod-
ities are being supported and, in the case of feed grains, the feed values of such grains 
in relation t0 corn, (3) the availability of funds, (4) the perishability of the commodity, 
(5) the importance of the commodity to agriculture and the national economy, (6) the 
ability to dispose of stocks acquired through a price-support operation, (7) the need for 
offsetting temporary losses of export markets, and (8) the ability and willingness of 
producers to keep supplies in line with demand. 
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For 1960 support for producers electing Choice A regular allotment was announced 
at 75 percent of parity (28. 97 cents per pound) the minimum for 1960 under the 
legislation, and for producers electing Choice B support was established at 60 
percent of parity (23 .18 cents per pound). 
Another important downward change with respect to the level of price support 
which will become effective with the 1961 crop is that the national average support 
level for upland cotton will no longer be based on Middling 7 /8-inch cotton o but 
will be based on average quality (which is some better than Middling 7/8 inch). 
Marketing quotas and acreage allotments 
Acreage allotments and mark:eting quotas are required to be proclaimed for 
the next succeeding year whenever the total supply exceeds the normal supply during 
the current year (domestic consumption, plus exports o plus 30 percent allowance 
for carryover) . 
The national marketing quota is the larger of (a) the number of bales of 
cotton needed together with the estimated carryover and imports required to make 
available the normal supply of cotton, or (b) the number of bales of cotton required 
to provide a national acreage allotment of 16 million acres. Under (b) the national 
marketing quota for the 1960 crop of upland cotton was determined to be 13,133,000 
bales (500 pounds gross weight). The Agricultural Act of 1958 provides for increas-
ing the allotment each year by as much as 310 thousand acres as needed to establish 
minimum farm allotments. 
Provision is made under section 344(f) (1) to maintain the acreage allottec;i to 
farms with small allotments by providing that insofar as acreage is available such _ 
small farms are to be allotted the smaller of 10 acres or the allotment established 
for the farm in 19 58. 
For 1960 (and 1959) producers had a choice of either planting within their 
regular allotment (Choice -PJ or choosing to plant not in excess of 140 percent of such 
regular allotment (Choice B) and accept a lower support level. Under this provisionu 
62 o lll farms elected the Choice B program for their 1960 upland cotton crop. Allot-
ments for these farms were thereby increased by 18 217 o 880 acres. The total acreage 
available for all farm allotments for upland cotton for the 1960 crop w~s slightly more 
than 17.5 million acres compared to 17.3 million acres in 1959. 
These choices are not available for 1961. However u it has been announced 
that the 1961 allotment for upland cotton would be 18 o 398 o 424 acres. Producers who 
exceed their allotment are subject to a marketing quota penalty on the excess pro-
duction equal to 50 percent of the June 15 parity price (19. 4 cents per pound for 1960). 
As in the case of other basic crops, acreage allotments and marketing quotas 
may be increased or terminated by the Secretary in order to meet a national emergency o 
to make a normal supply available free of marketing restrictions or to meet a material 
increase in export demand. 
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Under the 1960 conservation reserve program, 660 thousand acres of the 
1960 allotment were diverted, representing a reduction of about 491 thousand bales. 
Under the acreage reserve program, 1.1 million acres were diverted in 19 56 6 3. 0 
million acres in 1957, and 4. 9 million acres in 1958. 
Supplies, utilization, and exports 
Disappearance of cotton in the United States during the current marketing 
year (August 1, 1960 u to July 31, 1961) probably will be around 14-3/4 million bales. 
This compares with about 16.1 million bales of upland cotton in 1959-60 but is the 
third largest disappearance since 1928. 
Domestic mill consumption in 1960-61 is expected to decline about one-half 
million bales from that of 1959-60. The decline in domestic mill consumption is 
indicated by relatively large stocks of broad woven goods in relation to unfilled 
orders 1 lower fabric prices 1 and a sharp increase in cotton textile imports in recent 
months. 
Although exports will be relatively large at about 6 1/4 million balesu they 
are still about a million bales smaller than the extraordinari.Ly large exports of a 
year earlier. Consumption of cotton abroad is expected to remain at a high level, 
and the United States financial aid for cotton exports is also at a high level. 
United States export prices are fully competitive with prices for foreign grown 
cotton. 
The carryover of upland cotton on August 1 u 19 60, of about 7 o 4 million 
bales was down almost 50 percent from the peak carryover of approximately 14.4 
million bales on August 1, 1956. A further small decline may occur during the 
current season with disappearance slightly larger than estimated production. 
It is difficult to make any very specific projections for cotton for 1961-62 
or further ahead. However 6 the current cotton situation is in better balance than 
has been the case for some time, and it appears that per capita consumption of 
cotton in the United States probably will hold for some time at about the same level 
as now--about 24 pounds per person. This would mean a gradually increasing total 
consumption because of population growth. By 1965 domestic consumption of cotton 
should be close to 10 million bales if the above assumption proves correct. 
Meanwhile, recent experience indicates that with competitive export pricing, 
United States cotton can continue to compete with foreign-grown cotton and manmade 
fibers produced abroad. Under such conditions, consumption of cotton abroad would 
probably increase faster than production and United States exports would increase. 
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CCC activities 
On August 1, 1960, CCC had in inventory 5 million bales of upland cotton at 
a cost value of $879 million. This represented approximately two-thirds of the total 
carryover of cotton. 
During the 1960 fiscal year CCC handled large quantities of cotton due to 
the requirement that CCC purchase all cotton produced by Choice A producers. Total 
acquisitions (purchase and loan) during the 1960 fiscal year amounted to about 14. 6 
million bales (includes about 6 million bales of 1958 loan cotton taken over an August 1, 
1959, and 8.6 million bales of Choice A cotton purchased from the 1959 crop). Dis-
positions were 10.7 million bales over this same period. 
Legislation (P. L. 85-835) provided that CCC could not sell any cotton for 
unrestricted use at less than llO percent of support price applicable to the loan pro-
gram for the period August 1, 1959, through July 31 0 1961. Under this provision, 
CCC announced that for the 1960-61 marketing year sales of 1959 and prior years' 
cotton owned by CCC would be sold at the higher of (a) the market price o or (b) ll5 
percent of the Choice B loan rate plus carrying charges and that sales of the 1960 
crop cotton acquired would be made at not less than the higher of (a) the market price o 
or (b) llO percent of the Choice B loan rate plus carrying charges. The carrying charges 
are 10 points in October and 20 points additional for each month thereafter. 
Under the 1960-61 export payment program, exporters of upland cotton earn 
a payment of six cents per pound on all exports of all cotton except that exported 
under barter and donation programs. Such payments are made "in kind" out of CCC 
stocks. Equalization payments made on products exported are in cash. 
During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1960, CCC incurred a realized loss 
of $2ll million in disposing of the 10. 7 million bales and a reserve of $107. 8 million 
is Garried in the CCC banks against estimated future losses on the 5 million bales 
in inventory as of July 1, 1960. 
As in the case of wheat and other commodities, the losses referred to above 
represent only realized costs or losses to CCC and do not reflect other costs which 
are associated with the various disposal programs. Details with respect to these 
costs are shown in tables 2 0 and 21. 
The A and B choice programs end with this year's crop. As the legislation 
now stands. there will be a single support applicable to all cooperating producers in 
1961, assuming the program is approved in the producer referendum scheduled for 
December 13, 1960. This, together with the continuation of the payment-in-kind 
export subsidy, should mean that a minimum amount of cotton will move through the 
Corporation under the new program. 
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Impact an producers 
The cotton price support program has tended to maintain prices to producers 
above the support level. At the same time, it has created stocks which kept prices 
from rising when supply and demand conditions were favorable. Also, high support 
levels have in the past tended to reduce disappearance and in the case of foreign 
producers, to encourage increased acreage and production. In recent years the 
cotton industry, realizing the effect of continued high prices on the demand for cot-
ton, have supported legislation which meant lower prices, including the use of 
payments sufficient to assure that American cotton is competitively priced in the 
foreign market. 
Cotton harvested acreage has dropped from an average of about 24 million 
acres during 1947-49 to 15.5 million acres in 1960. The acreage taken out of cotton 
has generally gone into production of other crops such as grain sorghums o soybeans, 
hay and pasture. Some acreage has gone into the conservation reserve. 
Impact on consumers 
The cotton program has of course tended to increase prices of cotton goods 
to domestic consumers. However, these increases have been relatively small as 
the farm price value of cotton represents only about 15 cents of the average dollar 
spent by consumers for cotton clothing and household goods at retail. 
A more important question has had to do with the effect of the cotton support 
program in encouraging the increased use of synthetics. Certainly price is one of 
the factors in this area. But, as the National Cotton Council has so often indicated, 
the competitive position of cotton is by no means a matter of price alone. Synthetics 
have built their place in our market through research, promotion and prices geared 
to volume production. Cotton is now also looking to research and promotion both 
here and abroad. 
Impact on the export market 
The relatively large exports of cotton since the 1956-57 season have been 
associated in large part with U.S. financing arrangements and export payment pro-
grams. The financed programs include programs of the Mutual Security Act 1 Public 
Law 480, Title I, and Export-Import Bank loans. These three programs have covered 
exports of 1.4 to 2.1 million bales a year. The Mutual Security Act programs have 
tended to decline in recent years but exports under P. L. 480, Title I, have increased. 
(See table 3. 7.) 
As indicated earlier 1 developments into and through the 1958-59 season, 
when our cotton exports were about 2. 8 million bales 1 clearly showed that competi-
tive export pricing was essential if American cotton were to maintain itself in world 
trade. 
29 
For the period 1951-55, U.S. cotton exports declined even though world trade 
in cotton expanded. During this period surplus U.S. cotton production resulted in 
the carryover of cotton increasing from 2. 2 million bales on August 1, 1951, to a 
record high of 14. 4 million bales on August 1 n 1956. At the same time foreign pro-
duction expanded from about 21 million bales during the early fifties to nearly 32 
million bales in 1959. (See table 3.8o) 
RICE 
Current legislation provides that if growers have not disapproved marketing 
quotas the support price for rice is determined at the discretion of the Secretary 
after consideration of the eight factors specified under section 40l(b) of the Agri-
cultural Act of 1949, as amended. Howevero the support level cannot be in excess 
of 90 percent of parity o nor less than 7 5 percent of parity for the 1959 and 1960 crops, 
70 percent of parity for the 1961 crop, and 65 percent of parity for the 1962 and sub-
sequent crops. The support price for 1960 was set at 75 percent of parity ($4. 42 per 
cwt.). 
The 1960 rice acreage allotment of 1, 653 thousand acres is the minimum 
acreage that can be proclaimed under current legislation. Without this provision 
the 1960 computed allotment would have been 1, 381 thousand acres. Beginning with 
the 1961 crop, acreage allotments and marketing quotas are required to be proclaimed 
for the next succeeding year whenever the total supply exceeds the normal supply 
(P. L. 86-408) 0 For 1960 and earlier years such proclamation was required only when 
the total supply was more than 10 percent in excess of normal. The national allot-
ment is allotted to producers on the basis of producer's history or farm history. 
Farm history is used only when recommended by state committees and approved by 
the Secretary. This is the only instance in which current legislation provides for 
this type of personal or producer history allotment. 
Data with respect to supplies o disappearance, and CCC activities are shown 
in the attached tables. 
PEANUTS 
Price support for peanuts, when marketing quotas have not been disapproved o 
is mandatory within the range of 90 to 75 percent of effective parity, the minimum 
depending upon the relationship of total supply to normal supply. When quotas have 
been disapproved by farmerso support to cooperators is 50 percent of parity. For 
the 1960 crop, the relationship of total to normal supply required support at not less 
than 78 percent of parity (10. 062 cents a pound). In 1959 o the support level was 75 
percent of parityo and in 1958, 81 percent. 
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Under current legislation o marketing quotas and acreage allotments for 
peanuts must be proclaimed each year regardless of the supply situation. The quota 
to be proclaimed is equal to the average number of tons of peanuts harvested for 
nuts during the preceding 5 years o adjusted for current trends and prospective de-
mand. However o the quota must be sufficient to provide a national acreage allotment 
of at least 1 o 610 thousand acres. The Secretary has authority to increase the allot-
ment for any type or types of peanuts o if the marketing quota and acreage allotment 
determined under the formula is likely to result in a supply insufficient to meet the 
estimated demand for cleaning and shelling purposes at prices at which CCC may sell 
its stocks of such peanuts for such purposes. Any increase is apportioned among 
the States producing the designated type or types of peanuts. This authority has been 
used to make small increases above the established minimum allotments of some 
types every year since 1951 0 with the exception of 1954. 
For 1961 a national allotment of 1 o 610 o 000 acres has been announced o re-
flecting a quota of 970 o 000 tons. In the absence of the minimum acreage provision 
the quota would have been 720 o 000 tons o and the resulting acreage allotment would 
have been 1 o 195 o 000 acres. Neither acreage allotments nor marketing quotas apply 
to peanuts produced on any farm which harvests one acre or less of nuts, provided 
the producers who share in the peanuts produced on such farm do not share in pea-
nuts produced on any other farm. The word "peanuts" applies only to those picked 
and threshed. 
TOBACCO 
The 1960 crop of tobacco o for which marketing quotas have been approved 
(all except Pennsylvania type 41) is being supported at the same dollars-and-cents 
level as for 1959; or, in the case of Maryland tobacco 0 the 1959 support price that 
would have been in effect if growers had not disapproved marketing quotas. This is 
the result of recent legislation to stabilize the support price of tobacco. In recent 
years o the parity prices of tobacco have been increasing more rapidly than for other 
agricultural commodities. For 19 61 and subsequent years o the support price for tobacco 
will be adjusted upward or downward in direct proportion to changes in the parity in-
dex of prices paid by farmers using the previous 3-year moving average. (For example. 
for 1961, the relationship of the index of prices paid for 1958-60 to 1959.) 
Marketing quotas and acreage allotments are required to be proclaimed each 
year for most kinds of tobacco. If approved by growers o marketing quotas are in 
effect for the next three years o and no referendum is held during such a period unless 
there is a material revision in the marketing quota or allotment. 
The size of the national marketing quota and the acrea9e allotment is deter-
mined by what is required to make available a supply equal to the legally defined 
reserve supply level. The reserve supply level is computed as 105 percent of the 
sum of (a) the preceding 10-year average domestic consumption, adjusted for trend, 
plus 175 percent thereof, and (b) the 10-year average exports, adjusted for trend, 
plus 65 percent thereof. The provision for adjusting the 10-year average domestic 
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consumption and exports for trend gives the Secretary considerable leeway in deter-
mining the reserve supply levels. In addition 1 the Secretary has authority to increase 
the quota and the allotment by as much as 20 percent if he determines that such in-
crease is necessary in order to meet market demands or to avoid undue marketing 
restrictions. In recent years the full 20 percent adjustment was used for most kinds 
of tobacco. 
There are no minimum national acreage allotments for tobacco. However o 
there are some limitations such as: In the case of flue-cured o the allotment estab-
lished in any one State cannot be less than 500 acres. In the case of Burley 1 present 
legislation provides that allotments cannot be reduced below the smaller of (a} • 5 of 
an acre, (b) 10 percent of the cropland o or (c) the allotments established in the pre-
ceding year. In 1959 about 86 thousand farms o representing 28 percent of all farms 
with a Burley allotment had an allotment of • 5 acre or less. Thus o any reduction in 
allotments from those in effect would have to be applied to those farms having allot-
ments in excess of . 5 acre. 
Commodity Credit Corporation generally acquires relatively small quantities 
of tobacco o since the loan program is operated through cooperative associations o 
and tobacco placed under loan generally remains in loan status until disposed of. 
On June 30 o 1960 o the quantity under loan amounted to about 667 million pounds 
(dry weight) o valued at $418 million (about 75 percent flue-curedo 13 percent Burleyo 
and 12 percent other). No tobacco was in CCC inventory on July 1 o 1960 o but during 
fiscal 1959-60 ll million pounds of pooled tobacco was dwposed of at a realized 
profit of $638 thousand. For the entire period, October 17, 1933 - June 30 1 1960, 
the total CCC realized loss was $6.2 million. 
During the 1959-60 fiscal year, CCC assisted in disposing of about 30 
million pounds of tobacco under various barter contracts. The cost value of such 
tobacco was $19 million. 
During 1959-60 o 42 million pounds of tobacco representing nine percent of 
total exports were exported under Title I, Public Law 480. From the beginning of 
the Title I program in 1954-55 through June 30 1 1960, agreements have been signed 
with 23 countries and authorizations issued for about 284 million pounds (export 
weight) valued at $206 million. The quantity shipped during this period totaled 
254 million pounds o valued at about $183 million. Peak shipments were made in 
1955-56 when 79 million pounds (14 percent of all exports) were shipped under the 
program, more than half of which went to the United Kingdom. 
LONG STAPLE COTTON 
Price support 
Support of extra long staple cotton is mandatory at not less than 60 percent 
or more than 7 5 percent of parity o if growers have not disapproved marketing quotas. 
The exact level within this range is determined after consideration of factors speci-
fied in section 401 (b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, and of the price 
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levels for similar qualities of cotton produced outside the United States. If quotas 
are disapproved, support is at 50 percent of parity. 
Acreage allotments and marketing quotas 
Acreage allotments and marketing quotas are required to be proclaimed for 
the next succeeding year whenever the current year•s total supply exceeds the nor-
mal supply by more than eight percent. 
The 1960 allotment was 64, 776 acres, computed on the basis of legislation 
which provided that the 1960 quota shall not be less than 90 percent of the 1959 
quota of 73,989 bales. 
The marketing quotas, beginning with the 1961 crop, are required by legis-
lations to be equal to the estimated domestic consumption plus exports, less 
estimated imports, and increased by such quantities as the Secretary deems necessary 
to assure adequate working stocks in trade channels. Such quotas cannot be less 
than the larger of {a) 30 thousand bales, (b) 30 percent of the estimated domestic 
consumption and exports, and {c) 90 percent of the 1959 quota. The announced 1961 
allotment is 63,740 acres. For 1960 and 1961 the quota is 66,590 bales. Producers 
who exceed their allotment are subject to a marketing quota penalty on the excess 
equal to the higher of 50 percent of the June 15 parity price, or 50 percent of the 
support price. {For 1960, 41.2 cents a pound.) 
Supplies and utilization 
The 1960-61 supply of extra long staple cotton is estimated at about 312 
thousand bales, about the same as in 1959-60. Production in 1960, of 67 thousand 
bales, is slightly smaller than 1959 production. Imports for 1960-61 are estimated 
at about 95 thousand bales, the import quota for all cotton 1-1/8 inches or longer. 
Domestic mill consumption during the current season is expected to decline 
slightly from the 124 thousand bales consumed last year, but exports are expected 
to increase slightly. Total disappearance during 1960-61 may be about 128 thousand 
bales, not greatly different from the 1959-60 disappearance. 
CCC activities 
On August 1, 1960, CCC had an inventory of less than 42 thousand bales of 
extra long staple cotton at a cost value of $ll. 9 million. This represents less than a 
third of the total 1960 carryover of this type cotton, but is greater than ccc•s inven-
tory the previous year. On August 1, 1959, CCC owned less than 29 thousand bales of 
long staple at a cost value of $8. 5 million. 
Disposal of CCC inventories of long staple cotton during fiscal 1960 was limited 
to approximately 27 thousand bales sold-domestically for nearly $7 million, plus a 
small quantity donated for domestic use. The realized loss to CCC for fiscal 1960 to-
taled $752 thousand, and since the inception of the program totaled $7.3 million. 
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Chapter 4 
An Analysis of Agricultural Programs 
for Basic Commodities Other than Com* 
Lee R. Martin 
University of Arkansas 
The basic commodities are corn o wheat, cotton, tobacco, rice and peanuts. 
Specialization established by the program architects excused our team from worry 
about corn while the members of our team embraced enthusiastically the suggestion -
again from the architects - that one of us be concerned with wheat and the other 
with cottono tobacco, rice and peanuts. To relieve the suspense, I am the cotton, 
tobacco, rice 0 and peanuts man. 
These commodities have in common two important characteristics, and 
these will permit us to treat them as a groupo for no st purposes. Except for the 
participation of California in cotton and rice production, these four commodities 
are produced largely in the South.! Production of these commodities is labor-
intensiveo although rice is again something of an exception. Table 4.1 shows that 
typical commercial farms in the South use large amounts of labor in the production 
of tobaccoo cotton and peanuts, and no small amount in rice. 
There is no serious question of any of the data presented by Thompson and 
Wells 0 To their estimates of the realized cost of income-motivated programs --
$2,028 million for F o Y. 1959 and $2,053 million for F. Y. 1960 -- I would be inclined 
to add some of the expenditures for conservation. Many of the activities of the 
Soil Conservation Service (SCS) and the Agricultural Stabilization Control (ASC) are 
output-increasing and tmly in a limited way bring about the conservation for the 
future of scarce production resources. These conservation expenditures probably 
amount to something between 250 and 500 million dollars annually. Income effects 
constitute the factor that probably tips the scales in their favor. Again, there is 
no criticism of what I take to be their purpose. I do want to get a rough indication 
of the expenditures more or less directed toward raising farm income. 
Two other programs seem to have the indirect aim of raising incomes of 
individual farmers o even though their effect on aggregate farm income is not as 
certain to be upward. One is the set of credit programs; the other o the programs of 
the Bureau of Reclamation to increase the supply of land. The latter results in a 
net increase in farm land available, the former probably results in a net increase 
in farm capital goods, facilitates land transfers among farmers, and may contribute 
to the exit of farmers from agriculture. Credit programs ran around $50 million a 
year recently. During fiscal years 1958 o 1959 and 1960, Bureau of Reclamation 
expenditures for civil public works averaged about $200 million per year. However, 
not all of these expenditures should be charged against irrigation because power o 
1 For my purposes, the South is Texaso Oklahomao Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, Georgiao Tennessee, Kentucky, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia 
and West Virginia. 
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Table 4 .1. Cropland harvested, acreage of specific crops, and total hours of labor 
used, typical commercial family-operated farms in the South, 1958. 
Type of farm Cropland Acreage of Total 
harvested s,eecified crops labor used 
(acres) (acres) (hours) 
Cotton farms, southern Piedmont 50 Cotton 11.6 3700 
Cotton farms, Black Prairie, Texas 103 Cotton 36.3 3150 
Cotton farms (nonirrigated) , High 
Plains 8 Texas 302 Cotton 110. 0 3200 
Cotton farms (irrigated) o High Plains, Texas 284 Cotton 146.1 6400 
Cotton farms (small) , Delta 33 Cotton 11. 0 2740 
Cotton farms (large scale) , Delta 600 Cotton 197. 0 35710 
Peanut-cotton farms, Southern Coastal Plains 56 Cotton 6.1 3320 
Peanuts 17. 2 
Tobacco-livestock farms 8 Kentucky Bl~egrass 31 Tobacco 3.7 3910 
Tobacco-cotton farms, Coastal Plain, 35 Tobacco 5.1 5700 
North Carolina Cotton 3.6 
Tobacco-cotton farms (large) , Coastal Plain, 62 Tobacco 8.1 8510 
North Carolina Cotton 5.7 
Tobacco farms (small), Coastal Plain, 
North Carolina 18 Tobacco 3.0 3200 
Rice farm (small) , Arkansas 180 Rice 60.0 850 
Rice farm (medium) , Arkansas 540 Rice 180.0 5540 
Rice farm (large), Arkansas 900 Rice 300.0 9240 
Source: .Farm Costs and Returns 4 Commercial Family-Operated Farms, by Type and 
Location, U. S. Dept. of Agri. , Agri. Research Service, Agri. Inf. Bull. 
No.l76,Washington, D.C., Augustl959, pp. 6, 27, 29,31 8 33, 35, 
37, 39, 41, 43, 45, and 47, for data on cotton! tobacco and peanuts; 
Dr. Troy Mullins, cooperative agent of A.R.S., U.S. Dept. of Agricul-
ture, kindly provided estimates for rice farms. 
navigation 8 flood control and urban water supplies were involved to some extent, 
although probably much less than half. Annual expenditures by the Corps of En-
gineers for civil public works averaged slightly more than $200 million, but very 
little should be charged to irrigation. 
Expenditures for farm commodities in connection with foreign aid programs 
are in an ambiguous category. There is a great deal of scope for using farm commodi-
ties to accelerate economic development in underdeveloped countries, especially if 
the formation of human, social and community capital is accorded its proper impor-
tance along with private investment. In the early stages of these aid programs, the 
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motivating factor was probably surplus disposal rather than economic development. 
But the economic development potential is great, and, in my opinion, quite worth-
while. 
Now, the foregoing discussion simply indicates that the Thompson-Wells 
estimates of income-motivated expenditures are a bit low. On one final count, 
the estimates are high. While much commodity storage is done primarily for farm 
income effects, public welfare is clearly increased by having stocks against emer-
gencies. The optimum volumes and distribution of stocks needed could be worked 
out analytically and proper costs charged against the consumer sector and the de-
fense sector (including civil defense). While the accounting costs of this amount 
of storage might seem high, the social costs -- what our society must give up in 
order to realize the benefits -- are not nearly as high. Without considering de-
fense at all, stocks of feed concentrates should, for example o be large enough to 
carry us through two consecutive years of weather as bad as those in the mid-thirties. 
Civil defense considerations would seem to indicate a different distribution of stored 
supplies of food and fiber than at present. 
TOWARD A LONG-RUN SOLUTION FOR LOW INCOMES AND SURPLUSES 
... The problem is not how to carry out an easily recognizable idealistic 
policy, but how to reconcile conflicting ideals in a concrete text of their 
incompatibility, how to satisfy conflicting desires in circumstances that 
threaten to frustrate one or another of them. 2 
So much for revisions in cost estimates of income-motivated agricultural 
programs. I want to tum to some considerations that do relate more to southern 
areas producing cotton o tobacco o peanuts and rice than other areas, but never-
theless have implications for all of agriculture. As used hereo agriculture includes 
all rural farm people and not simply commercial farmers. 
These considerations are essentially long-run. Implied is the question of 
whether farm programs have carried us any nearer to a solution of farm problems. 
One major point of concern is to discuss whether different uses of the funds being 
spent in income-motivated programs -- roughly $3 billion -- could lead us more 
rapidly toward a solution, in the form of better balance in the resources allocated 
to agriculture. Movement toward a better resource balance would be movement 
toward an environment in which prices could guide production and reward producers 
satisfactorily. 
The central theme in what follows is that policy prescriptions have treated 
the symptoms, hardly touching the disease and its complicating factors. The hard-
headed diagnosis is that a much greater volume of human and other resources are in 
farming than is needed to produce what domestic and export markets will absorb. 
2 Abraham Kaplan, "American Ethics and Public Policy, " The American Style --
Essays in Value and Performance, Elting E. Morison, ed., New York; 
Harper and Bros., 1958, p. 34. 
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This is particularly true in the South o where much of the cotton o tobacco, peanuts 
and rice are produced. Implied here is that there are goods and services that our 
society needs badly and that underemployed rural workers could be gainfully em-
ployed in producing them. 
In 1954 o 2. 68 million farms (56 percent of all census farms) each had sales 
volumes of less than $2,500 o and together produced only nine percent of total 
market sales. 3 This underemployment of human resources in farming provides oppor-
tunities for redundant resources to be employed in the production of other goods and 
services needed in our society. 4 The transfer of human resources out of agriculture 
requires a pull from the nonfarm sector in the form of employment opportunities. 
Growth in employment opportunities accompanies e,conomic growth. Table 4. 2 shows 
that growth in GNP has not been at a high rate since 1953. The estimated level of 
underemployment reflects a slowing down in the development of employment oppor-
tunities in our economy. The existence of a slowdown is indicated by unemployment 
that averaged 3. 8 million in 1959. Let me summarize by saying that no group in 
America has more stake in a high rate of economic growth than rural farm families. 
Parentheticallyo it might be noted that 0 in issues related to growth acceleration, 
organized farm groups have usually been found against measures that were designed 
to step up the rate of economic growth. More will be said of this later. 
Table 4. 2. Peak-to-peak rate of growth in the gross 
national producto United Stateso 1937-57. 
Date 
1937 to 1945 
1945 to 1948 
1948 to 1953 
1953 to 1957 
.· 
Rate of growth in 
per cent per annum 
.7.2 
-3.0 
4.9 
2.4 
Source: Staff Report on Employment, Growth, and 
Price Levels, Joint Economic Committee, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1960) 1 Po 38. 
3 Karl Shoemaker, Opportunities and Limitations for Employment of Farm People 
within and outside of Farmjng, U. S. Dept. of Aqri. , Federal Extension Service, 
Washington 0 D. C., processed, undated, Table I. 
4 In their analyses of underdeveloped countries, economic development experts 
almost always point to the need for these countries to obtain a quick release of 
resources (especially human) from agriculture in order to achieve economic growth. 
Yet the United States is sitting on a pot of gold -- in the form of underemployed 
resources arixious to be released to nonfarm economic activities -- and not cap-
italizing on it. 
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Is a higher rate of economic growth needed for any other reason than to 
provide employment for underemployed rural people? Growth has been a funda-
mental goal in our society for a long time. Here are some good general reasons 
for seeking to maximize the rate of growth: 
1. 'fo raise living standards for our own and future generations. 
2. To provide for national defense without unnecessarily sacrificing 
other objectives. 
3. To assist in raising living standards in other parts of the world --
partly for humanitarian reasons o partly because failure to achieve 
progress elsewhere threatens freedom everywhere from within and with-
out, and partly because our own freedom depends on a free world 
environment. 
4. To provide a demonstration that free societies can provide for 
economic improvement as well as totalitarian systems can. 
50 Because demands for progress in different parts of our society can 
be reconciled only if total output can be expanded more than popula-
tion growth. 
To be more specific o greater volumes of the following types of goods and 
services would increase national welfare in the United States in the 1960's: 
1. Goods and services for a better national defense posture. 
2. Goods and services for greater volumes of human o social and 
community capital formation. 
3. Goods and services for low-income but employable individuals. 
4. A greater volume of aesthetic and recreational facilities and services. 
5. Goods and services for a minimum standard of living for unemployables 
(including the aged) . 
6. Goods and services to assist in the economic development of under-
developed countries. 
Now these goods and services, with the exception of those in group 3, 
are financed to a considerable extent by public funds. A higher rate of economic 
growth depends in part then on the willingness of our citizens to allow a relative 
expansion of the public sector of the economy. 
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Elsewhere the writer has shown that, in spite of severe pressure on 
earnings in public employment, the proportion of GNP produced in the public 
sector rose .23 percent from the average of 1929-35 to 1951,..56. 5 This rise 
occurred in spite of a 20 percent decline in the index of average earnings in 
public employment (average earnings in all employments = 100). The proportion 
of total employment in the public sector rose by 65 percent during this period. 
There is strong evidence that the relative demand for services is growing rapidlyo 
and that the relative demand for services financed in the public sector is grow,.. 
ing even more rapidly than for goods and services financed directly in the pri,.. 
vate sector. 
SOCIAL COSTS OF A GREATER VOLUME OF GOODS AND 
SERVICES PURCHASED BY THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
If all the nation's resources were indeed fully employed in producing 
the GNP in its present composition, then a greater volume of public goods and 
services could be had only by giving up some goods or services now being pro,.. 
duced for consumption or investment. Public agencies would have to bid up 
prices to take factors of production away from present uses. When there are un,.. 
employed and underemployed resources, then factor prices would not need to rise, 
and the social cost of additional product would be much less than conventional 
accounting methods suggest. 
Assume that from the 3. 8 million unemployed in 1959 and the 3 million 
underemployed farm families, 5. 4 million workers could be employed without se,.. 
vere inflationary pressure. This would have been an increase in 1959 employment 
of 8 percent. Productive capacity was not being fully utilized in the steel, pe,.. 
troleum, automobile, construction, chemical o railroad, paper, rubber o textile, 
leather o apparel, and many other industries. 
Table 4. 3 shows what the effects on GNP would have been ,.._ in the aggre,.. 
gate and per capita ,.._ if fuller employment of resources could have been achieved 
in 1959. Line 1 shows 1959 GNP as it was actually divided between the public and 
private sector o line 4 the same on a per capita basis. Line 2 shows an 8 percent 
greater GNP with the same proportion going to the public sector as in 1959, and 
line 5 shows these relations on a per capita basis. Line 3 shows the higher GNP 
with 22 rather than 20.3 percent allocated to the public sector, and line 6 converts 
this to a per capita basis. Comparison of lines 4 and 6 indicates that an 8 l:>ercent 
greater GNP even with a slightly increased proportion to the public sector would 
still have netted an increase in personal disposable income of $123 per capita, while 
allowing an increased expenditure in the public sector of $94 per capita. In total, 
$16. 6 billion more could have been available for national defense -- for human, so-
cial and community capital -- for greater expenditures on social welfare -- and for 
foreign aid. At the same time, $21.8 billion more would have been available for 
personal consumption and private domestic investment. 
5 Lee R. Martin, Investment in Human Resources and Economic Development c 
manuscript submitted for publication, 1960, chapter 3. 
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Table 4. 3. Estimates of gross national product and allocations to private 
and public sectors, 1959. 
Item 
Actual GNP in 1959 o 20.3% 
of GNP to public sector 
GNP with fuller utiliza-
tion of resources, 20.3% 
to public secto~ 
GNP with fuller utiliza-
tion of resources, 22% 
to public sectora 
Personal consumption 
Total and gross private 
domestic investment 
(in billions of 1959 dollars) 
479.5 382.2 
517.9 412.8 
517.9 404.0 
Government pur-
chases of goods 
and services 
97.3 
105.1 
ll3. 9 
(GNP per capita in 1959 dollars) 
Actual GNP in 1959, 20. 3% 
of GNP to public sector 
GNP with fuller utiliza-
tion of resources u 
20. 3% to public sectora 
GNP with fuller utiliza-
tion of resources, 22% 
to public sectora 
2707 
2924 
2924 
2158 549 
2331 593 
2281 643 
a GNP assumed to be raised 8 percent by increasing labor and capital 
employment 8.1 percent. 
Source: computed from data in Survey of Current Business, January 1960; and 
Current Population Reports -- Population Estimates, U. S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census Series P-25, No. 218 0 Aug. 1, 1960. 
HYMAN, SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY CAPITAL 
Clearly 0 the underemployed rural farm population needs the pull of in-
creased employment opportunities to bring about the shifts that will lead to 
higher incomes. The technological and managerial revoltttion in the American 
economy is bringing drastic changes in the types and qualities of workers needed. 
Table 4. 4 shows evidence of these drastic changes in demand for the human agent. 
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The types of workers most needed are those with the most education and training 
while the least needed are those with. the least education and training. It is sig-
nificant that average schooling of farmers and farm workers in 1959 was exactly 
equal to that of unskilled laborers. With 3. 8 million nonfarm workers unemployed 
in 1959, it can be seen that relatively unskilled rural residents could seldom com-
pete successfully with unemployed urban workers for nonfarm jobs. 
Table 4. 4. Estimated changes, 1955 to 1965 and 1960 to 1970, in numbers of 
workers required, by type of worker, and average schooling 
each type of worker had in 1959. 
Average 
Type of worker Changes reguired schooling, 
1955 to 1965 1960 to 1970 1959 
(percent) (years) 
Professional and technical +37 +42 16.2 
Proprietors and managers +22 +23 12.4 
Clerical and sales +27 +25 12. 5 
Skilled craftsmen +24 +23 11.0 
Semiskilled operatives +22 +18 9.9 
Service workers +13 +24 9.7 
Laborers - 4 0 8.6 
Farmers and farm workers -15 -17 8.6 
Source: Our Manpower Future, 1955-65, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., 
19 57; Manpower -- Challenge of the 1960's , U. S. Dept. of Labor, 
Washington, D. C., 1960. 
Again, in summary, no group in America would be likely to benefit more 
from increased expenditures on education, training and health than rural farm 
families, provided they shared. in these investments. This statement can probably 
be broadened to include social and community capital. Investment in social capital --
particularly research -- increases the rate of economic growth by providing the 
technological base for growth. Greater investments in community facilities in low-
income localities would increase considerably their potential for attracting industries 
and other economic activities. 
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That the level of investment in human and community capital was low for 
heavily rural states can be seen in Table 4. 5 by examining state and local ex-
penditures per capita for specified functions in 1957. In general, the level of 
expenditure per capita in rural states -- especially in the South -- was consider-
ably lower than in other states. This was particularly so for expenditures on 
local and higher education, and for health and hospitals. It was also generally 
the case for sanitation, police and fire protection, and local parks and recreation. 
It was less so for highways and for natural resources. 
SOURCES OF ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY 
The final point that needs to be made is the most important of all. For-
mation of human o social and community capital on a larger scale would lead 
directly to growth in employment opportunities and would benefit underemployed 
rural people in this way. Investment in the education and health of the rural 
population would raise their productivity potential in farm or nonfarm employment. 
But most important is the role of human o social and community capital in 
the economic productivity of the American society. Research conducted during 
the 1950 •s reveals quite clearly that changes in the volume of capital (as con-
ventionally defined) and in the size of the labor force (or population) account for 
less than half the growth in GNP since 1900.6 
The research summarized above indicates clearly that capital must be 
redefined to include other productivity-increasing factors, in addition to private 
domestic investment. Brieflyo here are definitions of the three factors not or-
dinarily considered to be capital but, in my opinion, very important in accounting 
for the unexplained productivity of the American or any other economy. Human 
capital results from investments in formal education and training, and from invest-
ments in healtho aesthetic and recreational experiences; human capital also arises 
in the learning that takes place from experience. Social capital is the total of 
all useful human knowledge, coming into being from research and other creative 
and innovating human action. Creators 8 transmitters and effective users of social 
capital require a good deal of human capital. Community capital consists in the 
official and unofficial organizations and facilities used to produce public services 
for our communities 1 including streets and roads, sanitation and water systems, 
parks and recreational facilities, libraries, police and fire protection o schools 1 
hospitals and clinics, museums and similar institutions, and so on. 
6 For a more complete summary of this vitally important research, see a paper 
read November 18, 1960 at the Southern Economic Association, Lee R. Martin, 
"The Significance of Human and Community Capital to Economic Development 
in the South." Briefly, no more than one-third to two-fifths of the growth in 
GNP is explained by increases in the volume of capital and in the size of the 
labor force. 
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Not only do these factors help account for the unexplained productivity 
of the American economy, but deficiencies in these forms of capital help explain 
the low average incomes in southern and other heavily rural states. 7 Six con-
tinuous variables representing human capital factors plus two discrete variables 
for regional factors accounted for 86 2ercent of the variance in 1950 state incomes 
per member of the working age group. 8 
Painted in :Oroad strokes u the relations are as follows: Additions to social 
capital increase the rate of development of new technology; prerequisite to these 
additions are large amounts of human capital. Additions to human capital increase 
the rate of adoption of new technology as well as facilitate its development. Addi-
tions to community capital increase the efficiency with which a given community 
can serve as a site for economic activity; without a given volume of this type of 
capital, a locality cannot qualify at all for a great many kinds of economic activity. 
SUMMARY 
Much of the effort of farm organizations to improve conditions in the farm 
sector has taken form in measures that would work best if the American economy 
were operating at full employment and had ceased to grow. Then indeed the welfare 
of farm people could be improved only by enlarging their share of the national income, 
assumed to be fixed in size. Once the unwarranted assumptions of a static economy 
in full employment are abandoned o then different actions are indicated. 
Rural farm people would be major beneficiaries of a higher rate of growth. 
Employment opportunities would open up more rapidly, and rural people could ob-
tain employment in the nonfarm sector o Those remaining in farming could obtain more 
resources to use, but some land resources will have to be transferred out of agricul-
tural uses. 
A greater rate of growth means a growing volume of goods and services pro-
duced. In an economy as advanced as ours, the demand for goods and services 
financed in the public sector is growing more rapidly than for those financed in the 
private sector. A more rapid growth rate will depend on our willingness to permit 
the public sector to expand somewhat more~rapidly than the private sector. There 
can be little doubt that our society needs highways more than taller tail fins, edu-
cation and research more than cosmetics o hospitals more than patent medicines, 
libraries more than comic books, city streets more than Go-Kart tracks, trash col-
lection more than bigger and better packages for consumer goods, and so on. 
7 For state personal incomes per capita, 1950-59 o see Martin, Investment •.• 
already cited, Appendix A. 
8 Martino Investment .•. , chapter 5. The continuous variables were: percentage 
of the adult population with four years or more of college, with 8 years or less 
of schooling; percentage of the total population that was not white, that was 
rural farm; percentage of the working-age population that was in the labor force; 
arid percentage of the labor force that was unemployed. The discrete variables 
were obtained by calling the first o third and fourth groups of states in Table 5 
as more rural o the other two groups as less rural (other factors were also con-
sidered). 
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Some of the public expenditures needed most are those that will form more 
human capital in the rural population and more community capital in low-income 
communities. Most of the working-age members of the underemployed farm families 
are simply not qualified to move readily into nonfarm employment. For employment 
opportunities to become available near the present residence of the excess farm 
population requires considerable investments in human and community capital. 
Permanent solutions to low incomes and surpluses would be greatly 
facilitated by accelerating the rate of economic growth. 9 This in turn will require 
acceptance of a more rapid rate of expansion in the public sector. Badly needed 
are more expenditures on humans and communities. Some of the farm organizations 
and their leaders have. resolutely maintained positions diametrically opposed to 
federal or state actions that would lead toward a solution to our serious farm 
problems . 10 
9 With less than full employment of all major classes of resources, economic 
growth would be increased by any net increase in purchasing power in the hands 
of purchasing units. Creating money directly or borrowing money created by 
the banking system could be handled in such a way as to add to purchasing 
power and to total product without adding to inflation. Unemployment compen-
sation to farmers with payments dependent on participation in training programs, 
subsidies for moving expenses, and rapid tax write-offs for new economic ac-
tivity locating in communities with heavy underemployment or unemployment 
would be three possible emergency measures. Greater levels of expenditures 
on education, health, research and communities are a more permanent need. 
10 Some type of council of farm organizations where enlightened representatives 
could get together for private and leisurely discussion that would result in the 
discovery of common goals and common grounds for action, in rational discussion 
of all the ramifications of different policies. These discussions badly need to 
precede the presently ineffective method of public debate and recrimination, as 
a means for developing national agricultural policies and programs. 
69 
Chapter 5 
Wheat Programs: An Appraisal 
Howard W. Ottoson 
University of Nebraska 
I think that Messrs. Wells and Thompson have done a complete job in 
providing the facts of the case with respect to wheat. There is little which can 
be disputed in the material which they have presented. My remarks are directed 
first at some topics which are stimulated by their facts about the present programs. 
Then I shall comment on some of the alternatives which have been suggested. 
This discussion is not actually directed at all wheat o but rather at 
Great Plains wheat. The problems of wheat relate largely to hard-red winter 
wheat, and hard-red spring wheat. These wheats are the particular problems 
of plains agriculture. 
I must also suggest at this point that it is difficult to talk only about wheat. 
The problems of wheat are symptomatic of the difficulties of all agriculture. The 
listener will note an increasing tendency to deemphasize wheat as a separate 
commodity as this paper progresses and to deal more heavily with the entire agri-
cultural setting. 
One of the basic troubles of wheat, as in the case of other agricultural 
commodities o is the fact that our ability to produce it, per acre o has risen since 
the 1920•s, not as rapidly as corn, but significantly nevertheless. Thus, if we 
estimate a trend line through harvested yield data since 192 0 the increase has been 
from 11 bushels to 18 bushels per acre, or over 60 percent; this amounts to 1. 5 
percent per year. The data given by Wells and Thompson indicate what this has 
meant in production, in recent years. This rise in producing ability has been due 
to the introduction and use of new technologies, and has characterized the whole 
agricultural industry. 
In the current discussions (and debates) on controls of farm production, 
it is instructive to review the history of proquction controls. The McNary-Haugen 
legislation of 1929 created a program which, under the Federal Farm Board, pro-
vided for marketing subsidy and storage with no control over production. This lack 
of control over production proved to be an Achille•s heel, as we found that we could 
not market our troubles away. Wheat (and cotton) prices were raised when the 
government purchased stocks and were later lowered similarly when the government 
later released these same stocks when appropriations were exhausted. 
With the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 came the first attempt to control 
acreage of crops, voluntarily. Drought was more important than this program in 
reducing wheat acres, however. More firm means of restricting acreage came into 
being with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Under this and succeeding 
legislation allotments and quotas were in effect in 1938-42, 1950, and from 1954 to 
the present. 
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The control has been over the acreage of wheat rather than over its actual 
production o however, since marketing quotas have been calculated by applying 
normal or actual yields o which ever~ larger. Farmers increased their yields on 
allotment acres for several reas,.ons; thus while wheat acres harvested were re-
duced 22 percent from 1953 to 1960, yields rose 49 percent higher (this includes 
the effects of very good weather in 59-60) and production increased 17 percent. 
In addition farmers raised feed --corn, sorghum, small grains--on their diverted 
acres. 
In 1956, however, we took more direct means to reduce production by 
creating the,Acreage Reserve. Drought conditions played a large part in the sign 
up in the Plains area in 1956 and 1957. The three million wheat acres (5. 5 percent 
of the wheat allotment) now in the Conservation Reserve represents a longer run 
commitment; as a production control measure, however, they are pretty well offset 
by the acres exempted from penalty on farms with allotments of 15 acres or less. 
At this point reference should be made to the oft-repeated hypothesis that 
the price support-acreage allotment program, through the exemption of small pro-
ducers from controls, has spread the production of wheat, and increased production 
outside of the wheat areas. The data fail to support this notion. Thus for 1954 the 
nirie Great Plains states had 7 3. 4 percent of the allotted acres, and still had over 
73 percent in 1960. During 1951-53, before controls were reinstituted, the nine 
Great Plains states planted 73 percent of the nation's wheat acreage. During 
1954-58 the proportion averaged 71 percent. While it is true that recent figures 
seem to indicate a shift in total production of wheat from the Plains the underlying 
cause here was drought in the Plains during several years in the 50's which lowered 
total wheat production in that region. Production in the Plains during 1958 and '59 
indicate that the proportion of the total production in this area was similar to that 
in the 1940's. It should also be noted, however, that the alternatives to wheat on 
diverted acres in the Plains are probably not as "close 11 economically as are the 
alternatives to allotment crops in areas with more rainfall. Thus the economic 
"pain 11 from diverting acres may be greater there than in more humid areas. 
On the domestic demand s:l.de we find that the use of wheat for food has been 
surprisingly stable; the effect of increases in population have been almost exactly 
offset by decreases in per capita consumption. In the meantime we have cut the 
use of wheat for livestock feed to a nominal level because wheat has been priced 
higher than its feed value in relation to other cereals. 
In· the face of a steadily increasing yield of wheat on the one hand, and a 
stable, inelastic domestic cons1,1mption on the other, we have institutionalized 
the supply acreage of wheat by fixing the minimum allotment acreage at 55 million. 
Apparently this figure has been a "last ditch" beyond which we have not wanted to 
retreat. 
Frustrated in our attempts to reduce production, or perhaps being really 
unwilling to do so, with little possibility of increasing domestic consumption of 
wheat for food, and being unwilling to price it for use as feed, we have engaged 
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heavily in the variety of export operations outlined by Wells and Thompson, most of 
them subsidized from the federal treasury to greater or lesser degree. Despite our 
success in increasing exports to the point where they have equaled our domestic con-
sumption, storage stocks have continued to mount quite steadily to over 1300 million 
bushels on July 1, or the equivalent of a year's crop. Visualizing no possibilities for 
increases in either domestic or export uses, and assuming no program changes on the 
supply side we can expect in the years ahead a continued buildup of storage stocks 
at the rate of about 100 million bushels per year. 
The basic weakness of our present approach to the wheat surplus problem has 
been our unwillingness to take a firm grip on production. It would seem that we could 
have done so under our present laws by decreasing the allotment acres more drasti-
cally, by using market quotas based on production rather than acres. It is almost 
redundant to say that a program involving price supports, a form of control, will in-
evitably result in build-up of storage stocks if production is not also controlled. 
The public concern over the cost of storage stocks, and of exact subsidies 
is recognized. In fairness, however, the nominal impact of price supports on wheat 
to consumers is also to be noted. Thus we can compare the one cent per loaf impact 
of price supports with the increase in the price of bread from 14. 3 cents per loaf in 
1950 to 19.6 cents in March, 1959 in the U. s.l, an increase of 35 percent. During 
this period the price per bushel received by farmers for wheat declined by 12 percent 
as the support level dropped. 
The impacts of our export programs on the foreign market, as discussed by 
Wells and Thompson, are indeed controversial, and in ways other than their impact 
on the world price of wheat, which is ne~otiated through the International Wheat agree-
ment. Data from Canada are suggestive~ In 1957, for example, the carryover of wheat 
(all of it on Canadian farms) was 135 percent of its 1950-54 production, compared to 
81 percent for the U o S. In that year the carryover in Canada was 1. 6 times as large 
as its domestic and export use, while in the U. S. the comparable ratio was • 9. 
Between 1945-49 and 1957 the build-up of stocks in relation to production was twice 
as rapid as in the U. S. 
The statement of one of our Canadian graduate students to the effect that 
"Canadian wheat farmers didn't mind competing with U. S. wheat farmers, but that 
competing with the U. S. Treasury was more difficult" illustrates this impact in 
less abstract terms. In fairness, however, it is my understanding that we are now 
working more closely with the Canadians, and other competing exports, than was 
true a few years ago. 
1 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949. p. 338. 
2 Hamilton, W. E., and Drummond, W. M. Wheat Surpluses and their Impact on 
Canada-United States relations. National Planning Association and Private 
Planning Association of Canada. 1959. 
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CRITERIA FOR APPRAISING FARM PROGRAMS 
In appraising a farm program, it is appropriate that we specify the criteria 
used for evaluation. Presumably, a program may be judged against at least the 
following criteria, and a new program must meet them acceptably. 
1. Its effect on efficiency of the industry and on the economy. 
2. Its· effect on income distribution among farmers, and between 
agriculture and the rest of the economy. 
3. Its political acceptability. 
4. Its administrative feasibility. 
I shall comment on these criteria in more detail in relation to the present 
program. 
THE PRESENT PROGRAM 
Efficiency 
There are several definitions of efficiency. From an individual farmer's 
standpoint it can probably be said that our past programs have provided incen-
tives toward increased physical productivity of land and labor. Higher incomes 
have enabled them to acquire more capital items, particularly machinery. Un-
doubtedly, wheat farmers have applied more fertilizer, adopted more improved 
practices 1 and invested in more machinery under our price support-acreage allot-
ment program than they would have in the absence of a program. 
From the standpoint of the economy, however, an increase in output by 
itself does not necessarily represent efficiency. It depends upon the. value 
placed on the product. By itself the buildup of stocks of wheat which no one 
wants is not efficiency. Neither do export programs whose principal objectives 
are to rid us of embarrassing stocks represent efficiency. Cutting the allotment 
of a supported crop but letting producers plant other substitute crops of which 
there are also surpluses on the diverted acreage is not promoting efficiency. 
Historic allotment bases tied to land, regardless of land productivity, do not 
make for efficiency. Consumers in the economy 1 as well as foreign customers u 
apparently do not want our wheat in the quantities produced and at the prices 
asked. Further, domestic consumers would not want food wheat in much larger 
quantities if the price were cut one-fourth or by one-half u or even if it were given 
away free. It is true, of course u with an inelastic demand that the margin between 
under-production and over-production is narrow. This margin translates into a 
high degree of price variation for wheat on the open market, without storage pro-
grams. Of course u if we allow the price to drop to a feed level the wheat not 
eaten by people would become part of the overall feed supply u the problems of 
which are being discussed in another paper. 
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In the general sense, where an industry shows the propensity, with the 
resources presently committed, to produce more product than consumers will take 
at satisfactory returns to the resource owners, the long-run solution from the 
efficiency standpoint involves moving out enough land, labor or capital, until 
the supply is decreased, and prices consequently raised to levels where. the 
resource returns, on the average, are satisfactory. (The net effect, after all the 
accompanying adjustments is a lowering of total costs, but a raising of marginal 
value products.) 
The problems of wheat are inseparable from the problems of the entire 
agricultural economy from the efficiency standpoint. The present price support-
acreage allotment programs must be regarded as involving resource inefficiency 
from the standpoint of society as a whole. 
Income distribution 
As suggested by Wells and Thompson, wheat producers have experienced 
higher incomes under the price support programs than they would have without 
these programs. These income increases represent a transfer of income to wheat 
producers from society. Of course they had to shrink the acreages of wheat o but 
they recouped the major portion of the income lost on diverted acres by raising 
feed crops. Income transfer came in three forms: (1) Purchases by CCC of wheat o 
by way of taxes (2) Subsidy of exports o again from taxes (3) Increase in market 
prices--a transfer in the market place. 
In economics it is not possible to really say that one income distribution 
is better than another. We do have minimum standards for income for industrial 
workers which are regarded as socially desirable. A price support program is 
quite impersonal in transferring income, up to the maximum payment limit. It 
affects producers in proportion to their gross production. An important share of 
price support money, at least half in the case of wheat o more in the case of 
corn, ~not end up in farmers• pockets at all but in the pockets of feed deal-
ers, fertilizer dealers, grain storage agencies o and transportation agencies. 
It must be noted that agriculture o and particularly the wheat industry, is 
peculiarly vulnerable in the market place, if prices are allowed to move freely, to 
the effects of production increases on income because of the peculiarly inelastic 
demands which it faces; small mistakes in production can have drastic effects on 
incomes. Because of this it is likely that agriculture will get special attention 
from the income standpoint for a long time to come. However o if income transfer 
in years of low income o or regions of low income is our objective o there are much 
cheaper ways to do the job than by price supports and acreage allotments. 
Political acceptability 
One reason why the price support-storage program has been with us this 
long is thato while not particularly popular o they have apparently been less 
objectionable in the minds of voters, farmers, and congressmen than some other 
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programs. Thus an income transfer through the price support program has been 
more acceptable than one made by means of a direct payment, although we do 
have direct payments in the case of wool o and use them in many other ways also. 
There is evidence now that consumer taxpayers of the nation have become increas-
ingly disenchanted with storage stocks; it is not that taxpayers object to paying 
taxes to support a farm program. Rather, it is that they have seen no solution to 
the "farm problem, " as evidenced to them in storage stocks. 
Administrative feasibility 
It is self evident that a successful program must be possible to administer. 
Knowing little about this subject I shall not comment further. 
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE WHEAT PROBLEM 
As I suggested earlier the "wheat problem" is really not unique. Wheat is 
but one of several sources of human and animal food. Therefore in the following 
I shall pay special attention to wheat, without confining myself to it. Further 1 
my remarks will be made from a background which is largely Plains and western 
cornbelt in orientation 1 and I shall note particularly the impacts of general pro-
grams on this region. 
The free market 
A return to free market prices would not cut the production of wheat; in 
fact production might increase as diverted acres in specialized wheat acres 
returned to wheat. The price of wheat would tend to be about 1 0 to 12 percent 
higher or more than the price of corn. The market supply of feed would be in-
creased by the wheat now diverted into storage, plus the increase in production 
of calories on acres now diverted to substitute crops. Wheat consumption by 
people would not increase; the wheat not consumed by people would be fed to 
livestock or exported. Incomes of wheat farmers would decline 1 and become 
variable. Declining prices would not cut production in the short-run. In 1929 
the purchasing power of a bushel of wheat was only three-fifths of what it was 
in 1919. U. S. farmers raised almost as much wheat, yet had only 46 percent 
as much income. This was when they turned to the government for help. 
With free markets. the disposal of the present storage stocks would be 
a troublesome problem until they were liquidated. Any sudden large scale 
release of stocks would be disastrous as far as agricultural income is concerned. 
Under a free market farmers 1 including wheat farmers, would be subjected 
for a long time to a downward drift in income created by the combination of 
inelastic demand 1 increase in production 1 and the inherent lack by the industry 
of the ability to assume organizational control over its production. 
75 
Even though we are not willing to convert to the free market now o but 
interested in doing so later 1 we ought not delude ourselves by thinking of pro-
grams as but temporary expedients which after a few years can be phased into 
the free market. We had better design our programs sensibly and not as emer-
gency measures, because they will likely be felt necessary for many years. 
Marketing program for wheat--a variation of marketing quotas 
The program presented to the second session of the 86th Congress by 
the National Association of Wheat ~owers o with the support of several other 
farm groups o was a variation of the so-called domestic parity plan which has 
been discussed for a long time. It was a two price plan I involving a separa-
tion of markets so that a higher price for food wheat derived by restricting sup-
plies in the food market. Wheat growers would thus in effect receive a blended 
price o through the use of marketing certificates which should accompany wheat 
sold for food and export. Wheat could be sold freely for feed at a feed price. 
The volume sold for food and export would be carefully regulated to achieve the 
desired price. The foreign buyers would pay the world market prices, with the 
difference being made up by the U. S. Treasury. 
The wheat growers • plan had several important innovations 1 however 1 
as compared to earlier two price proposals. First 1 it called for a retirement of 
10 percent of the original wheat base by each producer to a conservation reserve 
totaling 7. 8 million acres o without payment; an additional 10 percent might be 
retired with government payments if the funds were available. These measures 
would reduce competition with the feed grain sector. Secondo the plan included 
a proposal for the liquidation of CCC stocks at the rate of 150 1 000 1 000 bushels 
per year. More controversially u it called for a doubling of export subsidies on 
wheat. The 100 percent parity price of $2.36 which was called for would without 
doubt be subject to criticism, but was undoubtedly a lead from which bargaining 
might start. 
From the efficiency standpoint this program would score in the reduction 
of storage stocks. An innovation not proposed by the wheat growers which would 
promote land use and farm organizational adjustments even more would be to make 
the quotas o and by inference o the retired acreages negotiable. Thus some farmers 
might buy additional quotas and specialize in wheat production. Others might 
take over acreages of retired land simply for the rental. This would tend to keep 
the more productive land in wheat, and the less productive land in diverted use. 
In summary this program would accomplish the income transfer objective 
more heavily through the market than the present program; it would promote effi-
ciency by liquidating storage stock and requiring the retiring of marginal land. 
It would involve the government in heavier export subsidies than is now the case. 
Single commodity approaches complicate the achieving of overall solutions 
to the problems of agriculture. However, if we are to adopt the single commodity 
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approach this plan goes further in production control measures than have similar 
plans for grains in the past. 
This plan could be made part of an overall marketing quota system for the 
grains such as has recently been suggested. Such a system would involve esti-
mated fair prices 8 national marketing quotas for each commodity, or for composite 
collections of substitutable commodities, and allocations of quotas to individual 
farmers. Such quotas would be negotiable. If rigidly enforced these quotas would 
raise farm prices and income. With negotiable quotas efficiency would be encour-
aged between farmers. Of course o program benefits would become capitalized into 
the price of quotas in the same way as they are now capitalized into land values. 
Farm incomes could be increased by these programs, by means of a transfer 
of income from consumers to farmers through the market, with higher market prices. 
Important problems relative to international trade relations would have to be solved. 
The land reserve approach 
This label denotes several kinds of programs including the acreage reserve 
of recent history o the present conservation reserve, the whole farm bid plan which 
died 11 aborning 11 , as well as compulsory retirement schemes. Most current dis-
cussion seems focused on some sort of expanded conservation reserve, say o from 
the present 30 million on up to 60 million acres or more, most likely on a voluntary 
basis rather than being compulsory. 
This program as commonly conceived involves the shifting of land from use 
for wheat and feed grain production to non-use, except for practices consistent 
with erosion control. There is no doubt that if enough land were shifted from use 
to non-use, production of feed and wheat would be reducedo The program would 
result in higher farm prices o and would consequently provide the incentive for 
farmers to add more variable inputs to the crop land left in production; however these 
increased inputs could be offset by taking out additional land. Personally I feel that 
100 million acres is not to be regarded as a surprising requirement if the job is to be 
accomplished in the longer run 8 and in view of the fact that we would not be taking 
out 11 average .. acres. 
We should not be under any illusions that a land retirement program will not 
also result in the release of other resources from farming--capital and labor. Our 
experience during the last few years has indicated that people nearing retirement o 
those with special skills who live near a job vacancy o those in ill health 8 and 
others who are similarly less committed to farming are the first to take advantage 
of this program. A land retirement program is actually a device which makes it 
more certain that these people will not be replaced, either by their sons or by 
others who would otherwise till the land which is released. As these people leave 
farming they will disinvest the capital resources which they have in farming--
machinery, equipment, livestock, and buildings. This retirement of the human 
factor o and associated capital, will take place whether the program involves whole 
farms or parts of farms o albeit more slowly if the latter is the case. 
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A land retirement program is quite logical if it can be somehow applied to 
the land areas which we regard as marginal for tillage. Thus, during and after 
World War II the wheat acreage rose from a low of 53 million acres to 84 million 
acres in 1949; most of this increase came in the Great Plains States, presumably 
on the more marginal land. Recent research has indicated the location of other 
areas of marginal cropland around the country~ 3 
To be successful a land retirement program should be on a permanent basis; 
farmers shouldn't be given the incentive of waiting out the program as they are now 
doing in order to plow the land up as soon as possible. To my knowledge there 
is nothing in the present legislation which provides for a renewal of conservation 
reserve contracts at the end of the contract period. The C._ R. land can be brought 
back into production in a higher state productivity than when it was taken out. 
The contracts should be for as long a time as possible 1 and should be on 
both whole farm and part-farm basis. A voluntary program might provide for the 
sale of land to the government in lieu of rental payments. Careful attention should 
be paid to classes of land under the program, and payments should reflect differ-
ences between land classes 1 within the range of land classes included. A volun-
tary program related to land classes would cost less than a program which called 
for the same proportion of land between counties, or even more extreme which 
called for a similar allocation to each farm. 
A conservation reserve type of approach might be worked in over say a 10-
year period to replace the price support-allotment program; it would be less expen-
sive if not conducted on a crash basis, since it would give more farmers a chance 
to make definite plans for adoption, and to adjust themselves to the program. Farm 
communities would also have a chance to adjust to the program. At the end of 10 
years the production of farm products would have presumably been cut so as to 
achieve satisfactory price levels, storage stocks could have been liquidated, and 
the price support-storage program terminated. 
In the Plains area another advantage of a long-run approach would be that 
the program could be applied more heavily during drouth years 6 and in affected 
areas. Recent history in the Plains area indicate that farmers are more apt to move 
out during drouth, .!! they have .2. place !g_s,Q_. 4 
The use easement approach 
A variation of the reserve scheme is the land use easement 1 about which 
there has been less discussion. From the long-run standpoint it makes more sense 
economically than does the non-use approach. This is true because land which is 
3 Heady, Earl 0. and Egbert 6 A. C. I "Programming Regional Adjustments in 
Grain Production to Eliminate Surpluses." Joumal.2f!:s!:m.Economics 1 41:718-33. 
November 1 1959. 
4 Willsie, Roger 3 Why Farmers Sold Out in Central Nebraska in 1956-57 1 (Lincoln: 
1957) (NeQraska Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 445). 
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marginal for wheat (or corn) is not necessarily marginal for grass. While $25 gross 
income per acre under wheat may represent a long-run loss situationo $15 gross 
income under grass may represent economically viable production. Under this 
program the government would purchase the right to till crops on a land area for 
a very long periodo or better yet, permanently. Farmers could produce native 
grasses on this land, and use them for livestock feed. Such shifts will reduce 
the production of feed units, since the shift is from an intensive system to an 
extensive system from the standpoint of other resources combined with land. Such 
easements could be released temporarily o when national emergencies called for 
more grain production; the easement land should be transferable so that farm and 
ranch units can be reorganized. 
In its encouragement of the release of the labor factor from agriculture, and 
its effects on rural communities, this program would be similar to the non-use re-
tirement programs, except that its effects would probably not be as severe, par-
ticularly in areas with large eligible acreages. It would increase the production 
of grass, and consequently the production of forage consuming livestock. This 
production would be competitive with cattle production in grain areas o but the 
competition would be consistent with consideration of long-run competitive advan-
tage, and also with the projected increases in total demand, and demand per capita 
for beef in the future. 
Incidentally a program under which the federal government is presently 
supporting the conversion of cropland to native grasses is the Great Plains Con-
servation Program. Since millions of acres of grassland in the Plains were plowed 
up at the behest of society during a period of food scarcity o it is not inappropriate 
·that society also support financially the costly and risky process of converting this 
land back to another use when its cereal product is no longer needed. Unfortunately, 
however o up to this time more funds in the Great Plains Conservation Program have 
been used for practices other than regrassing, including even irrigation development, 
than have been spent for regrassing. Alsoo society has no real assurance that the 
regrassed land will not be plowed up with the expiration of the contracts. 
Expansion of exports 
Having touched on a couple of supply control programs of particular interest 
to wheat, it is also appropriate to note a couple of other programs which would 
attack the surplus problem via demand expansion. There appears to be little possi-
bility for any important expansion of our commercial exports of wheat abroad in 
volume large mc;:mgh to affect the storage stock situation. In fact we will do well 
to maintain our present exports. A troublesome problem with respect to commercial 
exports of wheat has been that of grading practices. Our foreign customers have 
complained in the past about the amounts of foreign material which has been allowed, 
and in fact deliberately mixed into wheat going abroad for export. Apparently this 
has been improved lately, but there are still problems concerning the variation in 
quality which may be found within one grade, such as No. 1 hard red winter. Appar-
ently we need grading standards which more closely represent baking quality. At 
this time some of our foreign competitors may be doing a better job of grading rela-
tive to baking quality than we are. 
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A more dynamic topic is that of the use of food for foreign economic develop-
ment. Many people look upon this as a humanitarian way to solve our surplus prob-
lems. However, the two objectives implicit in that statement need to be separated 
very clearly in our thinking. It is conceivable that more wheat than is now being 
shipped overseas under Public Law 480 and related programs might be used for econom-
ic development of certain developing countries under the best of conditions. These 
conditions would include our provision of technical assistance as well as other aid 
in the form of tools o machinery, and other non-food items. Food aid is only part of 
the total picture. We will have to think in terms of long-run agreements. Our pri-
mary interest will have to be in the best way to help these countries develop their 
economi~s, and not in terms of how much food they can take off our hands. We might 
better decide to tum these materials over to them free, instead of building up bank 
accounts of local currency. And in this process we will find that our surplus situa-
tion will not be alleviated without some kind of production control, since our farmers 
can rise to the challenge of improved prices resulting from increased exports with 
even more production, and we will be back where we were before as far as storage 
stocks are concerned. 
Other program alternatives 
Other program alternatives which would have an effect on the wheat sector 
might be discussed. However, time is too limited to do other than simply mention 
two. 
No economic possibility expanding the industrial use of wheat seems very 
tangible. 
I suspect that direct payments as a means of coping with drifting farm in-
comes are politically remote, as well as offering troublesome administrative prob-
lems. 
Collateral programs 
In closing, I would like to note some collateral measures which are not so 
widely discussed, but which have meaning toward particularly the long-run solution 
of problems in the Great Plains area, as well as other agricultural areas involved 
in long-run resource adjustments. 
Food and feed reserve 
Reserves should~ be regarded as a solution to surplus problems. Assuming 
this, then, it would appear that there may be sensible reasons for considering the 
establishment of two kinds of reserves of feed and food which should be kept sepa-
rate from each other. First, we might well have an ever-normal granary which might 
include an average of up to 500 million bushels of wheat kept as protection against 
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crop failure, as well as variation in demand. This reserve should not be used to 
support prices, but rather to keep market prices stable. It would be decreased by 
government sale when prices exceeded a specified limit, and replenished up to the 
storage limit o by government purchase, when prices fell below a certain limit. The 
stocks would have to be rotated, and this rotation going on annually should not be 
the cause for political excitement. 
A second reserve program might involve the storage of food and feed in the 
vicinity of livestock production centers and population centers against the contin-
gency of nuclear attack. A reserve of even as much as a billion bushels of wheat, 
or at the minimum, one year's domestic needs would not seem too startling. The 
cost of this reserve would seem chargeable against defense appropriations in the 
same way as other stockpiles. 
Homesteads in reverse 
Assuming a national economy which will continue to grow o and accepting 
the premise that the continued transfer of underemployed farm labor out of agri-
culture will be desirable for some time to come, it would seem possible to facilitate 
these adjustments and increase human welfare by several means. We have suggest-
ed that production control programs are going to encourage the outmovement of farm 
labor at a faster rate. These people might be provided with financial assistance 
for moving, and in getting established in other occupations. We could provide 
more complete job placement service, including specific job training. A variation 
in this general class of program, at a time when we are thinking of shorter work 
weeks, might be the lowering of retirement ages for farmers under social security, 
say to 60 o or to 55 years. 
Community assistance 
A forgotten sector of the farm adjustment problem in the discussion of pro-
grams is the rural non-farm community. It is well known that some of the most 
vigorous objections to the whole farm soil bank came from rural communities which 
saw in this measure their own deterioration. They have not been completely enam-
oured with the conservation reserve type of programs in general, and would raise 
objections again to an expanded form of this approach. Are there not ways to help 
rural communities in areas which will be affected most by land retirement or con-
version, particularly in view of the fact that there are at least as many non-farm 
people in the rural c.ommunities who are as directly dependent on farming as there 
are on the farms of the same community? Perhaps special training and other types 
of relocation assistance might be provided to non-farm people of rural communities 
also. Financial assistance might be given to assist in the consolidation of roads, 
schools o utilities, and local government. Perhaps special help in developing non-
farm industrial activity might be possible in certain communities where this is 
feasible. The challenge here is to help the community to adjust along with its 
farms, rather than ignore it as we have u setting up farm programs in the past. 
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The long-run 
In the long run we would hope to see wheat grown in its areas of greatest 
comparative advantage; in the long-run the Great Plains will have to compete on 
an equal basis economically with other farming areas. This area can grow wheat 
competitively. While the Plains have somewhat unique adjustment problems re.-
lating to the lack of opportunities for intensive. types of farming because of low 
and variable rainfall 1 because of the heavy costs of land use shifts 1 and because 
of the particularly costly problems facing rural communities as they attempt to 
adjust to decreasing populations, the fortunes of the Plains in the long-run will 
be tied to the fortunes of the whole agricultural industry and in particular with the 
feed-grain-livestock economy. In designing programs it is essential that the 
long-run view not be ignored. 
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Chapter 6 
Feed Grains, Soybeans and Livestock: 
A Situation Paper 
Martin Sorkin, USDA 
Orlin J. Scoville o ARS o USDA 
This paper describes the current-price-support programs that affect the 
feed-livestock economy, provides information about program operations o and 
discusses briefly their impact on producers, consumers, and foreign trade. The 
historical record of production, yields, utilization and prices of feed grains, and 
related information is carried in appendix tables 6. 2 to 6.10 
The feed-livestock complex covers a major sector of American agriculture. 
Livestock account for about 55 to 60 percent of the value of all farm marketings. 
Feed crops are grown on three-fourths of the total acreage of crops harvested. 
Of the seven crops that are largest in acreage o six are feed crops. The other is 
wheat, a part of which also is used for feed. In addition, about a billion acres 
of land are grazed. On a feed-equivalent basis, this is equal to about 183 million 
acres of hay land of average quality. 
There are serious adjustment problems in the feed-livestock sector. Each 
year since 1952 o carryover stocks of feed grains have increased. At the end of 
the current crop year, stocks of the four principal feed grains are expected to be 
82 million tons o or half the amount produced in 1960. 
In addition o large stocks of wheat add to the potential feed supply. Pro-
duction of feed grains has increased steadily. The mounting supply of feed crops 
is accompanied by increasing livestock production and the possibility of increasing 
pressure on livestock prices over the next few years unless feed grain production 
is reduced. 
Soybeans present a different picture. In most years, increasing production 
has been accompanied by increasing demand. At the beginning of the present feed-
ing year, stocks are at 23.3 million bushels compared with 62.1 million a year ago. 
By next October o they may be down to 10 million bushels. 
FEED GRAINS 
Price-Support Level 
The Agricultural Act of 1958 provides the basis for the current price-support 
program for feed grains and rye. Under that legislation o producers voted to discon-
tinue corn acreage allotments, and price supports on other feed grains became man-
datory. The legislation requires that the price support for corn shall be 90 percent 
of the preceding 3-year average price received by farmers adjusted for abnormal 
quantities of low-grade corn marketed during any such 3-year period, but not less 
than 65 percent of parity. The designation of a commercial com area was eliminated. 
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One basic support level applies in all states with appropriate differentials for grade 
and location. For the other feed grains, support is mandatory at such level of the 
parity price as is determined to be fair and reasonable in relation to the level of 
price support made available for corn, taking into consideration the feeding value 
of such commodity in relation to corn and the other factors set forth in section 40l(b) 
of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended. 
Under these provisions, the level of price support for the 1960 corn crop was 
established at $1. 06 per bushel. This represents 65 percent of the October 1 parity 
price. It is 2 cents higher than 90 percent of the preceding three-year adjusted 
average price. In consideration of the support level of $1.06 per bushel for corn, 
their feed value in relation to corn, and the other eight factors specified in the 1958 
act, the 1960 support price for the other feed grains was established for oats at 
$0. 50 per bushel for grade 3, barley $0. 77 per bushel for grade 2 or better, grain 
sorghums $1.52 per hundredweight for grade 2 or better, and rye $0.90 per bushel for 
grade 2 or better. These levels represent about 60 percent of parity. 
Farmers receive support on corn and feed grains through nonrecourse loans 
and purchase agreements. For the 1960 crop, the law limits the value of nonrecourse 
loans or purchase agreements made to any one person to $50,000, except for those 
who cut the acreage planted for 1960 harvest by at least 20 percent from the 1959 
acreage. 
Price-support loans are available on each year•s crop from harvest time 
through January 31 of the following year for oats, barley and grain sorghum, and through 
May 31 for corn in most areas. Purchase agreements must be signed by these closing 
dates. 
Corn loans mature on July 31 and grain sorghum loans on March 31. Oats, 
barley, and rye loans mature in most states on April ~0, but maturity in 16 eastern 
and southeastern states is the last day of February. Farmers can redeem their loans 
at any time prior to maturity by paying the face value of the loan plus charges, which 
consist mainly of interest at 3 1/2 percent. 
Price-Support Activities 
During the 1959-60 marketing season, about 529 million bushels of 1959 corn 
crop representing about 12.1 percent of total production was put under price support. 
About 20 percent of the grain sorghums, 10 percent of the barley, and 1 percent of the 
oats, produced in 1959 were placed under price support. 
With respect to the Conservation Reserve, it is estimated that in 1960 the 
following acreage normally devoted to feed grains was diverted to noncrop uses: 
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Item 
Corn ------------------------------
Oats ------------------------------
Barley-----------------------------
Grain sorghums---------------------
Acreage 
1, 000 acres 
4,579 
4,082 
1 1 616 
3,837 
Production 
reduced 
Mil. bu. 
183 
140 
42 
109 
During the 1956-58 period, 17.2 million acres of com were placed in the 
Acreage Reserve {1956, 5.3 million; 1957, 5.2 million; and 1958, 6.7 million). 
The total reduction in production for the three years was estimated to be 9 34 million 
bushels. 
Storage and Disposal 
On July 1, 1960, more than 1. 2 billion bushels of corn, 319 million hundred-
weight of grain sorghum, 71 million bushels of barley, and 15 million bushels of 
oats were in the Commodity Credit Corporation inventory. In addition, 579 million 
bushels of corn, 8. 5 million hundredweight of grain sorghum, 33 million bushels of 
barley, and 21 million bushels of oats were under price-support loans. 
These heavy inventory holdings have made necessary very extensive storage 
operations. CCC stocks are stored primarily in the normal commercial {including 
cooperative) warehouse facilities available throughout the country. Commercial 
storage is handled under a Uniform Grain Storage Agreement, which specifies rates 
and terms. In early 1960, approximately ll,OOO warehouses were "signed up" under 
the agreement and were therefore eligible to store price-support grain. 
Rapid expansion of commerical warehouse space.in recent years has been 
the major factor in providing adequate facilities to store increasingly heavy supplies 
of grain including price-support stocks. Farmers have also materially increased 
their on-farm storage space. 
It has been necessary, however, for the Commodity Credit Corporation to 
acquire a considerable volume of facilities of its own, for use when available commer-
cial space was inadequate to meet current needs. It has not been necessary to buy 
any government bins since 1956. Early in 1960, the capacity was approximately 
985 million bushels. The CCC storage bins have been used mainly to hold inventory 
stocks of corn. Some other grains have been stored in the government bins, but in 
most instances, the expansion of commercial facilities has been adequate to meet 
storage needs. A survey in September 1959 showed that about half of the more than 
one billion bushels of com then in inventory was stored in commercial warehouses 
and half in CCC-owned bins. At that time, however, the bulk of government inventory 
stocks of the other feed grains was in commercial storage. 
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In addition to storage 1 a major Commodity Stabilization Service-Commodity 
Credit Corporation responsibility involves the disposal of inventory holdings. Con-
tinuous efforts are made to move as much as possible of the surplus into useful 
channels of distribution and consumption. Both domestic and export outlets are 
utilized. 
There are legal limitations on domestic disposal of CCC-owned stocks. 
In general, sales cannot be made at less than 105 percent of the current price-
support level for each commodity 1 plus reasonable carrying charges. This limita-
tion does not anply when inventory grain is deteriorating or threatened with deter-
ioration. Nor does it apply to sales for feed so long as such sales impair no 
price-support program. From time to time, stocks have been sold under this pro-
vision at the current market price for the grade and quality. Inventory stocks have 
also been used in emergency feed programs. 
The limitation on sales prices does not apply to exports. 
Export payments are made to bridge gaps when they are present between 
United States feed grain prices and world prices 8 so that sales can be made abroad 
to assure our producers a fair share of the world market. To encourage movement 
of feed grains to countries lacking dollars with which to buy 1 the government accepts 
foreign currencies in payment for feed grains under the provisions of Public Law 480. 
Feed grains are also exchanged for strategic and other materials under a barter pro-
gram. Com, in the form of cornmeal 8 has been donated to feed needy people abroad 
as well as in the United States. 
Before a program change in 1958 1 a very large proportion of all United States 
feed grain exports came directly from the CCC inventory. Since that time 1 under a 
"payment-in-kind" program 8 export supplies are drawn primarily from commercial 
stocks 1 with the subsidy needed to meet world prices paid "in kind" to the exporter 
from CCC stocks. 
As a result of this major program change 8 export demand now has a direct 
impact on commercial markets. This results in less grain moving into and out of 
CCC inventory. At the same time, the use of CCC stocks to make the export pay-
ment permits some turnover of government-owned grain and helps in inventory 
management. 
As a result of the special efforts to find both domestic and export outlets, 
a total of more than two billion bushels of feed grains were moved out of CCC 
inventories from July 11 1953 1 through June 30 0 1959. 
Despite this large disposal operation 1 however 1 acquisitions of more than 
3. 5 billion bushels of feed grains under price-support programs during the same 
6-year period increased the CCC holdings by around 1. 5 billion bushels. On 
June 30, 1960, there was a total of about 1. 8 billion bushels of feed grains in the 
CCC inventory. 
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For corn, disposal operations during the 1959-60 fiscal year resulted in a 
net loss to CCC of $182 million. Since the inception of the program through June 30 o 
1960, the realized loss to the Commodity Credit Corporation totals $1 8 249 million. 
Realized losses to CCC on oats, barley o and grain sorghum during fiscal 1960 
amounted to $48 million. For the entire period of price-support operations through 
June 30, 1960, they totaled $486 million. 
Losses incurred by the Commodity Credit Corporation do not reflect all of 
the unrecovered costs of price-and income-support programs. The total realized 
cost of programs for feed and livestock enterprises designed primarily for stabili-
zation of farm prices and income is shown in appendix table 6 .ll. 
While exports of feed grains have been at relatively high levels 1 they are 
largely the result of various government programs including sales for foreign curren-
cy o barter o and export payments on sales for dollars. In general, world prices of 
feed grains have been below U. S. prices and therefore export payments were re-
quired. These payments were largely in kind from CCC stocks. They are reflected 
in appendix table 6. 8 showing ccc•s dispositions of exports for dollars and exports 
under Title I of P. L. 480. For the 1960 fiscal year o the average export payments 
were as follows: Corn 1 5. 3 cents per bushel; barley I 6. 9 cents per bushel; oats 1 
7.1 cents per bushel; and sorghum graino 9. 0 cents per hundredweight. In recent 
months o export payments have been made lower or have not been required. For 
example 1 no payments were required for corn from June through October or for barley 
from March through September. 
Evaluation of Feed-Grain Programs 
A review of corn acreage and production trends indicates that acreage allot-
ments have been less effective in reducing acreage and production for corn than they 
have been for other 11basic .. crops. A substantial proportion of farmers have over-
planted their allotments in most years. Corn acreage rose 10 million acres in 1959 
in the absence of allotments 1 but this was partly the result of the end of the Acreage 
Reserve Program and other acreage adjustments. There were declines of 3 million 
acres in oats 1 of 1 o 3/4 million acres in soybeans 1 and 3 1/3 million acres in tame 
hay. 
During allotment years o the effect of corn allotments was partly offset by 
the substitution of other feed crops and oil seeds on the acces diverted from como 
wheato and cotton. A decline of 25 percent from 1953 to 1959 in the combined acreage 
of cotton and wheat in the Southern Plains was accompanied by a 12-percent increase 
in the acreage of feed grains. But in the Southeast, acreages of both cotton and feed 
grains declined. During these years, the wheat area in the United States declined 
by about 16 million acres 1 and the cotton area by 10 million, but there was a 19-million-
acre increase in acreages of feed grains and soybeans. 
88 
The loan and purchase agreement programs have raised the level of prices 
of feed grains somewhat above the level that would have prevailed under free market 
conditions. The price-support program has tended to increase the quantities of 
feed grains carried in stock. This effect varies with the level of price support. 
Table 6.1 shows a sharp drop in the proportion of all feed crops except corn placed 
under price support in the crop-year 1959. 
SOYBEANS 
Price-Support Level 
The price of soybeans is supported by loans and purchase agreements. 
Neither acreage allotments nor marketing quotas are established for this crop. By 
law o support of soybean prices is permissive unless cottonseed is supported. 
Support may be at any level not in excess of 90 percent of parity. In determining 
support prices, several factors are considered o including the relation of supply 
to demand, the ability of the Commodity Credit Corporation to dispose of stocks 
acquired o and support levels of other commodities. The law specifically requires 
that whenever the price of either soybeans or cottonseed is supported, the support 
price of the other must be at a level that will enable these commodities to compete 
on equal terms on the market. For both the 1959 and 1960 soybean crops, the support 
price was $1. 85 a bushel, or 64 percent of parity. 
Price-Support Activities 
About 10 percent {52. 4 million bushels) of the 1959 crop of soybeans were 
placed under price support compared with 24 percent {140. 2 million bushels) of the 
1958 crop. The 1959-60 price received by farmers was above the support level, 
and, consequently, only about 5. 5 million bushels of the 1959 crop were delivered 
to the Commodity Credit Corporation. This compares with deliveries of 83 million 
bushels of the 1958 crop. 
In disposing of nearly 58 million bushels, inventory operations during 
fiscal 1960 resulted in a net loss to the Commodity Credit Corporation of approx-
imately $10.3 million. Since the inception of the program through June 30, 1960, 
the realized loss to the Commodity Credit Corporation totaled $18.2 million. The 
tabulation that follows details 1959-60 disposition, costs, and proceeds. Exporters 
of soybeans received no export payments duting the fiscal year. 
Disposition Quantity Cost value CCC proceeds 
l,OOObu. 1, 000 dol. 1, 000 dol. 
Domestic sales ---------------- 57o244 128,380 118,114 
Barter {export) ----------------- 703 1 637 1 570 
Total ---------------------- 57,947 130,017 1191684 
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As of June 30, 1960, there were 20 million bushels of soybeans in the CCC 
inventory, and holdings have declined since then to about 9 million bushels on 
October 1 o 1960. 
It is estimated that the Conservation Reserve reduced the 1960 soybean 
acreage by about l 0 l million acres 1 which represent about 21 million bushels. 
Program Effects 
Soybean production in the United States has increased from 56 million bushels 
in 1935-39 to 562 million in 1960. A record crop of 580 million bushels was produced 
in 1958. Despite expansion into less favorable producing areas, yields have risen 
from 18 bushels in 1935-39 to 24 bushels in 1956-60. 
Technological improvements in soybean production have come more rapidly 
than have those for some competing crops and at about the same rate as for corn. 
Yields per acre increased 83 percent from 1925-29 to 1955-59, compared with an 
84-percent increase for corn. Labor inputs per bushel declined over this period 
by 84 percent for soybeans and 81 percent for corn. Production costs for soybeans 
have declined relative to corn because of the greater increase in costs of fertilizer 
and machinery for corn. Soybean prices received by farmers have averaged a little 
above support levels in most years. 
Farm programs have stimulated soybean production to some extent. Cotton 
allotments have reduced production of cottonseed and thus have strengthened the 
market for competing oil seeds. Also o acreage allotments for wheat 1 corn (before 
1959) 1 and cotton have caused some land to be shifted to soybeans. 
Relative price-support levels for soybeans and feed grains may influence 
the acreage of soybeans 1 but in recent years I many farmers probably have based 
their plans on expectations that soybean prices would be more favorable than was 
indicated by the price- support relation ship. In 19 59 o for example, net returns in 
Illinois per acre of soybeans would have been only about 52 percent of returns 
frohl corn at support levels. But acreage of soybeans in the States declined only 
from 5 1 066,000 to 4,740,000 acres. 
In 1961, price supports for corn and soybeans are expected to have little 
or no influence on soybean acreages as soybean prices next spring are expected 
to be well above support levels. Some increase in soybean acreage is probable. 
Effects of Feed Grain and Soybean Support Programs 
on Livestock Costs and Prices 
The influence of price-support and allotment programs on livestock pro-
duction costs depends on several factors. It is sometimes claimed that price 
supports on feed grains raise feed costs to livestock producers and thus increase 
the cost of livestock production. But support programs have helped to stabilize 
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prices of feed crops and thus may have encouraged production. Allotment programs 
on wheat and cotton have shifted a considerable acreage into feed grains and soy-
beans, and there may have been some improvement in quality of land used for feed 
grains in the South as some cotton land was shifted to feed grains. 
The Acreage Reserve and Conservation Reserve programs shifted some land 
out of feed crops, but acreages in feed. grains in 1959 totaled about 11 million more 
acres than in 1952-53. The acreage in soybeans was up by seven million acres. 
The principal cause of continued increases in production of feed cro~s, however, 
has been the improvement in yields. [See chart AMS 6452 - 60 (10) .J 
Prices of feed grains declined sharply relative to livestock prices between 
1956 and 1958. In October 1960, the index of prices for livestock and livestock 
products was 88 compared with 61 for feed grains (1947-1949 = 100), and 76 for the 
five oilseed meals. U;ee Chart AMS 6457 - 60 (9) J 
During recent years, average feed grain prices received by farmers have 
followed the support levels rather closely. Soybean prices have tended to average 
a little above support levels in most years. 
The proportion of the different feed crops put under price support in recent 
years is shown in table 6 .1. Government storage has obviously provided a tempo-
rary outlet for a significant part of the feed-grain crops. It cannot be inferred that 
the entire amount shown in table 6.1 has been diverted from livestock feeding, since 
a part of it would have been held in storage by farmers and others in the absence 
of a program, but to some extent, the program has reduced livestock production below 
what it would have been without a program. As a result, some support has been 
given to livestock prices. 
Table 6.1. Percentage of total U. S. Production of feed crops placed 
under price support,' by crbp yearso 1953-58 
Crop 
Year Barley Corn Grain oats Rye Soybeans 
sorghum 
percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
1953---------- 18. 3 14. 7 39.4 4.9 28.7 11. 8 
1954---------- 30.4 8.5 48.6 5.3 28.0 12.1 
1955---------- 23.9 13. 0 43.8 4.6 43.9 8.1 
1956---------- 20.5 13. 8 19. 3 3.1 14. 9 14. 6 
1957---------- 32.5 10. 8 52.0 4.7 28.1 18. 7 
1958---------- 22.8 10. 0 45.0 5.9 32.1 24.2 
1959---------- 9.7 12.1 19 . 9 0.8 5.6 9.7 
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A review of price-support activities and price trends for feed grains and live-
stock indicates that technological developments have had a greater influence on 
output and prices of feed grains than have government programs. 
One objective of the grain-storage programs has been the creation of an ever-
normal granary to reduce fluctuations in supplies. They have substantially reduced 
fluctuations in feed grain prices. However, storage programs may have stimulated 
additional cyclical fluctuations. Breimyer observes that regular cycles in hogs have 
appeared only since the inauguration of corn-storage programs. 1 As. hog production 
is now less closely linked with the size of the annual corn crop, it is more able to 
fluctuate independently. 
LIVESTOCK PROGRAMS 
Livestock programs now in operation include mandatory support for milk, 
butterfat, wool, and mohair. Support is permissive for other livestock products. 
The National Wool Act 
The payment method of support authorized by the National Wool Act may be 
used only for shorn and pulled wool and mohair. 
Payments to support prices of shorn wool are called "incentive payments," 
because in enacting the payment type of program, the Congress declared it a 
policy "to encourage the annual domestic production of approximately 300,000 o 000 
pounds of shorn wool, grease basis. . . • " 
Although the National Wool Act authorizes support of mohair prices, market 
prices have been high enough to date to make payments under the act unnecessary. 
Under the wool program, a grower sells his shorn wool in normal marketing 
channels, obtaining, at the time he sells, a sales document describing the transac-
tion. The sales document and an application for payment are filed with the grower's 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation county committee. Payments are made to 
producers by the ASC county offices after the close of the marketing year when the 
national average of prices received by the growers is known and the rate of payment 
can be determined. 
The rate of payment is based on the difference between a previously announced 
incentive price and the United States average price received by producers for wool 
sold during the marketing year. For example, the announced incentive price for the 
1958 marketing year was 62 cents a pound for shorn wool. Growers actually re-
ceived an average price of 36.4 cents. To bring the national average of prices up 
to the incentive level, the U. S. Department of Agriculture made payments amounting 
to 7 0. 3 percent of each producer's sales returns, which had the effect of raising 
average U. S. wool prices to growers from 36.4 to 62 cents a pound. 
1 U. S. Agricultural Marketing Service, Livestock and Meat Situation, May 1958, 
pp. 17-18. 
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Using a percentage rate of payment offers an inducement to the producer to 
do a good job of {a) producing high quality wool, {b) preparing his wool for market, 
and {c) selling his wool in a manner to realize the highest price possible for it. 
The higher the price an individual obtains in the open market, the higher 
the payment. For example, the producer who sold high-quality wool at 70 cents 
a pound got a payment of 49. 2 cents a pound, whereas the producer who marketed 
"tags" at 20 cents a pound got a payment of only 14.1 cents a pound. 
Prices of pulled wool are supported by payments-based on the average in-
centive payment per pound for shorn wool and the live weight of unshorn lambs 
marketed. The purpose of the payments on unshorn lambs is to mai~tain normal 
marketing practices; that is, to discourage unusual shearing prior to marketing. 
Each producer who sells unshorn lambs is eligible for a payment, provided 
he has owned the animals for 30 days or more. Each owner is eligible for a payment 
only on that part of the weight produced during his ownership. 
Incentive payments on shorn wool, made to producers who buy unshorn lambs 
and later shear them, are adjusted downward by the amount of the lamb payment that 
a prior owner was eligible to receive. 
If it becomes necessary to carry on actual support operations for mohair, 
the support method will be the same as that used for shorn wool. 
Support Levels for Wool and Mohair 
Support is required for shorn wool at the incentive level determined by the 
Secretary as necessary to encourage an annual domestic production of approximately 
300 million pounds of shorn wool. The incentive level, however, must not exceed 
llO percent of parity 1 and the total amount of payment at any time is limited to 
70 percent of the cumulative receipts from duties collected on imports wool and wool 
manufactures since January 1 o 1953. Prices of pulled wool are to be supported at 
such a level in relation to the level for shorn wool as will maintain normal marketing 
practices. Support prices for mohair may deviate from the support price for shorn 
wool by as much as 15 percent above or below the comparable percentage of parity 
at.which prices of shorn wool are supported. 
Payments to producers for the first four years of the wool-incentive program 
{1955-58) were $210 1 660, 000. From this total, $11 5 464, 000 was deducted for pro-
motion of sales of lamb and wool by the American Sheep Producers Council 1 Inc. 
Some Results of the Wool Program 
Numbers of sheep and lambs, as well as production of wool o have increased 
since the wool program was inaugurated. 'I'his is partly a result of price incentives 
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under the program o but improved range conditions in drouth areas have been an impor-
tant factor. The number of sheep shorn has increased more rapidly than has the total 
number of stock sheep and lambs. 
The average price received by farmers for wool (excluding program payments) 
was only 44.1 cents from 1955 to 1959 8 compared with 53. 5 cents under the loan pro-
grams for the 1952, 1953 and 1954 marketing years. Without a program 8 wool produc-
tion would probably have declined substantially. Production of shorn wool in 1960 is 
expected to be 265 million pounds. This is the highest production since 1946, but 
it is 12 percent below the goal established in the Wool Act. 
As the wool program provides for direct payments to growers, the market price 
is free to reflect conditions of supply and demand 8 including competition from other 
fibers and imported wool. Under purchase or loan methods of supporting the price of 
wool, a large part of the domestic production accumulates in government stocks, and 
these must be m~rchandised in competition with the clip from the current year. Either 
of these methods encourages imports by holding up the market price of wool. 
Dairy Products 
Prices of butterfat and manufacturing milk and to some extent all milk are 
supported through purchases of butter o cheddar cheese, and nonfat dry milk from manu-
facturers and handlers by CSS through its commodity offices. 
Except as members of cooperatives, milk producers do not deal directly with 
the government in connection with the support program for manufacturing milk and 
butterfat. Purchases of butter 8 cheese, and nonfat dry milk by the CSS maintain the 
overall price structure for dairy products. The support level to milk producers is 
reflected in the prices paid by milk handlers and manufacturers. 
Support Level.- The Agricultural Act of 1949 requires that the price of milk and 
milk products be supported at levels between 7 5 and 90 percent of parity, as the Secre-
tary determines necessary to assure an adequate supply. Support is accomplished by 
purchases of butter o cheddar cheese o and nonfat dry milk solids. In line with require-
ments of the act, the support levels for the 1959 and 1960 marketing years were set 
as follows: 
Commodity Unit 
Butterfat------------------- Lb. 
Milk-manufacturing--------- Cwt. 
Average 
support price 
$0.566 
3.06 
Percent 
of parity 
77 
1 77 
1 Percent of parity equivalent for milk used in manufacturing principal dairy products. 
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Approval of Public Law 86-799 by the President on September 16 1 1960 1 
necessitated increasing dairy product purchase prices to 59.6 cents per pound of 
butterfat and $3.22 per 100 pounds of manufacturing milk. The new support rate 
is approximately 81 percent of parity.. The higher prices are in effect for the rest 
of the marketing year - from September 17 1 1960 I through March 31 1 1961. 
Price-Support Activities.- A summary of price-support purchases 1 utiliza-
tion 1 and estimated uncommitted supplies of dairy products during the 1960-61 
marketing year (April 1 1 1960 - September 30 o 1960) appears as appendix table 6. 9. 
PRICE ASSISTANCE FOR OTHER LIVESTOCK 
Except for wool and mohair o there are no governmental price-support opera-
tions on meat animals or their products. Instead, governmental price assistance 
programs for livestock have taken the form of diverting meat surpluses through 
additional outlets designed to expand consumption. The principal means has been 
the purchase of meats and lard under Section 32 (Section 321 Public Law 320, 74th 
Congress, 1935) for donation to school lunch programs, charitable institutions, and 
welfare agencies. Smaller quantities of meat have been purchased for school lunches 
through the National School Lunch Act and the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act (Public Law 480, 83rd Congress I 1954). Meat and its byproducts 
have also been shipped abroad under financing by the International Cooperation Ad-
mini strati on. 
The U. S. Department of Agriculture purchased approximately 70.2 million 
pounds of meat products late in 1959 and 61.6 million pounds of lard between October 
1959 and Aprill960. Under a purchase program announced in August, 58 million pounds 
of frozen ground beef, canned beef and gravy 1 and frozen ground lamb had been pur-
chased by November 4. The Department has just announced a lard purchase program 
and in the first week bought 3. 5 million pounds. 
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Table 6. 3 . Corn: Supplies and utilization, United States, 1937-60 
... ,., .. ,_ ~ .. Supply Utilization 
.. 
. . 
Year : Im- : 
.. Live-: Feed and: .. 
beginning: Carry-= Produc-: ports: :: stock : indus- : Exports: 
October 1 : tion :y : Total .. feed trial : Seed: y Total over .. 
.. y' . . use 
Mil. Mil. Mil. Mil. 
.. 
. . Mil. Mil. Mil. Mil. Mil . 
. bu. bu • bu. 
...llik. 
. . 
. . 
.. 
.Jlli.:.. bu. bu • ~ bu . 
. . 
1937---- 66 2,643 2 21711:: 21092 103 16 139 2,350 
1938---- 361 21549 y 21910:: 21099 178 15 34 21326 
1939---- 584 2,581 1 31166:: 21231 189 14 44 21478 
1940---- S8h 21457 1 3,146:: 21258 215 13 15 21501 
1941 ---- 645 21652 1 3,298:: 21500 275 12 20 2,807 
1942---- 491 31069 y 31560:: 21909 270 13 5 _g}3, 197 
1943---- ~..§/384 2,966 4 3,354:: 21866 234 13 10 3,123 
1944---- 231 3,088 6 31325:: 21717 264 12 17 31010 
1945---- 315 2,869 1 31185:: 21747 234 12 20 31013 
1946---- 172 31217 1 31390:: 2,671 297 12 127 3,107 
1947---- 283 21355 1 21639:: 2,263 233 12 8 21516 
1948---- 123 31605 1 31729:: 21553 240 12 111 21916 
1949---- 813 3,238 1 4,052:: 2 0 836 254 11 107 3,208 
1950---- 844 31075 1 31920:: 2,793 268 12 107 3,180 
1951---- 740 21926 1 3 0 667:: 21852 240 12 76 3,180 
1952---- 487 3,292 1 3 0 780:: 2,623 236 12 140 3, 011 
1953---- 769 3,210 1 3 0 980:: 21715 236 13 96 3,060 
1954---- 920 31058 1 31979:: 21592 248 12 92 2,944 
1955---- : 11 0 35 31230 1 41266:: 2,723 258 12 108 31101 
1956---- :1, 165 31455 1 41621:: 2,757 268 11 165 3,201 
1957---- :11420 31422 2 41844:: 2 0 911 269 11 183 3 0 374 
1958---- : 11 470 31801 1 51272:: 31226 289 13 214 3,742 
1959..§/- :1,530 41361 1 51892:: 31580 289 13 211 4,093 
1960 ..§./- : 1, 799 41259 1 6 0 059:: 31546 290 13 210 41059 
11 Includes grain equivalent of products. 
y' Residual; includes small quantities for other uses and waste. 
ll Grain only. y Less than 500 I 000 bushels . 
..v Beginning with 1943-44 1 total stocks in~lude stocks at interior mills 1 elevators and 
ware houses . These stocks excluded in computing 1942-43 disappearance. 
..§./ Preliminary. Based on indications in October 1960. 
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Table 6. 4. Oats: Supply and utilization, United States, 1937-60 
.. 
. . 
.. 
. . Utilization Supply 
----------~~-----------.. ----~------~----~------~----­
Year 1m- :: Live-: Feed ~nd: 
beginning: Carry-: Produc-: ports : :: stock : indus- : Exports : 
July 1 over : tion 1./ : Total :: feed 
:: y 
Mil. 
....2.Y.:. 
1937---- : 91 
1938---- : 209 
1939---- : 196 
1940---- : 148 
1941---- : 223 
1942---- : 194 
1943---- :.§/259 
1944---- : 208 
1945---- : 234 
1946---- : 290 
1947---- : 274 
1948---- : 182 
1949---- : 29"0 
1950---- : 208 
1951---- : 286 
1952---- : 277 
1953---- : 249 
1954---- : 227 
1955---- : 303 
1956---- : 347 
1957---- : 240 
1958---- : 325 
1959 y-: 368 
1960 y-: 269 
.. 
.. 
Mil. 
...!ll!:... 
Mil. Mil. ::Mil. 
~ J2Y.:- :: ..!ll!.:. 
1,177 y 
1,089 1 
958 11 
1,246 10 
1,183 1 
1,343 59 
1,140 81 
1,149 69 
1,524 24 
1,478 1 
1,176 2 
1,450 19 
1,220 20 
1,369 30 
1,278 62 
1,217 69 
1,153 80 
1,410 20 
1,503 3 
1,163 17 
1, 30·1 25 
1,416 3 
1,074 2 
1,178 5 
.. 
.. 
1,268 :: 927 
1,299 :: 980 
1,165:: 895 
11404 ::. 11052 
1,407 :2 1,076 
1 I 59 6 : : L, 2 0 9 
1,480:: 1,123 
1,426 :: 1,036 
11782 :: 11 315 
1,769:: 1,331 
1,452:: 1,111 
'1,651 :: 1,199 
1,530:: 1,164 
11 607 :: 1,182 
1,626 :::1,206 
1,563:: 1,169 
1 1 482 :: 1 1 101 
1,657 :: 1,185 
1,809 :: 1,286 
1,527:: 1,116 
1,566 :: 1,079 
1 1 7 44 :: 1 1 215 
11444 :: 11007 
1,452 :: 1,027 
.. 
.. 
l/ Includes grain equivalent of products. 
trial : Seed : 11 
use 
Mil. 
~ 
28 
29 
30 
31 
34 
44 
44 
46 
48 
44 
44 
40 
37 
36 
36 
36 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
42 
Mil. Mil. 
.J:ll!.:_ ~ 
93 
90 
92 
98 
102 
103 
105 
110 
111 
100 
104 
104 
109 
100 
105 
108 
118 
119 
112 
107 
96 
90 
83 
83 
11 
4 
y 
y 
1 
y 
y 
y 
18 
20 
11 
18 
12 
3 
2 
1 
y 
13 
26 
25 
26 
30 
43 
25 
Y Residual; includes small quantities for other uses and waste. 
11 Grain only. 
Y Less than 500,000 bushels • 
Total 
Mil. 
~ 
1,059 
1,103 
1,017 
1,181 
1,213 
.§/1,356 
11272 
1,192 
1,49 2 
1,495 
1,270 
1,361 
1,322 
1,321 
1,349 
.1,314 
1,255 
1,354 
1,462 
1,287 
1,241 
1,376 
1,175 
1,177 
.§/ Beginning with 1943-44 total stocks include stocks at interior mills, 
elevators and warehouses. These stocks excluded in computing 1942-43 
disappearance. 
Y Preliminary. Based on indications in October, 1960. 
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Table 6. 5. Barley: Supply and utilization, United States, 1937-60 
Supply .. Utilization 
.. 
Year . Im- : . . Live-: Food and: . . . 
beginning: Carry- : Produc-: ports: .. stock: indus- : Exports : .. 
July 1 over tion .v : Total:: feed : trial : Seed : JJ :Total 
.. y use .. 
. . 
.. 
Mil. Mil. Mil. Mil. :: Mil. Mil. Mil. Mil. Mil. 
bu. bu. bu. bu. :: bu. ~ bu. bu. bu . 
. . 
. . 
1937---- : 22 222 6 250 .. 114 64 21 18 217 . . 
1938---- : 33 257 3 293 .. 146 60 25 11 242 .. 
1939---- : 51 278 3 332 .. 191 60 26 5 282 .. 
1940---- : 50 311 2 363 .. 213 62 26 2 303 . . 
1941----: 60 363 2 425 .. 246 74 32 3 355 .. 
1942---- : 70 429 27 526 .. 322 84 28 2 11436 . . 
1943---- ;V 121 323 41 485 .. 288 95 23 3 409 . . 
1944---- : 76 276 38 390 .. 169 102 19 5 295 . . 
1945---- : 95 267 6 368 .. 191 90 19 9 309 . . 
1946---- : 59 265 4 328 .. 142 95 19 16 272 .. 
1947---- : 56 282 1 339 .. 143 99 21 24 287 . . 
1948---- : 52 316 12 380 .. 136 97 18 28 279 .. 
1949---- : 101 237 18 356 .. 140 93 21 22 276 
1950---- : 80 304 14 398 .. 145 101 18 40 304 . . 
1951---- : 94 257 13 364 .. 152 93 15 31 291 . . 
1952---- : 73 228 25 326 .. 134 88 16 37 275 .. 
1953---- : 51 247 38 336 .. 131 91 24 19 265 . . 
1954---- : 71 379 24 474 .. 186 88 26 43 343 . . 
1955---- : 131 401 28 560 .. 226 90 24 103 443 . . 
1956---- : 117 377 27 521 .. 216 89 27 62 394 . . 
1957---- : 127 437 24 588 .. 215 87 26 92 420 . . 
1958---- : 168 475 14 657 .. 228 90 27 117 462 . . 
1959 y- : 195 420 18 633 .. 230 92 25 118 465 . . 
1960 .i/- : 168 415 20 603 .. 216 92 25 100 433 . . 
. . 
.. 
11 Includes grain equivalent of products. y Residual; includes small quantities for other uses and waste. 
11 Beginning with 1943-44 total stocks include stocks at interior mills o 
elevators and warehouses. These stocks excluded in computing 1942-43 
disappearance. 
i/ Preliminary. Based on indication in October 1960. 
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Table 6. 6. Sorghum grain: Supply and utilizationu United States, 1937-60 
Supply .. Utili~ation .. 
.. 
.. 
Year Carry-: Produc~: .. Live- : Feed and: .. 
beginning: over tion :Total .. stock indus- : .. 
October ll .. feed trial : Seed: Exports : Total .. 
.. y use .. 
.. 
.. 
Mil. Mil. Mil • .. Mil. Mil. Mil. Mil. Mil. .. 
.. bu. ~ bu. . . ~ ~ bu. bu. bu • .. 
-.. 
.. 
1937---- 70 .. 67 2 1 70 .. 
1938---- 67 .. 64 3 y 67 .. 
1939---- 53 .. 50 3 y 53 .. 
1940---- 86 .. 83 3 y 86 .. 
1941---- 114 .. 111 1 2 y 114 .. 
1942---- 110 .. 106 1 3 y 110 .. 
1943---- 110 .. 97 10 3 y 110 .. 
1944---- 185 .. 130 48 2 5 185 .. 
1945---- 96 .. 84 9 2 1 96 .. 
1946---- 106 .. 75 5 2 24 106 .. 
1947---- 7 93 100 .. 64 10 2 17 93 .. 
1948---- 7 131 138 .. 73 4 2 40 119 .. 
1949--..-- 19 148 167 .. 63 10 2 32 107 .. 
1950---- 60 234 294 .. 143 36 2 75 256 .. 
1951---- 38 163 201 .. 115 12 2 62 191 .. 
1952---- 10 91 101 .. 78 4 2 10 94 .. 
1953---- 7 116 123 .. 79 5 2 15 101 .. 
1954---- . 22 235 257 .. 123 8 3 48 182 . .. 
1955---- 75 243 318 .. 160 8 3 66 237 .. 
1956---- 81 206 287 .. 174 9 3 22 208 .. 
1957---- 79 564 643 .. 265 9 3 57 334 .. 
1958---- 309 610 919 .. 297 9 3 100 409 .. 
1959 y- 510 579 1,089 .. 395 12 3 98 508 .. 
1960 y- 581 603 1,184 .. 429 12 3 100 544 .. 
.. 
.. 
ll Stocks in all positions on October 1, not reported prior to 1947. 
y' Residual; includes small quantities for other uses and waste. 
y Less than 500,000 bushels. 
y Preliminary. Based on indication in October 1960. 
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Table 6. 8. Commodity CI'edit Corporation disposition, costs, and proceeds from sale of feed grains 
Corn 
1'50mestic 
Sales 
Item 
Transfers to other government agencies 
Donations 
Exports 
Sales for dopars 
P. L. 480, Title I !.I 
P. L. 480, Title II 
P. L. 480, Barter 
Payment in kind 
Other donations 
Total com 
Corn meal 
Domestic 
Sales 
Donations 
Exu9f!s P: L. 480, Title II 
Donations 
Total corn meal 
Total com and com meal 
~ 
----nomestic 
Sales 
Transfers to other government agencies 
Exports 1 I P. L, 480, Title I -
P. L. 480, Title II 
P. L, 480, Barter 
Payment-in-kind 
Total Barley 
Qm. 
Domestic 
Sales for dollars 
Donations 
Transfers to other government agencies 
Exports 
P. L. 480, Title I!/ 
P. L. 480, Barter 
Payment-in-kind 
Total Oats 
Grain sorghums 
Domestic 
Sales 
Donations 
Exports 
Sales for dollars 
P. L. 480, Title I U 
P. L. 480, Title II 
P. L, 480, Barter 
Payment-in-kind 
Total grain sorghums 
ayment-in-kind 
Quantity 
dis osed of 
.1,000 bu. 
111,313 
53 
97 
690 
2,990 
377 
24,349 
5,874 
552 
146,295 
1,000 lb. 
15 
134,360 
29,996 
324,189 
488,560 
31' 219 
8 
4,242 
1,974 
11,647 
9,907 
58,997 
41,490 
577 
11 
1,527 
872 
1,610 
46,087 
1,000 cwt. 
7,836 
7 
3 
1,408 
771 
4,623 
2,023 
16,671 
1 000 bu 
234,902 115,825 
142 80 
330 
1,832 757 
7,897 8,461 
1,071 1,219 
64,646 30,173 
15,595 
1,572 
7,312 
327,987 163,827 
1 !I 
4,646 
1,200 
12,647 
1,225 
18,494 1,225 
346,481 165,052 
41,158 
11 
29,558 
14 
~,039 ~,640 
3,255 3,983 
17,177 11,531 
14,610 9,696 
82,250 61,422 
33,480 
742 
26,772 
10 11 
1,340 
794 
1,409 
516 
1,464 1,105 
37,830 29,813 
21,045 14,173 
22 
11 7 
4,207 4,299 
2,429 2,502 
16,646 8, 780 
7,284 3,909 
51,644 33,670 
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Table 6. 9. Dairy price-support purchases, utilizations and estimated 
uncommitted supplies, April 1, 1959 through March 31, 1960: 
Purchases (1959-60 Marketing Year} 
April 1 - March 31, 1960 
Utilizations 
Cocoa Butter Extender Sales 
Animal & Mixed Feed Sales 
Commercial Export Sales: 
Foreign Currency 
Barter Sales 
Dollar Sales 
Commercial Export Sales Total 
Non commercial Export Sales 
U. S. Army Transfers 
Veterans Administration Transfers 
ICA - P. L. 480 (Title II} 
Donations: 
Foreign 
Domestic Y 
Research 
Inventory Reduction 
Total Utilizations: 
Estimated Uncommitted Supplies: 
As of March 31 I 1960 
115,803,731 
151,372,023 
42,145,806 
2,500 
57,016,593 
182,668,007 
83,273,907 
59,000 
468,200 
562,498,385 
179,666,402 
..!/ Does not include purchases of nonfat dry milk made by USDA with Section 32 
funds - 49 I 021 I 200 pounds 
Y Includes 75 1 245,386 pounds of butter, 22,352,330 pounds of cheese and 3,850,000 
pounds of dry milk for donation financed with Section 32 (tariff} funds; also dona-
tions under Section 210 (P. L. -540} of 442,044 pounds of butter o 629, 783 pounds 
of cheese and 817,335 pounds of dry milk to penal institutions and 27 o 520 pounds 
of butter and 1 I 000 pounds of dry milk to Public Health Service. 
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Table 6.10. Dairy products. Disposition, cost and proceeds, fiscal year 1959-60 
Cost CCC 
Disposition Quantit~ Value Proceeds 
(1,000 lbs.) (1, 000 dol.) (1 o 000 dol.) 
Butter 
Domestic sales 1,202 734 555 
Domestic transfers to other agencies 31,363 19,027 18,659 
Domestic donations 49,988 30,714 
Export sales 1,215 717 473 
Title I, PL 480 sales 35 20 21 
Barter (export) 14,903 8,802 5,766 
Export transfers 814 480 311 
Total 99,520 60,494 25,785 
Cheese 
Domestic transfers to other agencies 16,462 5,959 5,802 
Domestic donations 23,660 8,828 
Export sales 357 126 101 
Title I, PL 480 
Title I I, PL 480 
Barter (export) 11,672 4, 136 3,682 
Export transfers 
Export donations 101 27 
Totall./ 52,252 19,076 9,585 
Milk, dried 
Domestic sales 21,584 3 0 199 2,306 
Domestic transfers to other agencies 3,106 450 431 
Domestic donations 84,059 13,967 
Export sales 111,845 16,590 5,787 
Title I u PL 480 17,117 2,580 2,565 
Title II, PL 480 73,292 11,498 11,934 
Barter (export) 44,516 6,603 3,486 
Export transfers 
Export donations 267,243 42,030 
Total 622,762 96 0 917 26,509 
Fluid milk 
Domestic donations 574,523 23,555 
l/ Exclud, s adjustments for prior years transactions. 
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Table 6. 11. Realized cost of programs primarily for stabilization of farm 
prices and incomes 1 feed grains, soybeans 1 and livestockl/ 
Commodity 
Com 
Barley 
Grain sorghums 
Oats 
Miscellaneous grain programs 
Soybeans 
Dairy products 
Wool 
Eggs 
Miscellaneous livestock and livestock 
products 
Pork and lard 
Poultry 1 including turkeys 
Fiscal year 1959 
Million dollars 
535.7 
30.0 
47.5 
7.2 
2.5 
134.7 
16.1 
6.4 
5.0 
7.6 
1.5 
1/ Excludes costs not allocable by commodity. 
Total 
1932-59 
Million dollars 
2,747.0 
183.5 
221.5 
79.1 
83.0 
82.3 
390.8 
253.8 
295.9 
211.2 
201.2 
45.2 
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Chapter 7 
An Analysis of the Situation Paper on 
Feed Grains, Soybeans, and Livestock 
G . E. Btandow 
Pennsylvania State University 
I have tried to condense my remarks to a few principal implications concerning 
policy. My comments deal rather specifically with the present situation, while 
Dr. Paulsen's deals with broader issues. 
l. Technology. The paper names technology as the chief source of rising 
output of feed crops and soybeans. Nothing is said about prospects for the future 1 
but there is little reason to suppose that technology will not continue to advance for 
years to come. We can expect discovery of new production techniques and wider 
adoption of presently known ones. The level of prices will not greatly affect the 
economic incentive to adopt new practices o but very low prices would seriously impair 
farmers • ability to finance any investments new methods might require. Except at very 
low prices o total output will be comparatively insensitive to price while technology 
is advancing rapidly. 
2. The rate of feeding. The paper does not mention one of the most impor-
tant current factors affecting use of feed grains -- the high rate of feeding. The over-
all rate of efficiency at which feed concentrates have been converted into livestock 
products for the mark8t appears to have been at least 10 percent below normal in the 
last two years. Probably feed disappearance in the past year has been 15-18 million 
tons above the amount normally required to produce the volume of livestock products 
flowing to market. At usual rates, more livestock products would have been sold at 
lower prices or more feed grains would have been turned over to the government. 
Though many do not agree, I expect the rate of feeding to return to earlier norms, or 
nearly so; and this will aggravate the surplus situation in feed grains still further. 
3. Effects of programs on the feed grain supply. The situation paper indi-
cates that marketing quotas on wheat and cotton have diverted land to feed grains 1 
and it shows that feed grains have been put under price support. It reaches no con-
clusion as to the combined effect of all programs on feed grain supplies. A common 
belief is that the programs have increased the supply of grains available for feed 1 
but I doubt that this is correct. My best guess is that the tonnage of concentrates o 
including feed wheat and oilseed meals o produced for feed would be about the same 
without any programs at all as the quantity actually produced for feed and government 
programs in 1960. This estimate assumes that yields per acre would be somewhat 
lower than they are if there had been no supports in recent years. The programs have 
reduced the amount actually fed o however o because large quantities of feed grains 
and wheat otherwise available for feed have been diverted from livestock to the govern-
ment for disposal. 
4. Level of grain prices without supports. The paper concludes that price 
supports have raised feed grain prices "somewhat above the level that would have 
prevailed under free market conditions. " I am not sure what "free market" means 
here, but I believe that feed grain prices would have been at least one-fourth lower 
in the absence of any and all farm programs. Most of the recent studies of probable 
free market prices in the 19 60' s support this view. 
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5. Feed grain supports and livestock prices. Government programs for feed 
grains have had large, favorable effects on hog prices and on incomes of hog pro-
ducers. Grain supports. have indirect! y benefited prices of range cattle, though in 
less degree. Returns in cattle feeding operations probably have been moderately 
affected. Without grain supports, we would have a somewhat larger poultry industry 
and lower poultry prices, Qut the margins between feed costs and product prices 
would be about the same as they now are. With respect to dairy, producers can 
shift from production of grains and meat animals to milk production readily enough 
so that lower grain prices would not only reduce dairy product prices (in time) as feed 
costs fell but would also reduce tre spread between feed costs and dairy prices. 
6. Overproduction an aggregate problem. The current surplus problem is 
more properly regarded as an overall situation in agriculture than as a problem of a 
few individual commodities. In the heartland of American agriculture in which this 
conference is held, vast land and labor resources can be shifted among corn, other 
feed grains 1 and soybeans. Within the area or on its fringes, resources can be 
shifted among feed grains, oil crops, dairy products o wheat, cotton o and a number 
of less important products. In free markets, the great bulk of feed grains and sur-
plus wheat must go into livestock products. Meat animals and poultry compete close-
ly with each other for a place on the consumer's table. Soybeans, hogs u dairy cows, 
and seed cotton are all sources of fats and oils, for which the total market is dis-
tinctly inelastic. With strong competition among leading farm products on both the 
supply and demarrl sides of the market, prosperity or depression in one segment of 
agriculture is eventually generalized over most of the whole. 
Conclusions or recommendations based on the situation for a single commodity 
can easily be wrong or miss the point. Two examples are given: 
(1) Preventing surpluses of wheat or cotton by reducing acreage with no re-
gard for the use of the diverted acres merely reallocates the surplus among commodi-
ties. 
{2) We can be optimistic about the outlook for the soybean marketo especially 
exports, but we need to remember {a) that this is partly at the expense of lard, butter-
fat, and cottonseed oil and meal o and {b) that even though larger exports might permit 
an important expansion of soybean productionu soybean exports would have to be enor-
mous to offset importantly the drag of static domestic demands for wheat and cotton. 
7. Crops more important in effective supply control than livestock.. Potential 
earnings on most farm land in non-agricultural uses is close to zero I and low crop 
prices will be very slow to remove land from production. Livestock adjusts more 
promptly to unfavorable relationships between product prices and feed costs, though 
the adverse effects of higher feed prices on dairymen and poultrymen until the adjust-
ment is made should not be underestimated. The most urgent problem is to bring 
crop production into line with what the market will take at reasonable prices. 
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8. But feed crops present special control problems. In principle o production 
controls should be put on the quantity produced or sold 1 for then producers could not 
substitute things like fertilizer for land and thereby raise output. But bushel controls 
seem next to impossible for feed grains because so much is fed to livestock on the 
farm where grown. Land controls seem the only WC1f to control feed grains even though 
such controls are clumsy and not fully effective. Controls could take the form of 
idling a fraction of growers' feed grain acreage or the less specific form of general 
land retirement. 
Summary. The situation paper is a straightforward description of the current 
position of feed grains 1 soybeans 1 and livestock. To me, the implications of the 
situation, especially with respect to crops, are more serious for producers than the 
paper suggests. Despite the need, this is just about the most difficult part of agri-
culture in which to develop programs for protecting farm income, and the success of 
of any comprehensive attempt to improve--or even maintain--the economic position 
of farmers is likely to depend upon how well it handles feed crops. 
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Chapter 8 
An Appraisal of the Situation and 
Programs in Feed Grain, Soybeans and 
Livestock 
Arnold Paulsen 
Iowa State University 
Why do we have economic policy? Why do we take a particular attitude or 
approach to agriculture? 
Obviously society has some goals or purposes for economic policy. The farm 
policy in force reflects the attitude and approach which policymakers collectively 
decided would make the most satisfying contribution to the many goals and purposes 
society has for policy. Numerous compromises of legislatures over the years have 
brought us the collection of programs that make up the official policy or approach to 
agriculture. New legislation modifies the collection of programs, amends the policy, 
reflects a shift in attitude or estimated "best" approach. New legislation indicates 
that the goals of economic policy are going to be contributed to in a little different way. 
But whose goals or purposes are served by economic policy? What we desire 
and want from economic policy depends on who "we" are. Naturally we don•t all agree 
on policy. We can •t be expected to agree on policy. 
It is rather like two people who happen to get in the same taxi. The one wants 
to go north and the other south. Is the one right and the other wrong? No! They 
each have a goal in mind which to them is important. But because the goals are dif-
ferent, they both can•t use the same vehicle to attain them. Only if we know the 
present goals for agricultural policy can we appraise the appropriateness of programs 
enacted. 
Are the goals of society for farm policy to be found in the legislation? In the 
preamble of the farm policy bills, there is a statement of purpose. For example, in 
the Domestic Allotment Act of 1938 and Soil Bank Act of 1956, we find similarity in 
stated purpose. Both bills state that conservation of natural resources and the pre-
vention of the disruption of interstate commerce are goals of the program. Stability in 
the agricultural economy is stated as a goal in the 1938 act. The 1956 act, for the 
first time, specifically stated that excessive supplies depressed farm prices and in-
comes, and that it was the purpose of the bill to protect and increase farm incomes. 
Are conservation and interstate commerce regulation the main goals because they are 
mentioned in both acts? Or are they only public appeal and constitutionality pegs 
on which to hang the legislation? Is stability no longer a goal because it is not in 
the 1956 preamble? Is farm income improvement only recently a goal? 
Are there other qoals? Probably other goals held by the policy makers were not 
made explicit in the preamble. From the Congressional Record and hearings of Con-
gressional committees, it is apparent that individuals and groups held additional goals 
or stressed particular goals included in the preamble. Some goals that logically are 
involved in farm policy are n,ot expressed. Where is the goal of cheap, plentiful food 
stated? Does any legislation promise to maintain freedom of farmers to operate as 
they choose? 
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, Can we find the goals for farm programs by looking at interest groups 'Z There 
are many groups with an interest in the consequences of farm policies. For example, 
consumers, in the form of millions of )\merican housewives, are interested in a low 
price for food at retail. This goal ofhousewives for cheap food may be transmitted 
to policy makers in the form of a side or border condition limiting the range of choice 
among farm policy alternatives to those that do not raise food prices enough to arouse 
consumers to political action. Legislators are free to do any number of things with 
respect to farm programs as far as the average housewife is concerned, but they 
must not influence. the price of food at retail enough to motivate her to write to her 
congressman or vote against him. 
The voters of rt.J,ral towns and in agricultural supply and processing industries 
are also interested in farm. policy. These groups also may impose side or border 
co~ditions on the range of choice of alternative farm programs. A number of policy 
alternatives would be "acceptable 11 to rural communities and agribusiness people; 
some other proposals would harm their business enough to be unacceptable. These 
groups favor the improvement of farm income but can be .aroused to political action 
against farm programs if they· are harmed sufficiently in the process. 
Taxpayers hold a goal for farm programs. They would like the cost to be a 
minimum. There are many cla1ms for limited tax funds, and savings of any magni-
tude are welcome. They are willing to accept some level of expenditures, but will 
become more vocal as costs rise. 
Farmers • of course, hold goals for farm programs. Higher incomes , more 
stable prices, preservation of family farms, and economic freedom can be enumerated. 
Legislators and ,executives as national statesmen rather than local represent-
atives are concernecl with national security, national growth and national full em-
ployment. 
SUMMARY UPON GOALS 
Backing off for a moment, the goals for economic policy, of which farm policy 
is a particular kind, may be said to fall in four categories: justice, progress, sta-
bility and freedom. Other categories might be named, but these will serve. 
Economic justice can be taken to mean income distribution and the distribu-
tion of opportunity. We all are concerned about how the wealth of America .is 
distributed among the people. Groups have goals and proposals about how to in-
fluence the income distribution by economic policy. Farmers feel they need more 
income than they would receive under free markets. They are not sharing fully in 
the income growth of the nation. Apparently, society as a whole agrees that the 
distribution of income between farmers and nonfarmers should be changed. However, 
all farmers do not agree on the distribution of income that is just. Urban people 
differ also on the optimum income distribution and almost certainly are less willing 
to transfer income. to farmers by economic policy than farmers. 'I'hese are differences 
in goals, and it is not possible to resolve them by .research. All groups are con-
cerned with economic justice. The rriany desires to change the income 'distribution in 
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various directions must be included in a category of goals called "justice". This 
category must be considered in appraising economic policy. 
Progress is most simply defined as an increase in the average per capita in-
come and living standard. Different rates of progress are deemed "necessary" by 
different groups. For example I we in America have strongly desired economic prog-
ress for many decades. We have enacted dozens of pieces of legislation that give 
expression to the gradual policy of promoting progress. We have great and powerful 
forces created in our society to help bring about new technology which is an ingredi-
ent of progress. We in America are heavily committed to progress. Role of growth 
received much attention in this fall's political campaign. I presume policy makers 
want to consider what alternative agricultural economic policies contribute to prog-
ress, 
· Stability means lack of fluctuations and may mean lack of change. With 
respect to economic ·policy 1 people hold various subgoals such as stable prices 1 
stable levels of consumption o stable business structures and stable social structures. 
Goals of stability are obviously held to varying degrees by different people. There 
are some gamblers who enjoy a chance in a world of instability. But o other things 
being equal 1 apparently there is some higher degree of instability that is less satis-
fying than a lower level of fluctuations and change. The conservation reserve was 
unpopular among some people partly because it accelerated change in small communi-
ties. We must consider how economic policies affect stability of our economy and 
society. People have goals to be served in the area of stability. 
Freedom is a goal of economic policy. We use a restricted definition here 1 
namely 1 freedom of economic choice.· That is I the lack of group control over the 
will of an individual with respect to choosing (1) the kind of work he does (products 
he produces) 1 (2) what he works with (resource mix he uses in producing) o and (3) how 
much he works (how many resources he employs and how much product he produces) • 
The amount of freedom of choice can vary greatly. It is not possessed completely 
like a child's doll or else not possessed at all. But it can be had in larger or smaller 
amounts. 
Freedom can be limited by many groups u such as o federal government 1 state or 
local government -- even by factories I labor unions I families or social groups. In 
any case 1 where the range of alternatives in the three areas of economic choice are 
limited by group rules 1 written or unwritten 1 an individual's freedom is affected. 
Individuals probably vary greatly as to the strength of their preference for 
increments or decrements of freedom. Individuals probably vary also as to how much 
freedom they would give up for more stability or progress. Goals of freedom are im-
portant in the choice of economic policy. 
The goals of progress 1 stability 1 justice and freedom are important for national 
general economic policy or for farm programs which are a form of economic policy. 
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In this session we are to appraise programs for the feed grain o soybeans and 
livestock segment of the agricultural economy. In considering farm policyo this 
group of commodities is a very useful aggregate. It is useful because it forms a 
rather thoroughly interrelated segment of the agricultural economy. Yet it can be 
reasonably dissected out of the agricultural industry. Although there are relation-
ships between wheat and the feed-livestock economyo these relationships are not 
presently operating because of wheat allotments and the price difference between 
wheat and feed grains. There is also a bond with cotton because they both us~ land 
on the same farm and protein concentrate for livestock is made from cotton seed. 
But the bond is rather weak. Feed grains compete rather weakly with cotton for land 
on cotton farms. Cotton seed meal is definitely a byproduct to cotton lint and cotton 
seed oH. 
Corn, oats, barley o grain sorghum o soybeans and all the livestock and live-
stock products is an aggregate that hangs together economically because of three 
attributes. f'irsto they are substitutes' for one another in consumption. All four of 
the feed grains substitute for one another in consumption by livestock. There is 
also a range of substitution between feed grains and soybean meal in livestock pro-
duction. The principle of substitution also binds all the meats together because 
they are substitutes in human consumption. The price of any meat animal is associ-
ated with the prices of other meat animals. A decrease in the quantity of any one 
meat tends to raise the price of all other meats. Eggs o meat and milk are not very 
good substitutes for one another on the dinner table but are bound together because 
of a second attributeo substitution in production. Milko meat and eggs are alternative 
products for many farmers. If the price of one should be high relative to the other, 
production of the one with the high price will increase while the other will fall. This 
substitution is relatively slow but, nevertheless o tends to bind the livestock classes 
together. Substitution in production applies strongly in the case of corn and soybeans. 
Literally millions of acres could be switched to soybeans from corn or vice versa with 
slight changes in relative prices. The third attribute involved in the cohesiveness 
of the aggregate is the input to output type relationship between the feed grains or 
soybeans and livestock. A demand for livestock implies a demand for feed grains. 
If livestock prices are high, the price of feed grains will be bid up. If feed grains 
are scarce, livestock can not be plentifuL The storage program for feed grains has 
attempted to uti.lize the input-output relationship of feed grains and livestock to in-
fluence the prices of livestock products. 
Since the aggregate is cohesive, it seems appropriate for any policy to deal 
with it in totaL Economic policy that attempted to deal with only one commodity 
would be rather like a small boy who tried to pluck a nut out of a huge mess of soft 
taffy. He could get hold of the. nut and move it , but he would stretch and pull the 
whole mess of taffy each time he tugged on the nut he wanted. 
PROGRAMS IN THE FEED GRAIN, SOYBEANS AND LIVESTOCK SECTOR 
Let us look at three programs that have been used in the feed-livestock econo-
my recently and appraise them using the four goals of justice o progress, stability 
and freedom. Let us also look at two other important policies, namely, public support-
ed research and development and programs of education for economic adjustment which 
are not always discussed as farm programs. 
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The collection of programs that created the universities, the public schools I 
the land-grant system, the research and development programs of national defense, 
the research departments of corporations, National Science Foundationo and many 
other parts of a vast system of public supported and encouraged research and de-
velopment has been tremendously important to agriculture. This system brings forth 
new technology, ideas and trained people at a rapid rate. We have a heavy support 
to this system. It is a part of our country. We may pour a larger volume of re-
sources into it as a result of international and domestic pressures. New technology 
is constantly leaping into our economy and with great force setting off change o more 
opportunities, progress, and also pressure on old ways, hardships for people who 
cannot or do not use the new technology. It creates growing pains and the frustra-
tion and discontent of decline. 
Public supported research and development is an economic policy. It con-
tributes to the goal of progress. It has meant much to our position of world leader-
ship and our high standard of living. It is not an unmingled blessing, however. 
With new production capacity and methods, agriculture, and other sectors too, have 
had low incomes, faced loss of opportunity to continue in chosen occupations and 
upheaval in business and social organizations of local communities. 
Public supported research and development also changes the pattern of income 
distribution and thus affects the goal of distributive justice. It causes change and 
thus detracts from stability. It enhances the range of economic choice and, hence, 
economic freedom by creating new opportunities and a changing situation. 
Let us look now at the grain storage program I the acreage allotment programs, 
and the soil bank. These three programso recently in force, can be appraised in 
light of the four goals of justice, progress, stability and freedom. The three pro-
grams are still live possibilities 1 subject to modification and expansion or contrac-
tion. The analysis, therefore, is not backward looking. 
All three programs -- grain storage I acreage allotments and the soil bank --
have the capacity to transfer income from the rest of society to agriculture. Thus o 
they contributed to the purposes of those who desired to raise the income of agri-
culture relative to the rest of the society. Some of the additional incorre to farmers 
was transferred by taxes on society and payments to farmers o but most of it was 
transferred from consumers through the market place. In total o society gave up about 
$1. 85 for each $1 of additional income secured for agriculture via the storage programs. 
None of the programs were able to secure an additional dollar of income for agricul-
ture without penalizing the rest of the society more than $1. The acreage allotment 
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program required about $1. 7 3 for each $1 transferred to agriculture. The soil bank 
possibly could transfer a dollar of income to agriculture for about $1. 48 loss of in-
come by the rest of society . .!../ 
l/ Rough approximations were used to estimate the relative efficiencies of the 
three programs in transferring income. A five percent decline in marketed out-
put was estimated to increase farm level prices 12 o 5 percenL Thus o in the 
case of the storage program u the value of the grain crop was increased 12 o 5 
percent o The cost of grain purchase for storage was 1.12 x o 05 or 5. 6 percent. 
The consumer food bill for the items involved would be . 95 x 1.12 or 1. 069 o 
In addition, consumers would receive 5 percent less food and would lose 
. 05 x 1. 00 or are presumed 5 percent worse off 0 The grain purchased will have 
to be handled and stored. This is assumed to amount to a second purchase of 
the grain or another 5. 6 percent o Summarizing, the total loss to non producers 
is 23ol and the total gain to producers is 12.5o The benefits to farmers are 
divided by the sum of the loss in income by nonproducers 0 Thus for each dollar 
given to producers as a groupo nonproducers as a group gave up $1. 85 o 
Loss to nonproducers 
6. 9 larger food budget 
5o 6 purchase of grain 
5. 6 storage 
5. 0 less. food 
23.1 
12. 5 larger income to farmers 
= $1. 85 for each $1 
transferred 
The arithmetic for voluntary allotments plus storage and soil bank are below: 
Larger food budget 
Purchase of grain 
Storage 
Less food 
Benefit to farmers 
Cost $1 transferred 
Allotment 
and storage 
6o9 
2.8 
2o8 
5o0 
16.9 Land rental cost 
Benefit to farmers 
Cost $1 transferred 
Soil bank 
5.0 
3o5 
15.4 
6.9 
3o5 
10.4 
$1.48 
value of crop 
payment 
total 
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Also under economic justice, one must consider the effect of the three pro-
grams on income distribution between agribusiness and other sectors. A storage 
program affects machinery dealers, fertilizer, seed, or feed dealers and o trans-
portation and processing industries relatively little. The entire volume of any 
production still must be produced and handled. Grain storage businesses benefit 
considerably and have been able to expand. Effective production control, on the 
other hand, will take income from agribusiness. The purchases of inputs and the 
need for processing and transportation services declines under either acreage 
allotments or the soil bank if they are effective. The problem is not avoided if 
the production control is evenly distributed over the country. Its depressing effect 
on the income of agribusiness is only not so noticeable. The total effect on agri-
business is not greatly different if a five percent cut is made by taking out one 
whole area or by a small part of every area over the country. The question is another 
one of justice of income distribution o in this case justice of distribution within the 
agribusiness group. Is it better to hurt a lot of communities a little bit than to hurt 
a few a lot? There is no 11 right 11 answer to this question. Howevero the policy 
makers must decide. 
Looking at the contribution of the three programs with respects to progress o 
we find considerable variation. For the sake of clarity, let us isolate two ingredi-
ents of progress -- adoption of new technology and efficient allocation of resources. 
With a storage program, adoption of new technology continues. The benefits , how-
ever, accrue to agriculture and not to consumers because price is supported. Added 
production ends up in government storage. With a storage program o present re-
sources in agriculture tend to be fully used because production must be brought forth 
to receive income. The release of unneeded resources from agriculture and the effi-
cient use of national resources is not aided. With acreage allotments o adoption of 
land-saving technology will be encouraged. That is o methods of production that 
get more output per acre will be popular. But land in aggregate is plentiful in the 
United States. We would be more efficient in national resource use if we used land 
as a cheap plentiful resource. 
Acreage allotments prevent full utilization of resources in production. The 
least productive land resources on a farm will tend to be unemployed from surplus 
crop production. This may result in transfer to other uses. However, allotments 
do not aid unemployed labor and capital resources to transfer to other uses. The 
transfer and re-employment of these resources in higher paying uses would contri-
bute to economic progress. 
The soil bank has been selectively unemploying land and associated labor and 
capital. The land selected, by the present rate schedule, has been the low return 
per acre land of Va:J;"ious areas. Where whole farms are retiredo considerable transfer 
and re-employment of labor has taken place. The soil bank has not made people more 
skilled to do nonfarm work, but it has provided them with income that could be used 
during the transition. 
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With the soil bank the adoption of new technology continues. Many farms are 
unaffected in their individual operations. The unaffected farms are inclined to adopt 
technology of all kinds with little influence from the program. 
Summing up, with respect to progress, storage and acreage allotments probably 
detract somewhat. The soil bank on balance may be about neutral. It should be re-
called, however o that the vast effort of public supported research continues unrelent-
ingly to push for national progress regardless of the farm program. The accomplishment 
of the farm program, with respect to national progress u is minor compared with the 
thrust toward progress brought about by national research education and programs of 
area development. 
Let us appraise the three alternatives with respect to stability o that is, price 
stability, social stability of rural areas, business stability of rural areas o influence 
on agribusiness o and occupational stability of farmers. The storage program brings 
the greatest price stability and permits the greatest social business and occupational 
stability. Stability of prices is accomplished in the case of the acreage allotment 
and soil bank programs by adding a supplementary storage program. 
Acreage allotments alone do little to prevent fluctuations in prices. They in-
fluence social, business and occupational stability little if the allotments are a part 
of every farm. Allotments cause more instability than storage. If allotments were cut 
severely in some areas and less in others, the effect would be similar to the present 
soil banku and the local business and social instability created could be quite large. 
The soil bank would upset local stability about the same as allotments if it were even-
ly distributed over the country. 
Freedom of economic choice is large with storage programs and the voluntary 
soil bank. Neither interferes in the operation of individual farms. In either case o 
farmers are free to choose the mix of products, the mix of resources and the level of 
output per farm. In the case of acreage allotments, the choice of products is limited. 
The choice of resources is limited and the level of output may or may not be limited. 
Lastly, I would like to mention a diff~rent kind of farm program o namely o 
programs of education to facilitate agricultural and economic adjustment. This kind 
of public supported program is not usually considered in a list of farm programs. 
However, education contributes to the four goals of justice, progress, stability and 
freedom. It contributes to the goals in a different way than storage, allotment and 
soil bank programs. 
Change and adjustment are a continuing part of our economy including agri-
culture. New production methods, new capacities come into our system at various 
rates in different sectors. Some products have expandable markets; others are less 
expandable. This means that some categories are called upon to expand employment 
rapidly, others to expand slowly or even decline. 
A program to retrain people for new jobs, and to reduce their fears of living 
and working in other areas, makes them more able and willing to change location and 
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occupation. This movement of people lessens the disparity of income between ex-
panding and contracting employment categories or locations. Thus, such a program 
affects the distribution of income among people u which is in the category of goals 
for policy called economic justice. 
If change is facilitated by public supported education programs c the alloca-
tion of resources is made more efficient. As resources are used more efficiently, 
economic progress results. Advances in technology are of little value unless the 
resource.s no longer needed in one occupation are transferred to a place where they 
are needed. 
Public supported education and retraining cannot prevent change. Therefore { 
it does not bring stability. However u it reduces the pain of change and removes 
some of the objectionable aspects of change. Farmers who understand the economic 
world and the reasons for changing conditions are less frustrated and angry with a 
system that returns less for more output. 
The freedom goal was defined as a wide range of choice as to the kind of 
work a person does u what he works with and how much he works. Education and 
change probably expands the range of economic choice. Opportunities not known 
about before u not considered before or unavailable because of lack of skill can be 
opened up by education. 
This kind of "farm program" could be operated relatively easily by the land-
grant college system. In addition, it could contribute substantially to our goals 
of justice, progress and freedom in other areas besides agriculture. 
The chart on the following page helps summarize the appraisal of the farm 
programs in the feed-livestock sector and their contributions to the four goa~s. 
In appraising the situation for feed grains u soybeans and livestock, I have 
tried to point out the following ideas: 
1. The commodities are highly interrelated r and economic policy would 
affect all of them if it dealt with anyone of them. 
2. Conflicts c with respect to agricultural policy~ stem from differences 
among voters in their goals and subgoals for economic policy for 
agriculture. The preference among goals and the strength of the prefer-
ences vary between consumers u agribusiness, taxpayers and producers 
for example. 
3. Storage programs, allotments and soil bank can and should be appraised 
with respect to their ability and efficiency in accomplishing four cate-
gories of goals for economic policy; justice, progress c stability and 
freedom. 
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Chapter 9 
Export and Import Programs as Related to Domestic Price and Income 
Policies: A Situation Paper 
Max Myers, FAS, USDA 
Clarence D. Palmby, CSS, USDA 
Expansion of agricultural exports has been a major objective of our overall 
farm program in recent years. By and large, we have made progress in reaching our 
goal. Taking into account the many problems and limitations that have beset our 
path, we can all look with a great deal of 1pride and satisfaction upon the successes 
we have had to date. 
Last fiscal year the volume of farm products moved into overseas markets 
set a new record. 
On a value basis, agricultural exports totaled $4.5 billion--close to the 
record $4. 7 billion in fiscal 19 57. 
In total, we are exporting the annual production of about 57 million acres. 
To visualize what this means, let us say that if is as though we were to export 
somewhat more than the entire harvested output of Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri. 
We have had a wide variety of tools to use as foreign market "wideners". 
Their names by this time are well-established in the lexicon of agriculture--pro-
motion of commercial exports; shipments under the special government programs 
authorized by Public Law 480--sales for foreign currencies, barter, credit, and 
outright donations--as well as the economic assistance programs carried on under 
the Mutual Security Act. Less well-known, but highly important, are the "agricul-
tural intelligence" activities based on the Department • s far-flung attache system. 
We are going into these programs in greater detail later on. First, however, let's 
discuss overall United States trade policy. 
U o S. TRADE POLICY AND GATT 
U. S. trade policy, in its simplest terms, encourages expanded world trade 
on a multilateral o non-discriminatory basis 1 principally through operation of the U. S. 
Trade Agreements Program. It is a liberal trade policy. It involves the complex of 
legislation by which Congress has grantedthe President power to enter into trade 
agreements and to negotiate reciprocal reduction in U. S. import duties. It also in-
cludes the administrative structure created by the President to put into effect the 
authority granted him. 
It is under the Trade Agreements Program that the United States takes part in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) • By any standard, GATT is a 
highly significant compact. Thirty-seven nations adhere to it; most of the world•s 
trade moves under its rules. Therefore o those rules are well worth remembering. 
As written out in the cold prose of the Agreement, the many rules seem complex. 
Actually, howeve.r, they can be reduced to a few fundamentals. The basic rules of 
GATT, at least for the purposes of this paper I may be expressed as follows: 
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(1) The only legitimate trade barrier, consciously applied as a trade barrier o 
is the import qr. export duty. This rule amounts to a prohibition on all forms of non-
tariff barriers designed to protect domestic industry. It does not a however, outlaw 
sanitary or marking regulations, customs practices, and the like when used for their 
legitimate purpo~e, despite the fact that these have ·some incidental protective''effect. 
There are exceptions to this rather severe rule, of course. 
(2) . Import duties are subject to reduction or binding through negotiation. 
This does not mean that every contracting party must be prepared to reduce every 
duty upon request, but it does mean acceptance of the principle of negotiated reduc-
tion. Under this rule the contracting parties have entered four major tariff negotiating 
conferences and are preparing to enter a fifth. 
(3) Trade barriers are to be applied in a manner which does not favor one 
contracting party over another. This is the most-favored-nation rule. There are in 
GATT some exceptions to this rule, also. The principal ones accommodate the several 
tariff preference systems which were in existence when GATT was developed, coun-
tries in balance-of-payments difficulties, and countries which form free trade areas 
and customs unions. 
(4) Commodities should be free of subsidies which materially interfere with 
traditional trade patterns. GATT provides that if a subsidy is used by a country to 
increase exports or decrease imports I that country must report the subsidy to the 
other contracting parties with a statement showing why the subsidy is necessary and 
an estimate of its effect upon trade. Export subsidies on primary products must not 
be applied in a manner which results in the subsidizing country having more than an 
equitable share in the world trade in that product. Export subsidies on non-primary 
products shall not extend beyond the scope of subsidization existing on January 1 u 
1955. 
There are a number of exceptions, both permanent and temporary 1 to these 
basic rules. The more familiar 1 certainly u are those which deal with injury to do-
mestic industry (the escape clause) 1 balance-of-payments difficulties, and the pro-
cedure by which the contracting parties acting jointly in exceptional circumstances 
can waive any obligation in the Agreement •. There are also exceptions for govern-
mental assistance to industry and agriculture in underdeveloped countries, for actions 
· required for national security reasons, and for agriculture under certain circumstances. 
Under the agricultural exception u a GATT contracting party is allowed to im-
pose import restrictions on agricultural or fishery products if like domestic products 
are subject to restrictive production or marketing controls. For example, wheat 1 
cotton, and peanut production controls in the United States provide a basis for non-
tariff import restrictions. 
These are the basic international trade rules under which domestic import and 
export programs of the United States and any other contracting party must operate. As 
with other trade agreements I of course, direct representation to the country concerned, 
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through normal diplomatic channels, remains the primary method for the protection 
of interests. The GATT contracting parties, however, provide a forum to which a 
contracting party can turn if normal diplomatic representation is riot fruitful of 
results. 
The contracting parties cannot impose an adverse decision upon another 
contracting party. The Agreement is not coercive in this respect. They can, how-
ever, authorize retaliatory action by contracting parties who believe any benefits 
accruing to them under the Agreement are being impaired by actions of another 
party to it. In any event, the contracting parties help police the Agreement; they 
can, and do, hold up for the scrutiny of all other contracting parties o and the world, 
actions which violate the code of trading practices to which these countries have 
subscribed. This process unquestionably has a decided influence on the interna-
tional trade practices of all member countries, including the United States. You 
can be sure that both our export and import programs undergo careful scrutiny in 
this international forum. 
The United States o in turn o scrutinizes actions of other countries. For 
example, the United States has tried to bring about a more strict conformity to the 
GATT rule prohibiting quantitative restrictions as an import barrier. A number of 
countries had been justifying the retention of such restrictions under the exception 
for balance-of-payments difficulties. Substantial increase in gold and foreign 
exchange reserves by many countries and the action of 14 Western European coun-
tries to make their currency convertible on external account o however, prompted 
the United States at recent sessions of GATT to point out that financial justification 
no longer exists for such quantitative import restrictions o and that they should be 
removed as rapidly as possible. This action, of courseo was only part of the over-
all U. S. effort to obtain the elimination of unjustifiable restrictions against its 
export commodities. 
A number of important trading countries have taken significant steps towards 
eliminating restrictions against the dollar area for both industrial and agricultural 
commodities. For our part, we will continue to press for further liberalization of 
agricultural products. It is in this area that progress has been relatively slow. 
Trade liberalization is a must if we are to expand exports. No amount of promotion 
will be effective if 8 through quotas o embargoes, and other restrictive measures o 
U. S. farm products are not given a chance to compete in foreign markets. 
EXPORT PROGRAMS 
As mentioned earlier 8 the Department uses a wide variety of programs in 
expanding exports. A brief description of each of these programs, with some indi-
cation of the value of exports involved, where applicable, is included here as essen-
tial background to this paper. 
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CCC Export Sales 
The Commodity Credit Corporation offers its stocks for export at prices 
reduced to the extent necessary to make them competitive in world markets. These 
stocks are offered on a competitive bid basis. CCC stocks of wheat, feedgrains u 
rice, and upland cotton are made available under the payment-in-kind program. 
Whatever the method used, the CCC sales programs are basic to the current level 
of agricultural exports. 
CCC initiated the payment-in-kind program for wheat in fiscal 1957, com 
and cotton in fiscal 1958, and extended it to other feedgrains and rice during fiscal 
1959. The payment-in-kind program is designed to maximize movement of commodi-
ties from commercial sources into export. Competitive pricing of CCC-owned wheat 
for export for other than International Wheat Agreement sales began in fiscal 1954. 
Competitive pricing of upland cotton for export began in 1957. 
Competitive pricing authority given CCC is a key factor in administration 
of sales for foreign currencies and barter u both of which are mentioned below. 
Title I, Public Law 480 
The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, 
commonly referred to as Public Law 480 u has as its principal purpose the con-
structive use of the agricultural surpluses of the United States. 
Title I of the Act authorizes the President to carry out a program for the 
sale of surplus agricultural commodities for foreign currencies under agreements 
with friendly nations or organizations of friendly nations. 
In negotiating Title I agreements, the President is required to (1) take reason-
able precautions to safeguard U. S. usual marketings and assure that such sales will 
not unduly disrupt world pri.c:es of agricultural commodities or normal patterns of 
commercial trade with friendly countries; (2) assure the use of private trade channels 
to the maximum extent practicable; (3) use the program to develop and expand con-
tinuous market demand abroad for agricultural commodities with appropriate emphasis 
on underdeveloped and new market areas; (4) secure commitments that the commodi-
ties sold for foreign currencies will not be resold or re-exported except with spec~fic 
approval; and {5) afford any friendly nation maximum opportunity to purchase U. S. 
surplus agricultural commodities taking into consideration the objectives of the law 
and to make effective use of the foreign currencies received. 
The Act provides that CCC funds shall be used to finance the sales and 
authorizes appropriations to reimburse CCC for its costs, including the acquisition 
cost of price support commodities from CCC stocks which may be shipped under the 
program. CCC requests an appropriation annually to obtain reimbursement for pro-
gram costs. 
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Authorizations to date are as follows: 
July 10, 1954 
August 12, 1955 
August 3, 1956 
August 13 o 1957 
September 6 , 19 58 
September 21, 1959 
Amount 
$700 :mHlion 
Increase to $1. 5 billion 
Increase to $3.0 billion 
Increase to $4.0 billion 
Increase to $6.25 billion 
Increase to $9. 25 billion 
Period 
3 years 
No change 
No change 
Extended 1 year 
Extended 1 1/2 years 
Extended 2 years 
through 12/31/61 
Through June 30, 1960, agreements with 38 countries committed about $6.8 
billion at cost to CCC and $4. 8 billion at export market value. Both figures include 
$515 million which CCC has paid or expects to pay in ocean freight costs on U. S. -
flag vessels required to be used by cargo preference legislation. 
Through June 30, 1960, exports were $3.6 billion or 84 percent of the export 
market value of the commodities included in agreements. Major commodity quanti-
ties are: 
Commoditl Unit Agreement Quantities EXJ2Qrted Qyg.ntiti~~ 
(Million) (Million) 
Wheat/wheat flour bushel 1, 286 ll 1,033 
Feed grains bushel 250 235 
Rice cwt. 46.2 ll 39.5 
Cotton bale 4.7 4.1 
Fats and oils pound 4,200 3,600 
Tobacco pound 281 255 
Dairy products pound 264 245 
During fiscal 1960 o 37 agreements with 18 countries committed more than 
$1. 7 billion at cost to CCC and more than $1. 1 billion at export market value. Both 
figures include about $140 million for ocean freight. 
Besides the commodity composition, the currency use is a major considera-
tion of these agreements. The United States attempts to obtain maximum dollar 
return to CCC from sales of foreign currencies to other government agencies for 
(1) embassy expenses o (2) procurement of housing for military dependent personnel, 
and (3) other U. S. programs. 
1./ Includes quantities to be financed during only the first year of the 4-year 
agreement with India signed on May 4, 1960. 
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More than 45 percent of the currencies under existing agreements are reserved 
for loans to foreign governments for economic development projects. In some cases 
additional amounts are granted for the same purpose. Many agreements since 1958 
provide that up to 25 percent may be loaned to private business firms. In certain 
Mutual Security countries, substantial amounts are used for common defense pur-
poses. Currencies are also used for such U. S. programs as agricultural market 
develop:r;nent and educational exchange and informational programs; only the foreign 
currencies earmarked for foreign market development are administered by the Depart-
ment. 
Mutual Security Act 
Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 19 54, as amended, requires that 
not less than $175 million {at this level since 1958) be used to finance the export 
sale of surplus agricultural commodities for foreign currencies. The foreign currency 
proceeds are used to further the objectives of the Mutual Security program. {The 
program is administered by the International Cooperation Administration.) 
In fiscal 1958, sales of $154 million were made directly to countries re-
ceiving U. S. assistance. Triangular transactions were worked out in the amount 
of $51 million through sales of grain, cotton, and tobacco to Austria, Belgium, 
France, Italy, and Germany--countries which do not receive economic assistance 
under the Mutual Security program. Such sales were financed by dollar funds pro-
grammed for Spain., Morocco, Tunisia, Greece, Pakistan, Korea, and VietNam. 
The local currency proceeds of these sales are being used to finance purchases of 
industrial equipment and other goods needed for assistance to the countries for 
which the dollar funds' were programmed. Actual export sales during fiscal 1960 
amounted to $177 million, of which $134 million was in direct sales and $43 million 
in triangular trade. 
Title II, Public Law 480 
Title I I provides that CCC-owned commodities may be used for emergency 
assistance to needy peoples in foreign countries to meet urgent or extraordinary 
relief requirements. The program also may be used {until June 30, 1961) to promote 
economic development in newly developing areas. 
To the maximum extent possible, commodities are distributed free and 
identified as gifts of the American people. Permission may be granted for their 
sale in the receiving country to raise funds for relief or economic development pro-
jects. 
Programs are usually undertaken on a government-to-government basis but 
may be carried out in cooperation with voluntary agencies. Most programs have 
been for disaster relief where food and feed were needed to alleviate suffering re-
sulting from floods, drought, hurricane, and other calamities. Commodities also 
have been provided for part payment of work relief wages where emergencies created 
unemployment problems, feeding refugees and escapees to alleviate social unrest, 
and expansion of school lunch programs. 
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In the six years ending June 30, 1960, $501 million worth of commodities 
at CCC cost was authorized for Title I I, mostly grain and nonfat dry milk. During 
fiscal 1960, $65 million worth of commodities was made available under the program. 
Title I I I, Foreign Donations (Section 416 Agricultural Act 1949) 
Title I I I of Public Law 480 authorizes donations of CCC surpluses to needy 
persons in friendly foreign countries. Distribution is made through voluntary relief 
agencies of the United States and to inter-governmental organizations which are 
responsible for final distribution to eligible recipients. All commodities are identi-
fied as donations from the people of the United States. Special emphasis is placed 
on programs that are supplementary to the health, welfare, or social programs of 
the recipient country. 
Usual categories of recipients include maternal and child welfare centers, 
health centers, school lunch programs, institutions such as homes for the aged, 
blind, and orphans, needy families, and refugees. 
Commodities donated include dried eggs, butter, nonfat dry milk, cheese, 
potatoes, vegetable oils, shortening, beans, com 1 rice, wheat, corn meal, and 
wheat flour. Fiscal 19 61 programs include com, wheat, com meal 1 wheat flour, 
rice, and nonfat dry milk. 
Since the inception of the program early in 195 0, approximately 9. 6 billion 
pounds of surplus commodities valued at $1.52 billion at CCC cost have been donated 
to 32 agencies operating in ll4 countries and territories. During fiscal 1960, dona-
tions valued at $128 million (CCC cost) were distributed by 21 agencies to over 60 
million persons in 92 countries and territories. 
Title III, Public Law 480, Barter Program 
The barter program is conducted by CCC under several legislative authorities. 
Emphasis was given to the program by Title I I I of Public Law 480 and later amend-
ments. 
The program, as modified in November 1958, now provides that in exporting 
agricultural commodities the national interest of the United States will not be ad-
versely affected, usual U. S. marketings will be safeguarded, and undue disruption 
of world prices or replacement of cash sales for dollars will not occur. The Depart-
ment of State is consulted in cases where the normal commercial trade of friendly 
countries may be affected. 
Under this program, a given value of surplus agricultural commodities at 
established export prices is exchanged for (1) an equal value of strategic or other 
materials produced abroad, (2) for materials required in off-shore construction pro-
grams of the U. S. Government, or (3) for materials required in foreign economic and 
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military aid and assistance programs of the United States. The great bulk of barter 
transactions are for strategic or other materials produced abroad which have been 
designated as eligible under the barter program and which are placed in the U. S. 
supplemental stockpile. 
Wheat, cotton, and feedgrains have been the major commodities moved 
under the program. The value of barter exports in recent fiscal years was about as 
follows: 1956, $300 million; 1957, $400 million; 1958, $100 million; 1959, $130 
million; and 1960, $150 million. 
Title N, Public Law 480 
Title IV provides for long-term supply and credit sales of surplus agricul-
tural commodities. Major objectives of this title are the use of the agricultural 
commodities and the financial resources provided through the extension of long-
term dollar credits to assist in the economic development of other friendly coun-
tries, and to expand or maintain U. S. dollar exports to such countries. 
Under Title IV, the U. S. government may enter into agreements with govern-
ments of friendly nations for delivery of surplus agricultural commodities for periods 
up to 10 years. Dollar payment, with interest, for commodities delivered is re-
quired to be made .in approximately equal annual amounts. Credit periods of up to 
20 years are authorized. The maximum interest rate which may be charged is the 
cost of funds to the U. S. Treasury. It is expected that the sales arrangements 
under this title generally will be based on short~r supply and credit periods. 
Several countdes have- been selected as "pilot" countries on the basis of 
their representative geographic positions, current trends in imports of U. S. agri-
cultural commodities, possibilities of demonstrating the utility of Title IV dollar 
credit sales approach in maintaining or expanding U. S. dollar exports through 
longer term supply commitments, opening up new markets for certain agricultural 
commodities, and other factors. Progress is being made with "pilot" countries, but 
no agreements have been concluded to date. 
CCC Export Credit Sales Program 
Commodity Credit Corporation stocks and tobacco under loan to CCC are 
eligible for CCC export credit for periods up to three years. CCC requires assurance 
from a U. S. bank that the sales value of the commodity and the interest will be 
paid when due. 
The program works through the private trade and is designed to promote ex-
ports by extension of credit to U. S. exporters who in turn pass on the deferred 
payment benefits to foreign importers. Since the payment-in-kind programs were 
initiated, certain restrictions have been applied to credit sales of wheat and feed 
grains to insure that they will not adversely affect the objectives of the payment-in-
kind programs. Wheat credit transactions, where the credit period is longer than 
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six months, are closely scrutinized to see that there is no undue interference with 
exports of friendly competing countries. 
A total of 207 credit approvals had been granted as of August 31, 1960, cover-
ing tobacco, wheat, cotton, dry milk, dry edible beans, rice, oats, corn, grain 
sorghums, and barley for a total dollar purchase value of about $91 million. Principal 
commodities and approximate values are: corn, $34.9 million; grain sorghums, $13.3 
million; wheat, $24 million; tobacco, $3.1 million; rice, $2.3 million; and beans, 
$2.5 million. 
Export-Import Bank Credit 
The Export-Import Bank of Washington extends short term credits to finance 
exports of surplus agricultural commodities where such credit is not available from 
normal commercial sources. Unlike CCC credit, this credit is extended directly to 
foreign importers, foreign banks I or in some cases, foreign governments. 
During fiscal 1958, Japan and Austria imported $ll0 million and $12 million 
worth of U. S. cotton, respectively, with financing provided under the terms of the 
program. The Bank also financed exports of wheat, barley 1 and soybeans to Japan 
during 1958 in the approximate amounts of $35 million, $12 million, and $16 million, 
respectively. 
Credits for $60 million and $6 million for cotton were granted to Japan and 
Austria, respectivelyu in fiscall959. During fiscall960, the Bank authorized 
credits totaling $70 million to finance the export of U. S. cotton to Japan. 
Foreign Market Development 
One aspect of foreign market development work is market promotion. This 
is going forward in about 50 countries, in close cooperation with about 60 agricul-
' tural and trade groups. Foreign market promotion covers many activities. It in-
cludes exhibits and demonstrations, product introduction, surveys and studies of 
market potential, publicity and advertising, nutrition and sanitation, education, 
exchange of management and technical personnel, technical assistance o and sales 
training. The Department works closely with agricultural industry in participating 
in international trade fairs. At the British Food Fair in London last September, for 
example, a third of a million consumers learned more about U. S. food products. 
This was followed by a similar exhibit in Munich, Germany, which also presented 
a broad array of U. S. farm products to potential new customers. 
Another aspect of the development program is utilization research. It is 
designed to develop new and improved uses of U. S. agribultural commodities and 
hence contribute to expansion of markets. 
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Since 1957 o a total of 53 grants valued at approximately $4. 5 million equiva-
lent has been made to research institutions in Israel, Finland, France, Italy o Spain, 
Poland, and the United Kingdom. Currently 21 research proposals are also under 
consideration for grants in India, Indonesia, Brazil, Colombia o and Uruguay for a 
total value of approximately $1. 5 million. 
Grants under the program are made to institutions which can provide trained 
personnel with specialized experience and have adequate laboratory space and other 
facilities necessary to conduct the proposed research. They are non-profit institu-
tions of higher education or non-profit organizations whose primary purpose is the 
conduct of scientific research. Grants are made directly to the institutions that 
are to undertake the research project and are made for periods up to five years. 
· Since the currencies to finance these promotional and research programs 
accrue mainly in underdeveloped countries (from Title I sales agreements) a pro-
cedure is used for converting some of these currencies to the countries where market 
promotion promises the greatest potential and where.research facilities are the most 
advanced. 
Agricultural Intelligence 
The Department of Agriculture is promoting marketing in other ways. 
For one thing, the Department is carrying on a comprehensive program of 
"agricultural intelligence". This consists of facts and figures on foreign produc-
tion, consumption, crop conditions, exports o imports, tariffs, and the like. The 
information comes from agricultural attaches, stationed in 54 posts throughout the 
world, and from surveys and analyses by marketing and area specialists. This 
information is issued in a wide variety of publications which are available to any-
body in a position to use them. It provides a background for American agricultural 
participation in world mar~eting operations in an informed manner. 
FOOD FOR PEACE 
The concept of the special export programs has been significantly broadened 
under the President's Food for Peace program. About two years agoo the President 
said: 
"I am setting steps in motion to explore anew with other surplus-producing 
nations all practical means of utilizing the various agricultural surpluses of each 
in the interest of reinforcing peace and the well-being of friendly peoples through-
out the world--in short~ using food for peace. " 
In keeping with the spirit of the President's message, we are building upward 
and outward from the substantial foundation of existing programs of which Public Law 
480 is the cornerstone. We are closely examining the work already in progress. We 
are trying to develop improved and new approaches. We have enlisted the participa-
tion of other countries. 
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In getting the participation of other countries, we started with the most 
burdensome food commodity, wheat. As you know, a series of meetings were held 
with the major wheat-exporting nations: Canada, Australia, Argentina and France, 
with FAO in observer-adviser capacity. Together we organized a Wheat Utilization 
Committee which has been meeting periodically. 
It is particularly gratifying that these consultations with other wheat ex-
porters have greatly improved their understanding of our export objectives. The 
complaints of a few years ago that the United States was engaged in a worldwide 
dumping operation have largely subsided and have been replaced by an increasing 
number of statements commending U. S. efforts to insure that food is moved to 
people in need without endangering established world commerce. 
Agricultural Exports 
For the fiscal year that ended June 30, the volume of U. S. agricultural 
exports reached an alltime high--29 percent above 1959 and 3 percent above the 
previous record in 1957. Exports of several major commodities payable in dollars 
(some moving under export payments) accounted for nearly all of the rise to the 
new peak; exports under specified government financed programs increased only 
slightly. 
As mentioned earlier, the value of agricultural exports totaled $4. 5 billion, 
22 percent more than last year and $200 million less than the record of $4.7 billion 
in 1957 when volume and value of exports were accelerated by the Suez crisis. 
Last year commercial dollar sales, including those receiving CCC payments 
in cash or kind, reached $3.2 billion or 71 percent of the total. The remaining 29 
percent moved out under special programso mainly Public Law 480. 
A complete breakdown of 1959-60 exports by programs and by export payments 
is shown in the attached table. In allo an estimated $2.2 billion worth out of the 
$4.5 billion moved under CCC payments in cash or kind costing about $618 million. 
(This figure excludes donations valued at about $172 million.) Thus, excluding 
donations, government payments equalled about 15 percent of the value of the prod-
ucts exported. Most of this applied to wheat, $269 million; cotton, $265 million; 
rice, $41 million; feedgrains, $23 million; and dairy products, $16 million; with 
limited payments on a few other commodities. Of the $2. 2 billion, $0. 9 billion 
worth was exported under Public Law 480 and the Mutual Security Act, and $1. 3 
billion worth as "dollar sales". Approximately 20 percent of the wheat was ex-
ported last year under the International Wheat Agreement. Prior to 1954, government 
payments on wheat exports were designed specifically to enable the United States 
to meet its obligation to member importers under this Agreement. 
Incidentally, this is the first time that the export picture has been presented 
in this particular form and detail. We believe it provides you with all the pertinent 
statistical information needed to analyze our agriculture exports from the standpoint 
of programs for the past year. 
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All time export highs were reached for feedgrains o soybeans, soybean and 
cottonseed oil combined, dried beans , tallow u poultry meat , and variety meats. 
Of the $800 million gain in exports over last year, cotton accounted for 
some 50 percent; vegetable oils and oil seeds, 15 percent; wheat and flour, 12 per-
cent; animal and animal products, 6 percent; with the remainder made up of fruits, 
vegetables and preparations, rice, and other miscellaneous commodities. 
U. S. exports of cotton, excluding linters, were 6. 6 million running bales 
(7. 2 million for the crop year) the second highest in over a quarter-century and 
more than twice the 3.1 million of a year earlier. Developments contributing to 
the gain in cotton exports were the rising consumption in major textile manufac-
turing countries, ample supplies of U. S. cotton at competitive world prices 
(export payments of 8 cents per pound), small exportable supplies in major foreign 
producing countries, and some inventory rebuilding in the major textile manufac-
turing countries. 
Wheat and wheat flour exports of 512 million bushels were the second high-
est in history and 69 million larger than a year earlier. The gain reflected larger 
shipments under Title I of Public Law 480, which rose from 231 million bushels in 
1959 to 301 million in 1960. 
Exports of rice increased substantially in spite of the continued upward 
trend in rice production in the Far East, where much U. S. rice has moved in some 
recent years under government programs. Title I sales accounted for over half of 
last year's rice exports and were the main factor in attaining the second largest vol-
ume on record. Milled rice shipments of 20. 2 million bags were 6 million bags 
more than in 1959. · 
Record feedgrain exports amounted to 12. 2 million short tons compared with 
the previous year's ll. 5 million. Shipments were made up of com, 216 million bush-
els; barley, ll4 million; oats, 43 million; and grain sorghums, 99 million. 
Exports of unmanufactured tobacco totaled 457 million pounds o 16 million 
pounds below the 4 7 3 million of a year earlier. Contributing to the decline were 
the continuation of foreign trade barriers against U. S. leaf o the higher price for 
U. S. leaf compared with similar foreign growths, and the record 19 6 0 tobacco crop 
in Rhodesia. However, the large supplies of high-quality tobacco in the United 
States and a steady rise in cigarette consumption abroad have helped maintain U. S. 
exports at high levels. 
Exports of soybeans rose from 103 million bushels to 133 million (crop year 
totaled 142 million). The record showing was encouraged by strong foreign demand 
for protein oilseed cakes and meals the summer and fall of 1959, large exportable 
supplies of U. S. soybeans at competitive world prices, and reduced foreign supplies 
of other oilseeds and oils. Combined shipments of cottonseed oil and soybean oil 
increased from 1, 080 million to 1, 601 million pounds. This all time high for edible 
oils represented larger dollar sales; exports under government programs remained 
about the same as in the previous year. 
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Exports of fruits and vegetables increased materially. More apples, oranges, 
dried prunes, raisins, canned fruits, and dried peas and beans were shipped abroad. 
Exports of fruits and vegetables were stimulated by ample U. S. supplies, prosper-
ous conditions in Western Europe, and some dollar trade liberalization. The record 
exports of beans and heavy exports of peas mainly reflected reduced crops in Europe 
and Latin America. Virtually all the above items were straight commercial sales at 
domestic market prices. 
Exports of animals and products expanded considerably, totaling $583 million 
compared with $533 million the previous year. Shipments of lardu tallow I poultry 
meats, and variety meats were encouraged by ample U. S. supplies and relatively 
low prices. 
Lard exports of 674 million pounds were the second largest since World 
War II. Increased hog slaughter resulted in plentiful supplies at reduced prices. 
In addition 1 shipment of most of the lard in bulk by tankers reduced the price in the 
foreign market by about 10 percent. 
The record export volume for tallow was 1, 569 million pounds compared with 
1, ll6 million a year earlier. Larger exportable U. S. supplies at competitive prices 
reflected increased slaughter of cattle at heavier weights. About half of the domes-
tic tallow output was marketed overseas. 
There was a remarkable gain in exports of variety meats. Shipments in 
1959-60 of 104 million pounds, a new record, were one-fourth larger than the 83 
million of the previous year. Practically all of this amount was sold to Western 
Europe where demand continued strong. 
Exports of 149 million pounds of poultry meat established fiscal 1960 as the 
best year ever I reflecting extensive market development work along with ample U. S. 
supplies at relatively low prices. Main foreign outlets were Western Europe, 
Venezuela, Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean area. Slightly smaller exports of 
eggs were the result of increased competition from other major producing countries. 
As with fruits and vegetables, exports of livestock and livestock products were 
virtually all regular commercial transactions at domestic market prices. 
EXPORT OUTLOOK 
As you know from the Outlook Conference just concluded, another good ex-
port year is in prospect during 1960-61. Export volume is expected to equal or exceed 
last year•s record high. In value, we look for a repeat of last year•s $4.5 billion--
second highest fiscal year value of record. 
The foreign economic outlook favors an expansion in world agricultural trade. 
The step-up in economic activity, particularly in Western Europe, continues; gold 
and dollar holdings in most industrialized countries are at alltime highs; and further 
progress has been made in lowering trade barriers against American farm products. 
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"Dollar sales" will probably total about $3.1 billion in 1960-61, while sales under 
government-financed programs will very likely reach $1. 4 billion. 
Looking ahead over the next 10 years we expect agricultural exports at 
constant prices to increase about 15 percent from the record volume of fiscal year 
1960. Although foreign production is expected to increase somewhat faster than 
population over these years, foreign consumption per capita of farm products likely 
will increase sufficiently so that the deficit in food and fiber outside the United 
States will be larger in 1970 than at present. 
It is expected that export payments will be required to move wheat o rice, 
and cotton into foreign consumption throughout the 1960s. Feedgrains at certain 
times probably will move at domestic prices without export payments. However, 
at other times small payments may be needed to bridge the gap between domestic 
and somewhat lower world prices for feedgrains. All fats and oils should move 
into foreign consumption at domestic prices. A special export arrangement will be 
needed to move dairy products. All other commodities in export positions should 
not require export price assistance during the 1960s. 
The projected magnitude of agricultural exports for 1965 is $4.7 billion and 
for 1970, about $5.2 billion. Within these forecasts, it is assumed that special 
government export programs will be in effect for wheat, rice, feed grains , cotton, 
fats and oils, and dairy products. The division between sales for dollars and under 
government programs will depend upon a number of internal and external factors, 
but primarily on the rate of economic growth in the developing areas. Over the 
past six years, exports under government programs have averaged about 33 percent 
of total agricultural exports. The trend now is downward {29 percent in 1959-60) 
and this trend may well continue throughout the 1960s . 
. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS 
Although a heavy surplus producer, the United States maintains a reasonably 
liberal policy in respect to agricultural imports. To be sure, we have some import 
restrictions on certain price-supported commodities which are described below. 
But these restrictions have not been important factors in determining the course of 
world trade. By and large our market is open to all agricultural commodities which 
we would normally be expected to import or for which we have a history of imports. 
Under this policy, the United States is the world's second largest importer 
of agricultural commodities, exceeded only by the United Kingdom. Agricultural 
imports reached a high of $5.1 billion in fiscall951, then declined to a post-
Korean War low of $3.8 billion in 1957, and have since averaged $4 billion annually. 
Correspondingly, agriculture's share of total imports has also declined since 1951 
reaching an alltime low of 26 percent in 1960. While the value has recently levelled 
off at $4 billion, a look at the longer period shows that the quantity of imports is 
far more stable from year to year than the value. 
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Over the years, two-fifths of our agricultural imports have supplemented 
the output of U. S. farms. However, in 1960 supplementary and complementary 
commodities each accounted for about SO percent of total imports o wl th rising 
meat imports offsetting the value declines for coffee and some other complemen-
tary items. 
The main supplementary items are sugar, grain, tobacco, cattle, meat o 
and apparel wool. These important imports have fluctuated with changes in do-
mestic production, but the volume of trade in 19SS-S9 was practically unchanged 
from 192S-29. The volume of complementary imports has been held down because 
domestically produced industrial products have partially replaced imports of silk, 
rubber, and wool; this has about offset the increase accruing from larger imports 
of coffee, cocoa o tea, and bananas. Imports of these four commodities normally 
make up about 7 S percent of the value of all complementary agricultural imports. 
Latin America is our principal supplier of agricultural commodities, annually 
accounting for 50 percent of the import market. Coffee, sugar, cocoa, and bananas 
account for the bulk of these shipments. Asia ranks second and is the principal 
supplier of crude rubber and tea. In 1960, 20 percent of U. S. agricultural imports 
came from this area. The remaining areas--Europe o Mrica, Oceania, and Canada--
are of less importance and ship us a variety of supplementary and complementary 
commodities. 
Section 22 o Import Controls 
It is well known that the United States, under the provisions of Section 22 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, restricts the importation of some commodities. 
Section 2 2 has been in effect since August 2 4, 19 3 S. It authorizes the control of 
imports whenever such imports render or tend to render ineffective or materially 
interfere with any price support or other programs or operations relating to agricul-
tural commodities undertaken by the Department of Agriculture. 
The Secretary of Agriculture, the U. S. Tariff Commission, and the President 
all participate in the proceedings which lead to the imposition of these controls. 
The Secretary initiates action by advising the President whenever he has reason to 
believe that imports are materially interfering with a Departmental program. If the 
President agrees that there is reason for this belief o he directs the U. S. Tariff 
Commission to make an immediate fact finding investigation and to report the facts 
to him, along with recommendations as to appropriate remedial action. 
If the President then finds that controls are necessary, the law requires 
him to impose import quotas or fees in addition to existing tariffs. Import quotas 
cannot be established at less than SO percent of the total quantity imported in a 
representative period, and fees cannot exceed SO percent ad valorem. Controls 
imposed are under continuing review, and the law authorizes the President, after 
investigation, to suspend, terminate u or revoke any control whenever he finds 
changed circumstances warrant the action. 
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Currently, Section 22 controls are in effect for wheat and wheat products, 
cotton and cotton waste, rye and rye flour including meal, flaxseed and linseed oil, 
peanuts and peanut oil, tung nuts and tung oil, and certain manufactured dairy prod-
ucts. 
It should be noted here particularly that the imposition of any quantitative 
import restriction by the United States involved an elaborate and carefully prescribed 
procedure including an investigation and public hearings by an independent agency, 
the Tariff Commission. It is not a case where the Secretary or even the President 
can reach a private decision and announce it next morning to unsuspecting trade in-
terests. Foreign governments with trade interests are free to participate in the hear-
ings. In actual practice, they make some of the strongest representations before the 
Commission. In contrast, we sometimes learn of foreign decrees affecting our ex-
ports only after the action is taken. Representations at this stage are much more 
difficult and generally less effective. 
Earlier in this paper it was pointed out that the United States, as a con-
tracting party to the GATT, has accepted a principle not to apply quantitative 
restrictions as a barrier to trade. Also o the United States, over the years o has 
negotiated under GATT rules certain specific tariff concessions upon which its Sec-
tion 22 actions could infringe. How, then, do these Section 22 import restrictions 
square with GATT commitments? 
In some cases, where U. S. domestic products are subject to restrictive 
production or marketing controls, the restrictive quotas fall within the scope of 
the agricultural exception to the no-non -tariff barrier principle. As we noted above, 
wheat, cotton, and peanuts are examples. Some of these controls, however, do not 
fall within this exception. Accordingly, some years ago the United States went be-
fore the GATT contracting parties to ask that they, acting jointly under the exception-
al circumstances provision, waive the obligations of the United States to adhere to 
the GATT where it might conflict with its Section 22 actions. 
The contracting parties granted the requested waiver subject to certain con-
ditions designed to safeguard the rights of other Contracting Parties, and subject to 
the requirement that the United States report each year {1) the restrictions in effect 
under Section 22, (2) the reasons why such restrictions continue to be applied, and 
(3) any steps it has taken toward solving the problem of surpluses of agricultural 
commodities. The U. S. report is reviewed carefully each year by the contracting 
parties. 
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS IN RELATION TO DOMESTIC PROGRAMS 
Exports and imports are clearly major considerations in the domestic agricul-
tural situation. A few observations are reviewed here which bear on the relationships 
we are considering in this paper. 
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Exports 
Production from one out of every six acres of cropland harvested is moving 
overseas. For some crops, export markets are especially important. Last year our 
exports were equal to over half our rice crop o and nearly half of our production of 
wheat, cotton o soybeans (including oil) o dry peas, and tallow. We exported any-
where from one-fourth to one-third of our production of tobacco o hops, barley, and 
lard. 
Exports of this magnitude represent an essential outlet for our high level 
production. Without such an outlet, the back-up of undistributed supplies and the 
problems of production adjustment would be far greater than anything we have en-
countered so far. 
Also, as we have shown, agricultural exports of this magnitude involve 
government programs and other forms of government intervention on a large scale. 
We have said that about 70 percent of the exports are paid in dollars--the balance 
under what we have come to call government programs. Of the $3. 2 billion last year 
in the dollar bracket, about 40 percent required payments in cash or kind to meet 
world price competition. The costs associated with these programs and payments 
might be considered part of the cost of our domestic farm program. But they are not 
costs that can be directly related to farm prices and farm incomes. In a real sense, 
the export programs are an outgrowth of domestic programs which existed before and 
independently of the export programs. All the CCC payments for export for example o 
are on price support commodities. The farm price and the farm income has already 
been determined before the export takes place. However, if it were not for the ex-
port programs moving huge quantities of cotton, wheat, feedgrains, rice I edible oils 1 
and ot:OO r products, the mounting surpluses might have forced basic adjustments in 
the domestic price support arrangements with attendant impacts on producer incomes. 
Because of the prevalence of export programs for agriculture the other side 
of the picture is sometimes overlooked or at least under emphasized. Soybeans are 
a c'ase in point. Though price supported, the new export record of 142 million bushels 
has not involved any export payments in cash or kind and none have been exported 
under Public Law 480. Only relatively small quantities have been exported under 
Mutual Security financing. 
Exports at this rate account for more than twice the soybean production in 
Iowa and at national average yields I take up about 6 million acres of cropland. lf 
this acreage had been devoted to I say I corn, another 300 million bushels of corn 
could have been produced. 
The situation in respect to feedgrains also deserves. special attention. The 
U. S. support price is now essentially competitive on world markets. Except for 
grain sorghums I CCC export payments have almost disappeared. Payments, where 
needed to meet competition, are in the 1-3 cents per bushel range. During last fis-
cal year when 12. 2 million tons of feedgrains were shipped abroad, export payments 
amounted to $23 million or less than 5 percent of the market value. About 72 percent 
moved under dollar sales. 
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Many of the non-price supported commodities also move in the export market 
at high levels on a straight commercial basis. Lard and tallow are two such items. 
The domestic market prices are competitive with world market prices. 
It is sometimes said that farmers derive little satisfaction from large exports 
when the exports resulted from low prices in the United States. It is generally true, 
of course, that when prices of commodities rise 1 other things being equal, exports 
tend to fall. In this case, higher producer incomes may be associated with falling 
exports. But this one case does not tell the bigger story. Even if our huge export 
market for, say tallow grew out of low prices, one can only speculate as to what 
tallow prices would have been if the export market had not absorbed 1. 5 billion pounds 
of this joint product. 
Imports 
Generally speaking o U. S. import programs are not directly related to pro-
ducer prices and incomes. One notable exception is wool. The policy of deficiency 
payments for wool was adopted in the National Wool_ Act of 1954 in lieu of raising the 
tariff on raw wool as recommended by the Tariff Commission. Under the Wool Acto 
an incentive price level is set each year o and government payments are made to pro-
ducers to make up the difference between the national average price received in the 
free market and the incentive level. During 1958-59, the last year for which complete 
information is available, incentive payments amounted to $85 million. The free mar-
ket price is approximately the world price plus the tariff. 
Another exception is sugar. The relative levels of sugar prices to our pro-
ducers (and consumers) are established and to a considerable extent stabilized by 
limiting the total supplies of sugar in the market. Limitation of both foreign and 
domestic additions to the U. S. supply is achieved under the quotas and other pro-
visions of the United States Sugar Act. As a result, U. S. sugar prices generally 
have been higher 1 when reduced to a comparable basis, than sugar prices in non-
preferential markets. Under the quota program the tariff has been greatly reduced. 
Our tariff on raw sugar from full-duty countries is 0. 625 cents per pound. In addi-
tion to the tariff, imported and domestically-produced sugar both bear a tax of 0. 535 
cents :per pound of refined sugar. This tax is paid directly to the Treasury. Domestic 
producers, however, receive conditional payments, not available to foreign producers o 
when sugar cane or sugar beets marketed are within the proportionate share established 
for the farm o when at least the prescribed minimum wages are paid to labor and when 
no child labor is used. The funds for the conditional payments are appropriated 
annually by Congress. The amount paid out has exceeded the amount of excise tax 
collected on domestic sugar, but has been less than the total collections. 
Imports of supplementary commodities in 1960 (the same kinds as those pro-
duced in the United States) represented the equivalent of 16 million harvested acres • 
. Persons representing U. S. farm interests frequently question the policy of permitting 
any imports of competing commodities in view of our agricultural abundance, our pro-
duction control measures 1 and the great public expense attached to our farm programs. 
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Some go as far as to say o and we are sure you have heard them o that such imports 
under U. S. farm circumstances are downright absurd. 
Basically o it is a question of international trade o Not only are there trading 
rules to follow and foster, but economic benefits to be considered. Often the coun-
tries from which we import the questioned products are our best customers for agri-
cultural items. Stated simply, import restrictions beget retaliatory import restrictions 
by other countries. We cannot measure what would happen to our exports if we 
restricted imports beyond the limits necessary to protect domestic price support pro-
grams. However o we would expect to end up with a net loss rather than a gain. 
Like all foreign trade matters, the difficult explanations arise because indi-
vidual producer groups cannot be expected to feel paramount concern for the totai 
welfare where their own incomes appear to be adversely affected. A cattle producer 
in the midwest doesn't necessarily welcome cattle imports from Canada just because 
Canada is a huge market for California citrus. These are real attitudes that have to 
be dealt with. It is a condition that requires statesmanship 0 education, good market-
ing leadership, and a willingness on the part of all of us in responsible positions to 
keep these trade matters under review in terms of finding the best solutions. 
CONCLUDING STATEMENT 
It follows from the above discussion that domestic price and income policies 
have some clear cut implications when related to export and import programs. These 
may be stated briefly as follows: 
(1) Whenever domestic programs result in domestic prices that are higher 
than the world price by an amount greater than the import duty and the transportation 
differential, it may become necessary to seek some additional protection at the 
borders. 
(2) Similarly, whenever domestic prices are above the world price, exports 
are not likely to take place without some governmental intervention to adjust export 
prices to world prices. 
(3) Under either of these conditions, special exceptions may be required 
for agriculture within the guiding rules of trade policy adhered to by the United States 
and the other major trading nations of the world. 
A number of corollary considerations follow from these basic implications. 
All tie to agricultural prices as the key to trade problems and trade opportunities. 
Take the matter of import quotas as additional protection to a domestic price 
program. These quotas may impair a tariff concession negotiated in the trade agree-
ments program. The injured country has recourse through withdrawing concessions 
of equal value granted to the United States. But withdrawals tend to negate the 
purpose of the program. Moreover, the interests of third countries are frequently 
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involved. These countries may in turn follow the example and place new restrictions 
against us and other countries. This then is not the way to build expanded world 
trade. Non-tariff import restrictions must be clearly justified in the eyes of our 
trading partners and applied with discretion. This is what we expect from others. 
This is what we press for in our efforts to gain greater trade liberalization for U. S. 
agricultural products. 
The situation in respect to export price assistance and export programs is 
not greatly different. If we are to make real lasting trade gains, our programs must 
be conceived with fundamental external factors in mind and administered with utmost 
discretion. A number of safeguards are written in the statutes o such as those· in 
Public Law 480. But the fact remains that our posture in international forums is 
directly conditioned by our own programs arising out of domestic price and income 
policies. When we seek trade liberalization for agriculture, we can only mean an 
opportunity to compete in the world market fairly o based on competitive prices. We 
cannot and do not expect to expand foreign markets by underselling world prices 
with U. S. Treasury support. 
There are other ways in which domestic price policies relate to trade programs. 
One is the danger of stimulating production of undesirable grades or varieties which 
end up in CCC inventories or under loans and for which there is little or no foreign 
demand. We had such an experience with tobacco not long ago. Another, is that 
high domestic price supports tend to stimulate production, retard domestic consump-
tion, and increase the pressure for special export programs. Export programs under 
these conditions, you can be sure, would not be very popular with foreign competi-
tors. 
Finally, we must be ever mindful in our trade policy to keep special excep-
tions for agriculture within completely justifiable limits. Currently, and for some 
time now, possible exceptions for agriculture has been our greatest concern in the 
emerging agricultural policy of the Common Market in Europe. Too many exceptions 
can only lead to a separate set of trading rules for agriculture. A separate code for 
agriculture, in tum, can only mean a severe weakening if not a complete breakdown 
of the U. S. goal of expanded world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis. 
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Chapter 10 
Export and Import Programs as Related to Domestic Price 
and Income Policies: An Appraisal 
R. 0. Olson 
Ohio State University 
The situation paper presented by Messrs. Myers and Palmby brings together 
and explains important details about our agricultural export and import programs. 
This should be a helpful basis for an appraisal of these programs. Yet evaluation is 
not at all easy. For one thing, not much useful research has been done on this. A 
more basic problem lies in the difficulty of deciding against what policy goals we may 
appropriately judge these programs. 
The topic assigned for this session suggests strongly that the goal to be con-
sidered is higher domestic farm prices and incomes. We might start with this. Then 
what can we say about the effects of our farm export programs on farm prices at home? 
The effects of expanded exports on prices will vary from commodity to commo-
dity. We can best discuss this if we consider them in two categories: (1) those 
commodities which we export that are not covered by price supports or for which 
support prices are lower than prices at which they can move into world trade, and 
(2) those commodities which are covered by price supports and for which domestic 
support price~ are above world prices. 
The first category includes many livestock and livestock products, fruits 
and vegetables. Lately soybeans have also been in this group. Domestic prices of 
all these products are directly affected by the volume of exports. How much, in 
each case, depends somewhat on the elasticity of demand for the product abroad but 
to a greater extent on the demand elasticity at home, since exports of most of these 
commodities represent a rather small part of world consumption. 
In the second category are a long list of our major products. This includes: 
wheat, rice, cotton, soybeans , feed grains, dairy products and tobacco. Price 
support programs have resulted in the accumulation of large surplus stocks of some 
of these products. For these commodities to move into export channels o some sub-
sidy is usually necessary. A few of these may at times move into world trade at 
prices above their support levels as soybeans are doing now, but normally they re-
main in this second category. However o as long as CCC stocks are substantial o they 
serve to insulate domestic prices from the effects of exports. 1 
Export commodities in this second (surplus) category make up by far the bulk 
of our export trade. It is in these commodities that much of the increase in exports 
in the last year has taken place. According to Myers and Palmby•s figures, 50 
percent of the increase was in cotton and 12 percent in wheat and flour. It seems 
fair to say that trade promotion programs that led to these increases contributed 
The effects of the exports depend on how exports are handled. If drawn entirely 
from surplus stocks, there may be no effect. If drawn from current supplies, the 
effect depends upon the corresponding storage operations. 
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very little I directly at least 1 to domestic price or income increases; the domestic 
prices were the result of price support programs and quite independent of exports. 
We can say the additional exports may make the price support programs easier to 
live with I to the extent that they reduce the cost of handling the large stocks in 
storage spawned by the price programs. Since commodities in this category make up 
the larger part of our export business 1 we can say that the export program has no 
effect on prices of most of our agricultural products. Justification for these pro-
grams will have to be in terms of other goals. 
It seems that to some people the alternative goal is simply surplus dis-
posal. But to most Americans 1 value systems are such that any surplus disposal 
tJ• ogram that does not lead to consumption by someone somewhere will be repugnant. 
Surplus disposal by destruction would not find acceptance. Surplus disposal that 
serves at the same time some nobler end is quite another thing. "Food for Peace, " 
famine relief 1 and surpluses for economic development all have wide appeal. Sim-
ilarly 1 disposal programs which may build defensive strength of friendly countries 
are acceptable. 
There is also, of course 1 the objective of earning dollars. This is one which 
we have been made well aware of recently because of the government's concern over 
the rate at which gold has been flowing out of the country. My guess is we would 
like to export to earn dollars as a primary objective and dispose of additional sur-
pluses with a view to doing "as much good as possible" in feeding hungry people, 
aiding development of underdeveloped areas 1 and promoting their defensive strengths. 
We want to do this 1 of course 1 in ways that are consistent with other important val-
ues I among which are the cultivation of good relations with other nations that may be 
our competitors in foreign trade. The basic rules of GATT, as summarized in the 
situation paper, express 1 I believe 1 ethical norms for behavior in foreign trade that 
most of us would find it easy to endorse. 
It is hard to make any very objective evaluation of programs in terms of all 
these goals and values 1 which probably all of us favor but in somewhat different com-
binations. Neverthelesso we can examine our export programs to see how they appear 
to affect these various goals. 
COMMERCIAL DOLLAR SALES 
Last year commercial dollar sales of agricultural exports amounted to $3. 2 
billion; of this, $1. 3 billion moved under CCC payments. Only $1.9 billion moved 
into export without assistance. Many of these unassisted exports were of price 
supported products I including soybeans 1 tobacco and some feed grains for which the 
domestic prices were 1 at times during the past year, competitive with world prices. 
The $1. 3 billion worth of products which went into commercial dollar exports 
on the basis of export payments of cash or in kind was accounted for almost entirely 
by cotton, $. 6 7 billion; feed grains 1 $. 35 billion; and wheat and rice 1 $. 2 6 billion. 
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These dollar sales did earn dollars; they helped our balance of payments 
situation. They helped to reduce our surpluses--for some commodities quite signi-
ficantly. We can make no pretense that these exports contributed to the humanitarian 
objectives. There is a question as to how they affected our relations with nations 
producing these commodities for export in competition with us. Can we contend that 
these exports are consistent with the spirit of the GATT principles '1 I think we can 
for those commodities moving into export without assistance. There may be some 
reservations about the $1. 3 billion worth which goes out under export payments. One 
of the GATT principles is that ''Commodities should be free of subsidies which ma-
terially interfere with traditional trade patterns. " Applying this principle o we would 
need to justify increases in exports on the basis that this represented our "fair share" 
of an expanded demand for these products. Our commercial dollar sales of farm pro-
ducts abroad increased by 30 percent over a year earlier (18 percent higher than the 
previous record year of 1957). Volume of sales increased even more. It is difficult 
to believe that none of this represents diversion of trade from competitive suppliers. 
I confess I don't know. I don't understand fully the basis used in deciding how much 
our exports under export payments will be in any period. Is it whatever we can get 
by with without provoking retaliation by competitors? The situation report is not clear 
on this, and I don't find the answer spelled out anywhere else. 
EXPORTS UNDER TITLE I, PoLo 480 
We are having some success in ridding ourselves of substantial amounts of 
surpluses under Title I of P. L. 480. 
These sales are for local currencies so they can do little to help our balance 
of payments problem. They do help to the extent that some of the proceeds are used 
to pay for U. S. government costs within the receiving country that otherwise would 
require dollar outflow, but this is at the expense of inconsistency with our foreign 
aid objectives. We receive other benefits from the proceeds when they are used for 
strengthening defense forces within the recipient countries; at least a portion of this 
we presume to be in our interest. We may also, eventually, realize some returns 
from loans made from proceeds of the surplus sales. But all in all, the monetary re-
turns to us from Title I of P.L. 480 sales are likely to be very small. T. W. Schultz 
estimates it will be no more than 10-15 percent of the cost to CCC. 2 Clearly o pay-
ments to us for P. L. 480 exports will be small. But it was not the purpose of the 
P. L. 480 program to earn dollars. Rather it was adopted to help dispose of surpluses 
and to serve at the same time humanitarian ends. The humanitarian and economic 
development objectives have been emphasized. Nearly half of all local currency pro-
ceeds are reserved for loans to the foreign countries for economic development. Some 
portions of the proceeds are also designated for grants for economic development. 
2 T. W. Schultz, "Impact and Implication of Foreign Surplus Disposal on Under-
developed Economies, " Journal of Farm Economics. Proceedings of Annual Meet-
ing, 1960. 
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There is some disagreement as to how effectively the exports under this act 
contribute to economic development. Some argue that the programs have been of 
little value to the receiving countries and may even have hindered agricultural de-
velopment in the receiving countries. Schultz 3 has argued that the real value of 
these goods to the receiving countries is probably no more than 37 cents for each 
dollar of CCC costs. That figure is arrived at in this way: the market export value 
of wheat 1 for example 1 is about 7 5 percent of the cost to CCC. The actual value of 
the grain to the receiving countries is only about 50 percent of the· market export 
value 1 based on the guess that if these countries had been given dollars and free 
choice in what they bought with them 1 their preference for alternative goods 1 such 
as industrial machinery 1 is so high that they would only buy wheat if it were ob-
tainable at half the market export value. This would be 37 percent of CCC costs. 
The assumption that food imports have such low priority is a weak one that I 
believe would be difficult to defend. It seems quite apparent that India, which has 
been the principal importer of P. L. 480 goods 1 would have placed a high priority 
on food grain imports during the past four years 1 notwithstanding the very strong 
pressures for acceleration of industrial imports. Throughout the past four years 1 the 
shortages of food and accompanying inflation in food prices have been a serious con-
cern of the Indian government. If some of the food deficit had not been met by P. L. 
480 imports, which amounted to more than 10 million tons 1 I feel sure that much of 
this would have been made up by either {1) diverting foreign exchange from other 
purposes to food imports or (2) a reduction in the pace of economic development. 
Another controversy centers around the contribution of the P. L. 480 program to eco-
nomic development in the recipient country;;ii~~some pe.Qpl-e try to measure the contribution 
to economic development in terms of how the local currency proceeds have been spent 
{when lent or granted to the recipient country). The fact that a very large part of this 
has been allowed to accumulate in our bank accounts in those countries is sometimes 
taken to mean that there has been little contribution to economic development. Such 
a view stems from a misconception about the roles the food imports and our resulting 
local currency funds can play in a country's development. 
The contribution of the P. L. 480 aid to the recipient country does not occur 
at the time we spend our proceeds but at the time the surplus commodities move into 
that country's markets. 
In an underdeveloped country such as India, there is much idle or underemployed 
labor. Much of this can be converted directly to capital in the forms of roads 1 .irriga-
tion canals 1 and drainage systems. However 1 employment of these otherwise idle 
labor resources for such purposes 1 except on a very limited basis, is possible only if 
the workers are paid. This payment of wages gives rise to an increased demand for 
food. If there is no additional food produced and, in the short-runu these capital 
producing projects will not contribute to higher food production, food prices will rise 
sharply--they will unless the increased demand is matched by increased imports of 
3 See T. W. Schultz 1 ibid. 
147 
foods. The P. L. 480 surpluses are intended to take care of this. Thus the imports 
of these commodities make possible additional development investment without in-
flation of food prices. 
When the P.L. 480 products are delivered to India, the u.s. government is 
paid in rupees which are held on deposit with the State Bank of India. The rupee 
payments made to the U.S. account are created money o raised by issuing treasury 
bills to the Government of India. When the wheat is sold, usually through govern-
ment fair price shops o the proceeds are used to redeem the treasury bills. The in-
creased food supplies from the P. L. 480 imports make possible additional development 
expenditures without inflation. The added development expenditures can be financed 
out of additional investments in government securities by the state bank on the basis 
of our deposits. The problem arises later, when and if we spend the accumulated 
deposits for still more development projects a The disbursement of these funds then 
will likely increase the money in circulation. 
It is not surprising that our local currency deposits remain largely unspent in 
those countries where we have had sizable P. L. 480 operations. But the fact that 
this is so in no way means that they have. not served well to finance economic de-
velopment in that country. The real resource is added when the food imports arrive 
and are distributed--not when we spend our proceeds. This food is what makes possi-
ble the added investment in development projects. Contribution to economic develop-
ment depends upon the extent to which the recipient country takes advantage of the 
added food supply to accelerate the pace of the development programs. In a country 
such as India 1 where there is a great deal of underemployed labor and where food is 
the major item in the cost of living I there are opportunities for substantial increases 
in capital formation by expanding labor intensive development projects. Howevero 
while ditches I roads and irrigation channels can be constructed with the barest of 
tools, even for such projects there are great returns to small investments in capital 
for the labor to work with. A small amount of dollar aid accompanying the food im-
ports would make much greater development possible. We need to be careful in not 
thinking that P. L. 480 aid can be substituted for dollar aid. To be successful it needs 
to be accompanied with dollar aid. ~it should .2!!2.E.!! pointed ..21!1!!!2! ,By substi-
tuting ~local currency proceeds .2! E.:...k. i§.!L.!Qr dollars in meeting .2!!!:. costs within 
a country .f2r military aid I embassy operations 1 etc. I ~ reduce the. dollar exchange 
~would otherwise have been available !2. that country. 
There has been some concern about the effects P. L. 480 imports might have 
on the recipient country's agriculture. Does it depress farm prices in that country? 
Does it reduce the incentive for agricultural improvement? 
If we can assume that the food supply in a country is an important factor 
limiting the rate at which development programs can proceed without intolerable in-
flation 1 then we can argue that if P. L. 480 imports had not come in prices would have 
been no higher but development would have been that much slower. 
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Regarding the incentive to improve agricultural productivity, it is conceivable 
that a country might take the view that investments to improve domestic agricultural 
output can be reduced and P. L. 480 imports relied on to meet food needs. I think 
there is little evidence that this is being done. What seems more likely is that the 
P. L. 480 imports are making it possible to divert resources from short-run expedien-
cies to longer run investments in agriculture--relying on the food imports to meet 
deficits until the effects of the longer run programs are felt. Thus, instead of having 
to buy fertilizer to meet this year's food needs u they can invest in a fertilizer factory 
that will meet next year's needs. They can invest in irrigation facilities, agricultural 
colleges, experiment stations and educational services that lead to high productivity 
in the long run • 
There is next the question of the effect of the P. L. 480 program on relations 
with competitive producers of these surplus products. Other nations producing wheat, 
rice or cotton for export might well be concerned at our sales on such concessional 
terms. The law, of course, requires that "reasonable precautions be taken to (l) safe-
guard U.S. usual marketings and (2) assure that such sales will not unduly disrupt 
world prices of agricultural commodities or normal patterns of commercial trade with 
friendly countries. " It appears that we have conscientiously adhered to this policy. 
Criticism of the P. L.480 program by competing countries has been directed mostly at 
exports under Title I I I of the act, involving barter of surplus food grains for strategic 
materials. Canada, in particular, has been critical of our barter program but has in-
dicated approval of sales under Title I. 
It is argued convincingly that P. L. 480 Title I exports, rather than replacing 
purchases from other sources, have actually led to an expanded demand for these 
products which has been beneficial to our competitors. There is some evidence to 
support this. Total commercial sales of wheat in the world market have not declined 
with the increase in P. L. 480 sales. In India, wheat imports were only • 2 8 million 
tonsinfiscal year 1955-56, prior to imports under P.L. 480. Since thenu India has 
imported more than 10 million tons of wheat under P. L. 480; yet average annual wheat 
imports outside this program have been . 44 million ton. With economic development 
and increased population, total wheat consumption has increased by about 20 percent 
without any decline in consumption of other cereals. 
It is not easy to measure very accurately how much additional per capita con-
sumption has been generated in the recipient countries u but there seems to be agree-
ment that there has been this effect. Dr. Sen cited one study of the effects of P. L. 
480 operations in 25 recipient countries that shows that per capita consumption of 
wheat for the period 1955-59 averaged 7. 4 pounds more than for the period 1951-54. 
Of this, it was concluded 4 pounds could be said to be due to P.L. 480 imports. 4 
4 S. R. Sen, "Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal on Under-
developed Economics, " Journal .Q!. Farm Economics, Proceedings of Annual Meeting, 
1960. 
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It appears to me that exports under Title I of P. Lo 480 have provided very 
little direct returns to us but have served well to reduce our surplus stocks, have 
helped meet food needs abroad and contributed to economic development in re-
cipient countries. They have done this without adverse effects on our commercial 
exports or those of other exporting countries. In fact, there is reason to believe 
that these exports have helped to expand commercial markets in these commodities. 
Exports under Titles I I and II I of P. 1. 480 for emergency assistance and 
relief to needy people have also succeeded in meeting most objectives except the 
earnings of dollars. These programs have not been unmixed blessings, however. 
There has been some reluctance on the part of underdeveloped countries to accept 
gifts of milk nowder which would admittedly raise nutritional standards just be-
cause they could not be certain that such relief programs would add enough to growth 
of national income that they could continue at the acquired standard when the gifts 
stopped. Where the surplus imports are integrated with the country's development pro-
gram, this is not a problem. 
MUTUAL SECURITY ACT, SEC. 402, P.Lo 665 
The effects of this program should not be essentially different from those 
of exports under Title I of P. 1. 480. Sales are for local currency, and the proceeds 
are designated to be used for advancing the mutual security programs within those 
countries. 
FOREIGN MARKET PROMOTION 
One could well question the wisdom of spending much on promotion of ex-
panded foreign markets for U.S. farm products. Are our agricultural products differen-
tiated enough that we can hope to significantly develop in the foreign consumer a 
preference for American wheat or milk or eggs? If not, can we hope to increase the 
demand for food in the developed countries where this program is concentrated to 
any appreciable extent? I don't know how we have measured the results of this 
effort. To succeed, it seems that our products would have to be distinctly different 
from similar products from other countries--not only different but better. From some 
reports, it seems our products do not measure up to products of our competitors--
due to minimum grade standards. 
IMPORT POLICIES 
How do our import programs relate to our domestic agricultural price and 
income policies? 
Our total agricultural imports come close to matching the value of our total 
agricultural exports at about $4 billion each. According to the definitions used, 
about 50 percent of these imports are "complementary"--products which are not grown 
commercially in this country. The other one-half are referred to as "supplementary" 
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imports. The implication might be that these products compete with our home-produced 
commodities. 
The complementary products imported probably have. little direct effect on our 
domestic prices. On the other hand, the $2 billion worth of supplementary products 
imported may in some cases have important effects on domestic prices. Sugar, which 
is the largest single commodity in this category, is imported in amounts of around $. 5 
billion annually. As pointed out in the situation paper, domestic sugar prices are 
established by limiting the supplies of sugar in the market through import quotas and 
production restrictions. Sugar prices, therefore, are a very direct result of import 
restrictions. 
Wool is another commodity imported in substantial quantity for which the domestic 
price is directly related to our import policy. The domestic market price is essentially 
the world price plus the tariff. However, the farmers' net prices and incomes are quite 
independent of the imports. The National Wool Act of 1954 provides for the government 
to set an inc~ntive price level and make deficiency payments to wool growers to make 
up the difference between this and the market price. We import about $100 million worth 
annually of wool types that compete with our own wools. We import another $ll0 million 
worth of wools considered complementary. 
Aside from wool and sugar, it is not easy to see how import programs relate to 
domestic prices and incomes for the products in the supplementary category. Between 
$300 and $400 million of these imports are livestock and livestock products for which 
we have no price support programs. We export nearly as much livestock products u 
but the composition is considerably different. For example, last year we imported $208 
million worth of beef and veal and exported only $ll million of beef and veal. We im-
ported no tallow but exported $109 million worth. We imported $l10 million worth of 
pork and exported $62 million worth of lard. In these commodities, it appears that the 
relatively free movement of goods permits us to use the cuts and qualities of meats we 
prefer and dispose of the jointly produced types of products for which we have less use. 
Imports of hides and skins of about $70 million are about equal to our exports of 
these products. The explanation presumably lies largely in the differences in kinds and 
qualities, which make the imported goods essentially different products from the domestic 
ones. Imports probably have little influence on our domestic prices. 
We import about $150 million worth of vegetable oils and copra. This may seem 
odd in view of our large exports of fats and oils. We can compete in the world market 
with oils and yet attract imports, we suppose, largely because of the imperfect sub-
stitutability between various fats and oils for certain purposes. If so, the imported oils 
are actually more in the nature of complementary products to our own oils. 
We also have some imports of products of which we have abundant surpluses in 
storage as a result of price support programs. However, imports of these products are 
very minor. The escape clause in the GATT principles permits us to restrict imports of 
those commodities for which we have restrictions on production or marketing. We take 
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full advantage of that. In addition, we also have obtained concessions from the GATT 
countries to restrict imports under provisions of Section 22 of the old Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act. Between the two of these concessions, we very effectively restrict imports 
of commodities that might interfere with our price.support programs. 
SUMMARY 
A very large part of our farm export trade is in commodities for which we usually 
have sizable stocks in CCC storage as a result of price support programs. Our exports 
of these commodities bear no direct relation to their domestic prices. These exports 
serve other objectives such as earning dollars, relief and foreign economic development 
as well as reducing the costs of our price support and storage program. But as far as 
having any significant effect on our domestic prices and incomes, we don't believe they 
do. Put the other way, though, it's a different matter. Our price and income programs 
have most certainly had a very important effect on our export policies. The P. L. 480 
program, the CCC export payment program and the export promotion programs are the 
direct consequence of the surplus stocks accumulated by our farm price programs. 
Import policies, too, which are very restrictive on imports of price supported 
commodities are also directly the consequence of these price policies. 
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Chapter ll 
Economic Implications of Alternative Agricultural Policies 
(A Summary of Staff Reports for the Joint Economic Committee) 
Walter Wilcox 
Library of Congress 
As farm families entered the 1960's their incomes were lower relative to nonfarm 
incomes than at any time since the 1930's. 
Low farm incomes persist at the present time in spite of: 
(1) A net migration of 7. 2 million people from farms in the past 10 years and a 
decline of 4. 8 million in farm population; 
(2) A l. 1 million reduction in number of f~rms; and 
{3) Farm price support 1 soil bank, and surplus removal pr9grams, which in-
creased farm income several billion dollars in each of the past 8 years. 
The purpose of this study is to illuminate the farm income and adjustment problem 
in the 1960's and to analyze the economic implications of alternative policies for dealing 
with it. 
FARM FAMILY INCOMES VARY WIDELY 
In 1958, the latest year for which data are available o over a million farm families 
had incomes of less than $2 1 000 o Family income takes into account income from all 
sources, including home-produced food, fuel, and shelter. Farm production expenses 
are deducted. Only 336,000 farm families had incomes of $10 o 000 or more. The number 
of farm families in each of 5 income groups in 1958 is shown below: 
Farm family personal income from all sources before income taxes: 
Under $2 1000----------------------------------------------
$21000 to $2,999 ------------------------------------------
$31000 to $4,999 ------------------------------------------
$5,000 to $9,999 ------------------------------------------
$101000 and over ------------------------------------------
Total ---------------------------------------------------
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce o 
Number of 
farm families 
11177,000 
834,000 
1,242,000 
1,160,000 
3361000 
41749,000 
In 1947, farm families made up 47 percent of those in the lowest income fifth of 
all families in the United States. Although there were over 1 million fewer farm families 
in 1958, their relative income position had worsened--50 percent were in the lowest income 
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fifth of all families. The percentage of farm and nonfarm families in specified personal 
income classes in 1958 is shown below: 
Farm families Nonfarm Farmfam-
Family personal income class before income tax (percent) families Hies as 
(percent) percentage 
of total 
Under$2 1000------------------------------- 25 6 33 
$21 000 to $21999 --------------------------- 18 6 26 
$31000 to $41999 
---------------------------
26 24 12 
$ 5 1 0 0 0 to $ 9 1 9 9 9 
---------------------------
24 . 47 6 
$10 I 000 and over ---~----------------------- 7 -17 5 
Total----------------------------------- 100 100 ----
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce. 
Wide variations in incomes persist in agriculture primarily because of the range in 
size and productivity of farms. 
In 1954 I the latest year for which comparable data are available 1 12 percent of all 
farms--those with sales of $10 I 000 or more--marketed 58 percent of all farm products. 
At the other extreme 1 families obtaining most of their income from farming but on small 
farms with sales of $2 1500 or less--43 percent of the total--produced only nine percent 
of the products marketed. A full 30 percent of the farms were part-time farms or country 
residences 1 and produced only two percent of the farm products marketed. 
Because of the wide range in the size and productivity of farms, it is helpful to 
divide them into two major groups--commercial farms with $2,500 or more products mar-
keted--and all others 1 often referred to as low income farms. 1 
In spite of a decline of almost two million farms in the past 15 years 1 the number of 
commercial farms with sales of $2 1500 or more has remained remarkably constant at about 
2. 1 million. With the trend in farm consolidations continuing 1 a decline of perhaps five 
percent in number of commercial farms may occur by 1965. 
The worsening relative income position of families on commercial farms in recent 
years is illustrated by figure 11. 1. Taking into account income from all sources 1 fam-
ilies on commercial farms in the period 1949-52, received incomes approximately equal 
to those of all nonfarm families. Although data on income from off-farm sources are not 
available for recent years 1 it appears that in 1959-60 average income of nonfarm families 
may have been 30 percent higher than the average income of families on commercial farms. 
1 The noncommercial 1 or low-income farms with less than $2 I 500 of farm product sales 
produce less than 10 percent of the products marketed. 
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FIGURE 11.1. Estimated average net income of farms with sales over $2,500 and 
average family personal income of nonfarm families, 1949-59. 1 
Dollars 
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1 Estimated from U.S. Department of AgricuHure and U.S. Department of Commerce 
data. Families on farms with s,ales of over $2,500 also received income from nonfarm 
sources averaging $800 to $1,600 per family during this period. 
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Trends in the return to labor on farms and in other industries also indicate in-
creasing disparities. In 1951-52, workers on farms, including owner-operators, received 
a return of $0. 9 0 an hour for their labor as compared with $1. 6 3 for manufacturing em-
ployees. 
In 1959, returns to labor on farms was $0.75 an hour, only one-third of the $2.22 
received per hour by workers in manufacturing. 
DYNAMIC FORCES IN AGRICULTURE 
It is the dynamic forces in operation in agriculture which will give rise to con-
tinuing income and adjustment problems in the 1960's. 
Farm output per man-hour increased threefold in the past 20 years, and almost 
doubled in the last 10. Utilizing about the same cropland area, farm output increased 
60 percent in the past 20 years and 25 percent in the last 10. Increased crop production 
per acre accounted for almost two-thirds of the increase in farm output in recent years. 
The average annual change in farm production and source of change is shown below: 
Average annual change in factors contributing to farm output, 1947-49 to 1957-59 
Source of change Index points Percentage 
of total 
Reduction in farm-produced power------------------ 0.33 16 
Increase added by livestock and pasture------------ .83 39 
Decrease in cropland used------------------------ -.40 -19 
Increase in crop production per acre --------------- l. 37 64 
Average annual change in farm output -------------- 2.13 100 
Source: Agricultural Research Service. 
Since 1947-49: 
Farm output per unit of input has increased 24 percent; 
Production per breeding unit of livestock has increased 25 percent; 
Feed consumption per 100 pounds of broilers produced has declined 30 percent; 
Output of all livestock and livestock products per hour of labor has increased 
44 percent; 
Output of all crops per hour of farm labor has tripled; 
The rate of increase in farm output per hour of labor has been three times the 
rate of increase for nonfarmworkers. 
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Dynamic forces affecting agricultural production in the 1960's include rapid 
technological advances in production practices, sweeping changes in organization of 
farm production and marketing, and continued growth in use of nonfarm inputs" Most 
increases in farm production have resulted from purchases of nonfarm items such 0s 
fertilizer, machinery, fuel, and pesticides. If innovations were to stop today, pur-
chases of nonfarm inputs would continue to increase for several years. Farmers L:tve 
just started using many of the new pesticides, new feed addiUves, and the newest 
farm equipment. Fertilizer use is still less than opt.i.mum. Even though farm prices 
decline further, increased fertilizer use would sti.ll be profitable for many crops on 
many farms. 
Added production achieved by using new technology costs less per unit of 
output than when using previous production practices. Farm technological advances 
typically involve increased quantities of non-farm resources, increased fan •. output, 
and lower costs per unit of output. Under these conditions, with unrestrai.ned price 
competition, increases in total farm output depends primarily on the rate of adoption 
of new technologies and on the upward trend in the use of fertilizers, weed killers, 
pesticides, feed additives, and other nonfarm inputs. Usual supply and demand forces 
do not achieve equilibrium in agriculture at satisfactory price and income levels under 
conditions of rapid technological advance. The extremely inelastic demand for farm 
products causes sharp price declines when supplies increase faster than population 
growth. Previously committed resources--tractors o improvements in land, specialized 
machinery and most farm operators--cannot shift out of agriculture in response to price 
declines. Thus the addition of new output increasing practices becomes the most profit-
able alternative to the individual farmer in spite of low prices" 
As an industry agriculture differs from most others. Relatively little labor .i.s 
hired and purchased supplies are a smaller part of total costs than in manufacturi.ng. 
Economic incentives encourage the full use of all land, labor 6 equipment 6 and unH 
cost-reducing technologies as long as the family continues to farm. In the present state 
of agriculture's development, farm output may be increased with fewer farm operator 
families and workers as mechanization of crop and livestock production continues. 
With rapid technical advance the cost-price squeeze drives those with capital 
available into output-expanding, cost-reduci.ng investments. Eventually, however, 
farmers are unable to replace wornout equipment or purchase needed current supplies, 
and farm production fai.ls to increase. But under such conditions a long period of de-· 
pressed farm income, falling land values, and farm financl.al di.stress appears probable. 
Agriculture has greater difficulties than manufacturing i.ndustri.es in assimilaUng 
rapid technological change. Farmers are price takers under current market organizaUon 
in contrast to industrial firms which typically establish sales prices and produce to 
supply their markets at stable prices. Manufacturers typically make differentiated, 
trademarked products, often using patented processes. They utilize pc<rchased ma·-
terials and hired labor. New technological processes are adopted to hJwer costs. But, 
utilizing purchased materials and hired labor for the most part, they limit production 
to amounts that can be sold at prices in line with costs. 
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Workers displaced by labor-saving equipment Sl.lffer income losses but are 
cared for by unemployment insurance and welfare services until they find new employ-
ment. Industrial workers usually have less difficulty than farmworkers in finding new 
employment, since they usually live in urban areas accessible to new employment 
opportunities. Also, their experience better fits them for other industrial employment 
than the experience of farmworkers. It is these differences in economic organization 
of the industries which make it possible for most manufacturers to operate profitably 
at less than full capacity while assimilating rapid technological change and prevent 
agriculture from following similar practices. 
Farm youth have limited income earning opportunities. --Agriculture has other 
critical problems resulting from dynamic forces. Approximately 220, 000 farm boys 
reach working age each year,, yet there are OlllY about 23,000 openings for new farmers 
on farms offering promise of a net income of $1,500 for the farm family. 2 Approximately 
90 percent of the young male workers in farm families must look forward to nonagricul-
tural careers or to low levels of income from farming~ 
Looking forward in the 1960's, one finds no evidence that increases in farm 
output will soon level off. Unless the rate of growth in job opportunities increases 
substantially, however, farmworkers' difficulties in finding nonfarm jobs may increase. 
Because of the higher birth rate in the 1940's, young workers will enter the labor force 
in the 1960's at the rate of 2, 600, 000 a yea!", a 40-percent increa-se as compared with 
the 1950's. 
In the past 6 years t:he net increase in employees in nonagricultural establish-
ments was 2 I 294 I 000. Changes in the number of employees engaged in various occupa-
tions are shown below: 
Government--------------------------------------------------
hange in number 
of employees in 
1959 as compared 
with 1953 
Service and miscellaneous------------------------------------- 9871000 
Wholesale and retail trade-:----..--------------------------------- 8581 000 Do. 
Finance, insurance and real estate ------------------------~---- 387 1 000 Do. 
Contract construction---------------:--------------------------- 145 I 000 Do. 
~ining-----------------------------------~------------------ 176,000 Decrease Transpcrtation and public utilities __ ...; _______ . ______ ;...;. ________ ..,;___ 319,000 Do. 
~anufacturing ------------------..:-_.;. _ _, _________ ..,_...;_.,. ... _..;..;._..;;.. __ 1, 070, 000 Do. 
Increase in employees in nonagricultural .establfsht:nents.:.;-----~·-·- ... 2 2·94 000 Increase 
Change in workers employec;i in agricul~ure (B. L. S. labor force serie~ '719 I 000 Decrease 
Source: Employment and Earnings, vol. 7 I No. 1, U.S. Dep~rtment of Labor. 
------...-.... · ............... '• '.,• · .. ": .... : .. : .... ~ .. ·:.: ... ··:·"' ' ,.-. ·.·.,, ·. ' 
2 From Karl Shoemaker, "OpJ>bttuniUes anq Limitation.s fat Employment of Farm 'People 
Within and Outside AgiiC:ulture;."l~tt~d by Ernest}. -Nesius jn "Opportunities and 
Limitations i~~..prt>'grams for Youl\ger More Flexible Persons Now in Agriculture." 
"Problems and Policies of American Agriculture, u Iowa State Center for Agricultural 
and Economic Adjustment, 1959, p. 360. 
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Ewan Clague, Commissioner of Labor Statistics, foresees an increase in pro-
fessional, clerical and sales jobs in the coming decade, but no increase in jobs for 
unskilled workers in industry. This, he points out, could lead to a condition of sub-
stantial unemployment existing at the same time that shortages of skilled labor occur. 3 
These observations are particularly relevant in considering the opportunities of farm-
workers, many of whom are unskilled. 
Farm youth have educational ..sill!. geographic disadvantages. --Rural areas have 
not shared fully in the improvement in education in the past 40 years. 
Small school districts, low density and lower income have produced a quality 
of rural education which, by all available measures * * * is less adequate than educa-
tion provided in urban systems. 4 
Although much progress has been made in rural education in recent years, fur-
ther improvement is urgently needed. All measures of education reported in the 1959 
census show a wide disparity between farm and nonfarm people. Educational deficiencies 
of rural youth place them at a disadvantage in obtaining nonfarm employment. 
Farm youths face other disadvantages in their shift to nonfarm employment. 
The growth in job opportunities has not been rapid enough to provide off-farm jobs for 
all who are willing to work at prevailing wages. The greater distances of farm people 
from employment centers make farmworkers less readily available for the limited number 
of newly opening nonfarm jobs. 
Farmworkers also often have differences in cultural backgrounds which cause 
them to be discriminated against when the demand for labor is smaller than the potential 
supply. These dynamic forces result in agriculture bearing a large share of the economy• s 
underemployment. Whether this situation improves or becomes more serious tn the 1960•s 
depends primarily on general economic policies, the rate of economic growth in the econo-
my, and on improvement in education and training of rural youth. 
Two aspects of agriculture are worthy of special note in considering the dynamic 
forces affecting resource adjustments in the 1960•s. The first relates to the fixity of 
both labor and capital in agriculture, once they have been committed. Most of the labor 
used in farm production is that of farm operators and their families. For very good rea-
sons most farm operators, after reaching 35 or 40 years of age, continue farming even 
though incomes are discouragingly low. At the same time, many retiring operators are 
replaced by sons and sons-in-law who will inherit all or a large part of the farm, thus 
predisposing them toward a farming career. These patterns of behavior slow adjustments 
in farm size and in the labor employed in agriculture in response to technical innovations 
and low returns from farming. 
3 NewYorkTimes, Aug. 22,1960. 
4 Warren Rovetch, ,.Opportunities and Limitations in Education of Farm Youth, ,. 
.. Problems and Policies of American Agriculture,,. Iowa State Center for Agricultural 
and Economic Adjustment, 1959, p. 340. 
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FIGURE 11. 2. Prices received by farmers and prices paid for farm machinery and 
motor vehicles, 194 7-60 . 
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Source: Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. (Rising 
prices paid for farm machinery and motor vehicles in part reflect quality improvements in 
the items priced.) 
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Capital investments in farming, once made, also tend to be committed for their 
entire productive life. As pointed out earlier, individual farmers continue to invest in 
output-expanding, cost-reducing equipment even though farm prices and incomes are 
relatively low; and improvements in land, specialized equipment and tractors seldom 
can be shifted to alternative employment even though returns from their use tum out 
to be far less than anticipated at the time of the investment. 
At the other extreme, few industries are as easy to enter as agriculture. In the 
subhumid areas, small, low-productivity farms. can be purchased or leased with little 
capital. Families who lose out in non-agricultural industries often migrate to rural 
communities and eke out an existence from farming. Thus there are a number of dynamic 
forces which lead to overinvestment in capital equipment in agriculture in periods of 
rapid technological change, retard the rate of increase in farm size, delay the reduction 
in number of farm operator families, se·riously delay adjustments in farm production to 
market outlets available and add to the difficulties of commodity supply-management 
programs. 
Production .£2§1 trends will be important l!l the 1960's. --Increases in farm pro-
duction expenses are fully as important as sinking farm prices in creating the serious 
cost-price squeeze now gripping all farmers. Farm prices fell 12 percent from 194 7-49 
to 1959 while production expenses increased 45 percent. About half the increase in 
production expenses was the result of increased quantities of production supplies used, 
and half was caused by price increases. The trends in prices paid for farm machinery 
and for motor vehicles are shown in figure 11. 2. 
Price increases for industrial products purchased by farmers, 1947-49 to 
June 15, 1960 
Farm machinery------------------------------------------------------
Motor vehicles------------------------------------------------------
Motor supplies---------------------------------------------------:----
Building and fencing materials-----------------------------------------
Farm supplies-------------------------------------------------------
Fertilizer-----------------------------------------------------------
Percent 
59 
45 
24 
33 
12 
6 
Wage rates also increased 51 percent; farm real estate taxes increased 90 per-
cent, and interest payments on farm mortgage debts increased 170 percent. 
Manufactured product prices have been rising almost steadily in recent years. 
Price increases since 1947-49 accounted for $4.4 billion, or 17 percent, of farmers' 
production expenses in 1959 (table 11.1 and fig. 11. 3). It is disturbing to note that 
production expense increases due to price increases more than doubled in the last 
five years, increasing throughout the business recession in 1957 and 1958. 
FIGURE 11. 3 . 
Percent 
162 
Increase in farmers 1 production expenses due to price increases since 
1947-49 as a percentage of net farm income. 
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Source: See table 11. 1. 
163 
Table ll. l. Production expenses, increases due to price increases, reali.zed net 
farm income and related datau 1949-59 
(Dollars in billions) 
-~.-~-----··-·· ' I Production expenses ·Increase in Production ~ R 1' d production ea 1ze expenses 
expenses net farm 
' 
due to price 
Year Current 1947-49 due to pri.ce income increases 
dollars dollars i.ncrease as percent of 
, si.nce 1947- net farm 
49 income 
1949----------------- $18.0 $17.8 $0.2 $13.8 l 
1950----------------- 19.3 
' 
18.6 7 13.2 5 
1951----------------- 22.2 19.3 2.9 15.2 19 
1952----------------- 22.6 19.3 3.3 l4A 23 
1953----------------- 21,4 19.3 2 0 l 13.9 15 
1954---------~------- 21.7 19.5 2,2 12.2 18 
I 
1955----------------- 2L9 19.9 2.0 ll. 5 17 
1956----------------- 22.6 ' 20.4 2o2 12.0 i 18 1957----------------- 23.4 I 20.5 2.9 ll. 0 26 1958----------------- z~ ' 2L5 3.7 13 0 l ~. : 
r 
28 
1959-----------------
i 26.2 21. 81_ 4.4 ll. 3 39 
-
~ 
·---1...·-· --~-· . 
Source: Agricultural Marketing Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 
AGRICULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Parm price.,-support and supply-management policies in the 1960's will have 
important effects on international trade. The United States is by far the world • s largest 
exporter and is the second largest importer of agricultural products. In value terms, 
imports at times exceed exports. The value of agricultural exports and imports in re-
cent years is shown below: 
(In blllions) 
Fiscal year Exports Imports for Fiscal year Exports Imports for 
consumption 
.. ,.-.,...,. 
consumption 
--··-···· 
1955------------ $ 3' 5 $ 4. 1 1958------------ $4.0 $3.9 
1956----------- 4.7 3.8 1959------------ I 3.7 4.0 
1957----------- 4.0 3.9 
---·-'~--..--~·--=-""'-"-- = 
Traditionally the major U. S. agricultural exports have been wheat, feed grains, 
cotton, tobacco, and lard. More recently rice, vegetable oils o and oil seeds have be-
come important export items while animal products o fruits, and vegetables have been 
major items in years of surplus. 
164 
Approximately 60 percent of our exports in recent years have moved under 
Public Law 480 and related programs or have been subsidized if sold for dollars. 
Exports of agricultural products in the fiscal years 1958, 1959, and 1960 classified 
as to conditions of sale are shown below: 
( In billions) 
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal 
year year year 
1958 1959 1960 
Exports under International Cooperation Administration 
and Public Law 480 programs--------------------- $1.2 $1.3 $1.3 
Sales for dollars (involving some subsidy)------------ 1.2 • 8 1.3 
Subtotal----------------------------------- 2.4 2.1 2.6 
Nonsubsidized sales for dollars--------------------- 1.6 1.6 1.9 
Total agricultural exports-------------------- 4.0 3.7 4.5 
Estimated subsidy in sales for dollars involving some • 3 .2 • 3 
subsidy.---------------------------------------
Source: Foreign Agricultural Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture. 
Traditionally, the major U. S. agricultural imports have been sugar, coffee, 
bananas, rubber, cocoa, vegetable oils, and wool. More recently imports of cattle 
and meats have assumed increased importance. Approximately half of the agricultural 
imports, such as cattle, meats, fruits, vegetables, sugar, grains, cotton, wool, 
and vegetable oils are directly competitive with domestic production. The others 
complement, rather than compete directly with, domestic production. These products 
include coffee r natural rubber, cocoa beans, bananas, tea, spices, and cordage fiber. 
Import quotas under the Sugar Act limit imports of sugar. No other import 
quotas limit physical quantities of imports of farm products except those under section 
22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended. This act authorizes the 
use of import quotas to limit imports which materially interfere with farm price support 
programs. Imports at present controlled under section 22 are wheat and wheat flour, 
cotton and cotton waste, certain dairy products, rye and rye flour and meal, flaxseed 
and linseed oil, peanuts and peanut oil, and tung nuts and tung oil. 
If price support Sill! production controls~ removed. --Farm price support 
programs have been criticized for interfering with the freer foreign trade policies 
advocated by the United States. They have given rise to government-subsidized ex-
ports and to quota limitations on imports as indicated above; and future farm income 
improvement measures may not permit the removal of existing export subsidies and 
import quotas. 
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With this in mind, it is important to appraise the extent to which exports 
have been expanded by subsidies in recent years and the extent to whlch usual 
imports have been restricted by quotas to protect domestic price support programs 0 
Most of the present barriers to imports and the current export subsidy programs 
only offset the special market conditions created by price support programs. If 
all domestic price supports and limitations of imports were abandoned, imports 
would not be increased importantlyo In some cases they might even decline. 
If agricultural price support and control programs were abandoned o prices 
of several American farm products would drop sharplyo Dairy products and wheat 
prices now substantially above foreign market levels o eo g. o would quickly drop o 
effectively shutting out imports. Even more important, the eliminaUon of price 
supports and production controls might have serious disruptive influences on world 
price levels. It is probable that domestic prices would fall below current world 
prices and exports would increase beyond present subsidized levels o 
In the longer run it appears that in the absence of domesHc price support 
and production control programs U. S. producers would either cont1nue recent 
levels of commercial exports of cotton, wheat o tobacco, vegetable oils, and 
several other products or expand rather than contract them. Hence it is probable 
that restrictions on agricultural imports, subsidies on commercial exports, and 
Public Law 480 programs associated with domestic price support have not greatly 
altered the normal volume of trade in agricultural products. If more extensive and 
more effective domestic price and income support programs are adopted in the future, 
it is doubtful that any of the present quotas and subsidies can be discontinued. It 
may be necessary to add to the present list. However, if care is exerc.ised in the 
administration of quotas and subsidies in the future, as in the past, normal volumes 
of imports and exports may be maintained. 
INCREASED EXPORTS ALONE WILL NOT SOLVE FARM PROBLEM IN THE 1960'S 
Increasing agricultural production is now almost worldwide and ]s particu-
larly evident in the major food importing and exporting countries of Western Europe, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In some lines, such as the production and 
export of broilers and feed grains, U. S. production costs are sufficiently lower 
than those elsewhere as to assure expanded exports without subsidy. With farm 
production in industrialized countries increasing faster than population, oppor-
tun.ities for expanding exports to these countries may be largely :i.n feed grains to 
support expanded livestock industries, specialty products adding variety to national 
diets, and nonfood products such as tobacco and cottono 
Less industrlalized countries with rapidly expanding economies and popula-
tions may be expected to increase commercial imports of a number of products o es-
pecially cereals. Foreign-trade specialists, however, foresee only moderate increases 
in commercial imports of farm products by these countries in the near future. In 
short, prospects for sharply increased commercial exports of farm products by the 
United States are not good. 
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With hunger and malnutrition widespread in the less developed areas of the 
world, opportunities for expanding Public Law 480 exports might appear almost un-
limited. However, without collateral development programs in these countries, 
this is not the case. Transportation and distribution systems are inadequate to han-
dle greatly increased quantities of food. Governments also are reluctant to accept 
substantial special imports of food for a few years without assurance with respect 
to future supplies. 
In the longer run, it is probable that most of the increased food in the less-
developed areas must come from increased domestic production. These countries 
must fit food imports acquired under Public Law 480 programs into development plans 
which assure adequate future food supplies from home production and commercial 
imports. Expanded imports under Public Law 480 programs might, under some circum-
stances, delay and weaken increased home production programs. Responsible govern-
ments in underdeveloped countries are unwilling to assume the risks involved in 
becoming heavily dependent on non-commercial food exports from the United States. 
This is not to prejudge the extent to which abundant food supplies in indus-
trialized countries can be utilized effectively to wipe out hunger and malnutrition in 
underdeveloped areas. Nor does it deny the possibility of increased utilization of 
abundant foods in speeding economic development in the free world. But there is 
a definite limit to the quantities that can be used in an orderly manner even in coun-
tries where hunger and malnutrition are widespread. 
A total of $7 o 9 billion of farm products (food, livestock feeds, and fibers) 
have been disposed of in the five years of Public Law 480 programs. This rate of 
disposal was too slow, however, in relation to current production. Even though pro-
duction was held partially in check by soil bank.programs o stocks continued to 
accumulate. Expansion of Public Law 480 disposal programs sufficient to reduce 
stocks to desirable levels, without reducing current production or price levels, does 
not appear feasible. 
DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR FARM PRODUCTS 
The market for all farm products o food and nonfood, is increasing year by year. 
It is expected to grow only slightly faster o however, than the increase in population 
in the 1960's. Supplies have been more than ample to meet all market demands for 
the past nine years. Consumers have upgraded their diets o substituting animal prod-
ucts for cereals. In recent years, consumption of red and poultry meats increased 24 
pounds per capita and consumption of cereal foods declined by an equal amount. An 
uptrend in the per capita consumption of fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables also is 
in progress. · 
Increasingly, food consumption is based on personal preferences rather than 
on satisfying hunger at least cost. Nevertheless, demand for all food is limited by 
family income levels and by the physical capacity to enjoy food. 
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Although Americans would consume larger quantities of the higher priced 
cuts of meat and fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables if the prices were lower o few 
would increase their total consumption of food in response to lower prices. As a 
result of sharply higher weekly wages and only slightly higher retail food prices, 
expenditures by urban wage earners • families for a fixed basket of farm-produced 
food dropped from 32 percent of weekly earnings in 1950 to 24 percent in 1959. Food 
costs in relation to workers• earnings at the beginning of the 1960•s are the lowest 
on record and probably lowest in the world. 
Only 10 to 12 percent of the nonfarm population need to spend 40 percent or 
more of their income for food to achieve an adequate diet. University of Minnesota 
studies indicate if food purchased by these families were raised to the level of all 
nonfarm families, market demand for food would be increased only one to two percent. 
Also, fewer than six percent of the nonfarm families received incomes of less 
than $2 o 000 in recent years--fewer than four percent of the people are receiving wel-
fare assistance_ either from states or under social security. More generous food 
distribution programs for these people, while important to their welfare o would in-
crease food consumption relatively little. 
At the present level of economic development in the United States the demand 
for food increases primarily with the increase in population. With stable prices o 
per capita income increases of 10 percent may increase the market demand for food 
only one to two percent. 
Increases in food supplies in excess of population increases cause sharp 
farm price declines. A five percent increase in supplies results in farm prices dropping 
15 to 20 percent or more. 
Demand i.Qr nonfood products limited~ substitutes. --Demand for nonfood 
products such as timber, cotton, and wool is not limited by physiological needs as 
in the case of food. Rather o it is limited primarily by the cost and substitutability of 
competitive products. Research carried on by the Agricvltural Research Service and 
the land-grantcolleges discovers and develops new uses for farm products. In 1959 
patents were issued on 96 new processes or new products developed by the utilization 
research staff of the Agricultural Research Service. 
Over a period of years, however, farm products have lost ground in competi-
tion with products of nonfarm origin. Forty years ago some 85 million acres of crop-
land were devoted to the production of feed for horses doing the work now performed by 
motor power on farms and in cities. Rayon and other manmade fibers have displaced 
cotton and wool in many industrial and clothing uses. Synthetic detergents have dis-
placed farm-produced animal fats in the soap market; industrial products are taking 
the place of farm-produced drying oils in paints. Plastics, and paper products from 
forests, have displaced leather and cotton from farms in many uses. 
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The goal of farm utilization research--the discovery of new products useful 
to society--is most commendable. Research is a long-run activity. It is important 
in holding and expanding existing markets for farm products. New industrial uses 
for farm products are unlikely I however 1 to provide large-scale outlets in the near 
future for farm products now in overabundance. 
FARM INCOME WITH PRICE SUPPORTS REMOVED IN THE 1960'S 
In the past seven years an average of $2. 2 billion 1 or seven percent of total 
farm marketings I were removed from commercial channels by surplus disposal and 
storage programs. If these programs were dropped without replacement by others I 
farm income would drop several billion dollars. Projections of farm production 1 
prices and income for 1965 indicate a drop in net income of 36 percent from 1959 and 
45 percent from 1958 if production controls and price supports are discontinued. 
Prices of the price-supported crops of cotton and wheat would drop 30 to 50 percent. 
Prices of the uncontrolled feed grains and livestock also would drop 10 to 30 percent 
below recent levels. The index of prices received by farmers would decline 21 per-
cent from 1959. 
These projections provide (1) that existing surplus stocks be isolated and 
disposed of outside usual markets, and (2) that Public Law 480 exports from 1965 
production be continued at about recent levels. They also provide for a conservation 
reserve of 30 as compared with 28.7 million acres in 1960. Marketing quotas for 
tobacco are assumed to continue. 
ProJections assume continued economic growth. --These projections are esti-
mates of the probable situation in 1965 under specific assumptions. They are not 
forecasts of expected prices and incomes. The latter would require estimates of 
probable changes in Government programs. Stability in the international situation and 
continued upward trends in population I productivity 1 and real income per capita are 
assumed. The specific projections for population 1 disposable personal income I and 
per capita disposable income which were used in estimating the demand for farm prod-
ucts in 1965 are as follows: 
Disposable Per capita 
Year Population personal disposable 
income income 
(1959 prices) (1959 prices) 
(Millions) (Billions) 
1958--------------------- 174.1 $318.4 $11846 
1959--------------------- 177.0 337.3 11906 
1960--------------------- 1 180. 1 1 350. 0 1 11943 
Projections: 
2 183 0 2 1961 ----------------- 2 362.4 2 1,978 
1962 ----------------- 186.2 375.0 21014 
1963 ----------------- 189.3 388.1 2,050 
1964 ----------------- 192.5 401.7 21087 
1965 ----------------- 195.7 415.9 2,125 
1 Estimated. 
2 Projections from S. Doc. 77 1 86th Gong. 
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The projections of prices and incomes for 1965 are based on analyses utilizing 
an as yet unpublished demand model developed at Pennsylvania State University by 
George Brandow as a contribution to an interregional policy research project desig-
nated in the Office of Experiment Stations as IRM-1. 5 The projections indicate that 
the expected increased production of crops and livestock in 1965 selling at lower 
prices would lower cash receipts as compared with 1959. 
Allowing for lower feed and livestock prices, and assuming physical quantities 
and prices of purchased supplies will continue to increase at half their longtime trends, 
higher production expenses are projected in 1965. Allowing for an expected small 
decline in commercial farms with sales of $2,500 or more, projected net income per 
enlarged commercial farm in 1965 would be about 30 percent less than in 1959. 
The detailed projections of crop acreages harvested, acre yields, livestock 
production, prices, exports, cash receipts and production expenses o together with 
similar data for 1959 are shown in tables 11. 2, 11. 3, 11.4 o 11. 5o 11. 6, and 11. 7, 
which follow: 
Table 11. 2. Acreage harvested, 1959 o and projections for 1965 with price supports 
and production limitations removed 
(In millions of acres) 
Crops 
VVheat---------------------------------------
Corn----------------------------------------
Oats----------------------------------------
Barley---------------------------------------
Grain sorghums-------------------------------
Soybeans------------------------------------
Rice ----------------------------------------
Cotton --------------------------------------
Hay-----------------------------------------
All other-------------------------------------
Total, 59 crops ----------------.-----------
1959 
53.0 
84.6 
28.5 
15.1 
15.6 
22.4 
1.6 
15.2 
69.4 
20.0 
324.8 
Projected 1965 
54.0 
80.0 
26.0 
10.0 
11.0 
26.0 
1.6 
18.0 
73.0 
19.4 
319.0 
5 A general description of this model and the analytical methodology involved in 
its use is presented in appendix A. Comparisons are also made in the appendix 
between these projections and those made by U. S. Department of Agriculture 
technicians, reported ins. Doc. 77 I 86th Gong. 0 2d sess. I utilizing slightly 
different assumptions and methods. · 
-· 
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Table 11. 3. Yield per harvested acre·u 1959, and projections for 1965 with price 
supports and production limitations removed 
Crops 
VVheat---------------------------------bushels-
Corn-------------------------------------do---
Oats-------------------------------------do---
Barley------------------------------------do---
Grain sorghums----------------------------do---
Soybeans---------------------------------do---
Rice ----------------------------------pounds--
Cotton -----------------------------------do---
Hay--------------------------------------tons--
1959 
21.3 
51.5 
37.7 
27.9 
37.2 
24.0 
3,349.0 
465.0 
1.6 
Projected 1965 
25.0 
53.0 
39.0 
32.0 
35.0 
24.0 
3,570.0 
500.0 
1.7 
Table 11.4. Production, 1959, and projections for 1965 with price supports and 
production limitations removed 
{In millions) 
CROPS 
VVheat---------------------------------bushels-
Corn-------------------------------------do---
Oats-------------------------------------do---
Barley -----------------------------------do---
Grain sorghums ---------------------------do---
Soybeans---------------------------------do---
Rice ---------------------------hundredweight --
Cotton ----------------------------------bales-
Hay -------------------------------------tons-
LIVESTOCK 
Cattle and calves, slaughter ---------------pounds 
Hogs, slaughter---------------------------do---
Sheep and lambs, slaughter-----------------do---
All chickens ------------------------------do---
Turkeys----------------------------------do---
Eggs-----------------------------------dozen--
Milk-----------------------------hundredweight 
1959 Projected 1965 
1,128.0 
4,361.0 
1,074.0 
420.0 
579.0 
538.0 
53.1 
14.7 
112.8 
29,546.0 
21,442.0 
1,676.0 
7,172.0 
1,392.0 
5,196.0 
1,244.0 
1,350 
4,240 
1,014 
320 
385 
624 
57.1 
18.75 
124 
34,149 
23,827 
1,615 
8,260 
1,701 
5,699 
1 1 1438 
1 For technical reasons involving use of milk for various purposes, projected pro-
duction may be somewhat too high. 
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Table 11. 5. Exports from current production projected for 1965 with price 
supports and production limitations removed 1 
Commercial Public Law 
480 
~heat---------------------------bushels-- 175 275.0 
Feed grains ------------------------tons--- 15 0 
Rice ---------------------hundredweight--- 19 10.0 
Cotton ----------------------------bales-- 7 1.5 
Soybean oil-----------------------pounds - 2 2,000 3 625.0 
Total 
450.0 
15.0 
29.0 
8.5 
21625.0 
1 Public Law 480 exports in addition to those listed would be required to reduce 
surplus stocks now on hand. 
2 Includes oil equivalent of soybeans exported. 
3 Also 160 1 000 1 000 pounds cottonseed oil. 
Table 11. 6. Prices received by farmers u 1959, and projected for 1965 with price 
supports and production limitations removed 
Cattle---------------------hundredweight---
Calves -----------------------------do----
Hogs ------------------------------do----
Sheep and lambs---------------------do----
All chickens ----------------------pound---
Turkeys ----------------------------do----
Eggs ----------------------------dozen---
Milk, wholesale------------hundredweight --
Corn ----------------------------bushel--
Oats ------------------------------do----
Barley------------------------------do----
Grain sorghums------------hundredweight --
~heat-------·---------------------bushel--
Soybeans---------------------------do----
Rice ---------------------hundredweight --
Cotton ---------------------------pound---
1959 
$22.50 
27.10 
14.20 
17.94 
.15 
.24 
. 31 
4.16 
1. 07 
.62 
. 88 
1. 68 
1. 75 
2.02 
4.79 
• 32 
1965 Percent 
decline 
$17.08 24 
18.39 32 
10.95 23 
16.78 6 
.14 7 
.19 21 
.26 16 
3. 67 12 
0 77 28 
.41 34 
.62 30 
1.21 28 
0 87 50 
1. 35 33 
3.49 27 
.21 34 
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Table 11.7. Income and production expenses 1 1959, and projected for 1965 with 
price supports and production limitations removed 
1959 Projected Percent 
1965 change 
Cash receipts from marketings: Millions Millions 
Cattle and calves------------------ $ 7 1 89 3 $ 71 044 -11 
Hogs----------------------------- 21806 21504 -11 
Sheep and lambs------------------- 337 268 -20 
All chickens ---------------------- 1,038 11096 + 6 
Turkeys -------------------------- 329 317 - 4 
Eggs----------------------------- 1,489 11420 - 5 
Milk and cream-------------------- 41617 41965 + 8 
Corn----------------------------- 1,508 11002 -34 
Other feed grains------------------ 860 381 -56 
~eat---------------------------- 1,986 1,093 -45 
Rice ----------------------------- 224 195 -13 
Cotton lint------------------------ 21385 21008 -16 
Cottonseed ----------------------- 218 204 - 6 
Soybeans------------------------- 952 818 -14 
All other-------------------------- 61504 7,542 +16 
Total receipts ------------------ 331 146 30,857 - 7 
Other income: 
Government payments -------------- 662 662 0 
Food and fuel used in the home------ 1,628 1,063 -35 
Rental value of dwellings----------- 21012 2,012 0 
Total other income -------------- 4,302 3,737 -13 
Total income ------------------- 37,448 341594 - 8 
Production expenses: 
Purchased feed 
-------------------
4,623 4,403 - 5 
Purchased livestock---------------- 21727 2,260 -17 
Hired labor ----------------------- 2,929 2,929 0 
Real estate taxes and mortgage 1nteres~ 1 2,025 2,600 +28 
All other-------------------------- 131855 15,200 +10 
Total production expenses-------- 26,159 271392 + 5 
Realized net income------------- 11,289 71202 -36 
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The implications of the decline in farm income projected for commercial 
agriculture are serious. In spite of the isolation of existing surplus stocks, a 
conservation reserve of 30 million acres, and continuation of Public Law 480 ex-
ports from current production, prices for farm products would decline sharply in 
19 65 in the absence of programs to balance supplies with market outlets available. 
Producers financially able to make investments in new output-increasing, cost-
reducing technologies would attempt to meet the painful cost-price squeeze in this 
way. Land and capital investment values g~nerally would shrink. Industries and 
financial institutions serving farmers in the towns and cities would feel the finan-
cial pinch in the rural areas. A prolonged period of severely depressed farm in-
comes adversely affecting all who deal with farmers appears probable if agriculture's 
full production potential is utilized in the 1960's. 
Programs to prevent excessive farm output or increased government payments 
appear to be required to prevent further worsening of commercial farmers' incomes 
in the 1960's. Supply management programs to hold farm output below full capacity 
are of two types--those which limit inputs of resources, and those which deal dir-
ectly with market supplies. 
No one has seriously proposed placing limitations on development of new 
technology. The long and uncertain time periods involved in discovering and per-
fecting production innovations make it impossible to manage market supplies of farm 
products by varying investments in technological research. In facto from a practical 
standpoint o cropland appears to be the only resource input susceptible of direct man-
agement by government programs. 
Land management programs may be either voluntary or compulsory. They also 
may be limited to acreages used for specific crops or they may be applied to cropland 
without reference to specific crop acreages. The tobacco o wheat, cotton 1 rice, and 
peanut marketing quota programs are compulsory land management programs applied 
to specific crops. Producers o by a two-thirds majority, voted to limit production to 
allotted acreage of these crops. In this way they manage supplies of the products 
moving to market. Producers who overplant their allotments are subject to heavy 
taxes on the extra production. 
When the only inducement for planting within the allotment is an adjustment 
payment or the availability of a government price-supporting loan (as in the case of 
the corn program prior to 1959) o it is a voluntary land management program. The present 
conservation reserve program, with government rental of 28.7 million acres of crop-
land for three to ten year periods is also a voluntary land management or land retire-
ment program. It is designed to reduce the aggregate volume of farm products marketed. 
Supply management programs which deal directly with market supplies also 
have been operated on a limited scale since the 1930's. They have been applied to 
'. fresh fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, and fluid milk in urban markets. Market order 
or direct market supply management programs, under legislation passed in 1937, 
among other things may regulate the grade o size, quality, maturity, quantity 1 and 
rate of shipment of the product from specified production areas to market. Marketing 
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orders for specified products are issued by the Secretary of Agriculture under 
legislative authorization, when requested by a two-thirds majority of the pro-
ducers of the commodity. 
Analyses of alternative policies analyzed in Parts II and I II of this study 
utilize. the same basic assumptions as were used in making the price and income 
projections for 1965 with full utilization of resources and price supports removed. 
They utilize the same estimates of demand elasticities u livestock feeding rates, 
yields o and production expense trends. These analyses are presented by compe-
tent economists as estimates of the magnitude and cost of alternative programs to 
achieve specific levels of farm prices and income for a period in the 1960's center-
ing on 1965. 
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Chapter 12 
Voluntary Land Retirement 
John A. Schnittker 
Kansas State University 
Voluntary land retirement as a means of holding production in check, and 
therefore, of holding farm product prices above free market levels in the 1960•s, 
is the subject of this report. Two alternatives are described. One would main-
tain the 1959-60 price level and price relationships. The second would support 
the prices of cotton and feed grains near 1959-60 levels, but would price wheat 
as a feed grain. There are large differences between the two in the location of 
idled land and in regional income effects. 
GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF VOLUNTARY LAND RETIREMENT 
Land retirement is one of many production control and price support tech-
niques. As described here, it would be a substitute for acreage allotments, 
marketing quotas, and stock accumulation, all of which support prices now. Land 
retirement, operating with a price-stabilizing loan and storage program (as assumed 
here}, would continue one serious flaw of earlier programs--the commitment to 
support the price of 11 all output from a given acreage ... A second major shortcoming 
in acreage allotment programs to date--failure to reduce total resource use--could 
be remedied, however. 
Land retirement, in effect, introduces a new farm enterprise in competition 
with others. Since this program would be voluntary, it would have to be more 
attractive from an income standpoint than production, or it would not be used. 
By reducing the supply of land for cultivation, land retirement increases the 
intensity of competition for agricultural land, especially for farm enlargement. It 
may increase, or at least support land prices for a given product price level. What-
ever the system--whole farms or part farms--it reduces opportunities for farm oper-
ation without seriously affecting opportunities to earn income from investment in land. 
Land among farm inputs. --To maintain the 1959-60 farm price level without 
adding i'OS'tocks would require that farm resource use (thus output} be reduced at 
least as much as output is now excessive, or by six to eight percent. This prospect--
reducing aggregate resource use now, and allowing moderate increases to begin, 
perhaps by 1964 or 1965--must be faced in all systems of agricultural production con-
trol. But land retirement deals directly with resources, while other systems would 
affect marketings directly and resources indirectly. 
Only 15 percent of all farm resources are land and buildings. (fig .12 .1}. How-
ever, any system of land retirement will reduce not only land use, but also labor, fuel, 
and machinery use. 
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FIGURE 12. 1. Major input groups in agricultural production. 
PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL INPUTS 
Farm Labor .............. . 29°/o 
Power and Machinery .... 
Real Estate ...........•.... 
Feed, Seed and Livestock 
Fertilizer and Lime •.•.... 
Other .. .................. . 
Source: Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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Whatever the method of administration of a land retirement program or the 
location of idled acreage 1 the volume of business of farm suppliers must fall if 
output is to be cut significantly. Clearly 1 contracting entire farms would remove 
labor and capital from agricultural production and would minimize the possibility 
of more intensive practices on remaining lands held by others. Other things being 
equal o idling entire farms would minimize the effect on land remaining in cultiva-
tion and increase the impact on farm supplies 1 whatever the scope of the program. 
Contracting part farms would leave open two immediate possibilities to 
offset reduced acreage. First, fertilizer and other resource use per acre might be 
increased on farms where capital had been limited. Second u where machinery or 
labor had been limited 1 cultivation or labor use per acre might be increased. Both 
possibilities would increase the acreage which would have to be retired to achieve 
any price support level. 
Because resource use per acre would increase in a part-farm land-retirement 
program o the effect on land use would be greater and that on farm supplies smaller 
than if entire farms were idled, for any net reduction in output. 
Declines in consumer spending--apart from production expenditures--in rural 
communities would probably be greater if entire farms were contracted, since former 
operators might change residence. But if substantial and rather uniform shares of 
cropland were retired across the country in the 1960's 1 expenditures for farm supplies 
would decline somewhat whether entire farms or part farms were contracted. We 
should not o for example I expect to see important differences between two counties, 
one with 10 percent of cropland idled on all farms and the other with l (average) farm 
in 10 completely idle. 
Duration of land retirement.-- Public demands for reduced farm output and 
higher farm prices arise out of agriculture's great output potential and full use of it. 
As pointed out in part I, a large backlog of farm technology almost assures 
excessive production in the 1960's if prices are as high as in 1960 or even somewhat 
lower. To maintain current price and income levels, land retirement must be con-
sidered as a long-range program o not a temporary expedient. 
FARM PRODUCTION AND PRICES WITHOUT PRODUCTION RESTRICTIONS 
As chapter ll indicates 1 with no restraints on farm production and no accumulation 
of farm commodity stocks by the federal government 1 farm output would increase, its 
comnosition would change, and prices and incomes would decline sharply in the early 
1960's. 
Those were short- run estimates; they assume an agricultural economy geared 
for high production, using its resources fully through several unfavorable years. 
Capital losses 1 farm consolidation o and reduced resource use would surely follow at 
some time. 
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Whatever the nature and timing of adjustments which might occur in five 
or ten years, there is little reason to expect returns to farm resources during the 
1960's to be as high as in the late 1950's. If improved methods of production and 
farm credit remain available, any substantial improvement in prices and incomes 
would set off a new tendency toward greater output and lower prices. 
A PROGRAM TO MAINTAIN 1959-60 PRICES 
Two voluntary land retirement programs are discussed below o One would 
maintain prices near 1959-60 levels; the other would raise average prices slightly 
but permit wheat to sell at feed prices. Stock accumulation would end under either 0 
To maintain roughly 1959-60 prices would require that land retirement be 
located much like acreage allotments in the 1950'su but that it be more extensive. 
It would focus on wheat and cotton directly and on feed grains indirectly. Acreages 
and production would be about as in table 12 .1. 
Table 12 .1. Acreage harvested and production with retired land concentrated in 
wheat and cotton regions to hold prices near 1959-60 levels 1 
(In millions) 
Acreage harvested Production 
Crops Pro- Pro-
1959 1960 jected, Unit 1959 1960 jected, 
1965 1965 
Com 84.6 83.7 82.0 Bushel----- 4,361 4,379 4,320 
Oats 28.5 27.4 25.0 --do------ 1,074 1,178· 1,053 
Barley 15.1 13.9 9.0 --do------ 420 415 288 
Grain sorghum 15.6 15.3 7.0 --do------ 579 618 245 
Total feed grains 143.8 140 3 123 0 Ton-------- 165 6 168 7 152 
Wheat 53.0 53.0 44.0 Bushel----- 1,128 1,368 1,100 
Cotton 15.2 15.5 14.4 Bale------- 14.7 14.3 14.4 
Rice 1.6 1.6 1.4 Hundredweight 53.1 53.6 50.0 
Soy beans 22.4 23.6 23.0 Bushel----- 538 560 550 
Peanuts 1.5 1.4 1.4 Pound----- 1,602 1,766 1 0 680 
Tobacco 1.2 1.1 1.1 --do------- 1,800 ·'l, ~52 1,900 
Flaxseed 3.1 3.4 2. 7 Bushel----- 22.7 30.6- 24.3 
Hay 69.4 69.6 70.0 Ton-------- 112.8 119.0 119.0 
Subtotal (8 crops) 167.4 169.2 158.0 
------------
----- ----- ------
Total (12 crops) 311.2 309.5 281.0 ---------,·--- ----- ----- ------
Other 13.7 12.0 10.0 
------------
----- ----- ------
59 crops 324.9 321.5 291.0 
------------
----- ----- ------
Soil bank 22.4 28.7 59.4 
------------
----- ----- ------
Grand total 347.3 1~350. 2 350.3 
------------
------ ----- ------
1 Assumes average productivity on cropland retired, except for present conservation 
reserve. 
2 About 3 million acres not harvested in 1959 apparently were in 1960 soil bank. 
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Prices in the 1950's were favorable to greater wheat and cotton production than 
was possible with acreage allotments enforced by marketing quotas. Land diverted 
from wheat, cotton, and corn in 1953 was put to other crops also under price support 
and in excess supply. These diverted areas would have to be idled so that as acre-
age controls were lifted producers would not return to preallotment patterns of pro-
duction. 
In addition, acreages which have produced additions to stocks sine e 195 3 
would have to be retired. Wheat, cotton, and feed grains are involved here. Re-
sources diverted to maintain the price of one commodity could not be transferred to 
production of another as in the 1950's. 
A reasonable point of departure for this land-retirement program, if enacted 
in 1961 for 1962 and subsequent crop years, would be to begin regional land retirement 
concurrent with the end of allotments, so that preallotment patterns would not re-
appear. It is assumed that the conservation reserve, of 28.7 million acres of some-
what below average quality land including little wheat or cotton land, would be 
continued. 
Wheat. --With 1959 prices (table 12. 2) but no acreage allotments, 7 5 million 
acres or more would be planted to wheat, and perhaps 67 to 70 million acres harvest-
ed in 1965. Such a harvest would depress wheat prices severely unless stocks in-
creased. Enough land would have. to be retired, therefore, where wheat growing is 
most advantageous at stated prices, so that only 50 million acres remained in those 
areas to be planted to wheat (44 million acres or 1. 1 billion bushels harvested; 
appendix B, table A.) 
This would require that up to 17 or 18 million acres, diverted from wheat chiefly 
to feed grains after 19 53, be idled. Otherwise, the land would be plan ted to wheat. 
In addition about 8 million harvested acres (of average quality of the land producing 
wheat in the late 1950's), the recent average acreage producing wheat for stocks, 
would also need to be retired. This would leave 50 million acres of the 75 to 80 
million acre wheat base of 19 53 available to be planted to wheat. 
The larger acreage to be retired is now mostly in feed grains. It might rea-
sonably be distributed among regions and farms according to wheat planted for 1953 
harvest (the last preallotment harvest), or from a similar preallotment base. Acreages 
to be retired, based on 1953 wheat planted by states, are in appendix B, table D, 
column 2. Seventy-two percent of this land would be in the northern and southern 
Plains states where wheat production is concentrated. 
Eight million acres currently producing wheat for stocks are located chiefly 
in the southern and central Great Plains and the western com belt, which makes up 
the hard red winter wheat belt. Most recent stock additions have been of that class 
of wheat. There is some logic but little practical appeal in concentrating land re-
tirement in the hard red winter wheat area, rather than distributing it over all wheat 
growing regions. Further, concentrating land-use changes in the Plains would tend 
to be compatible with widely accepted, but not unanimous, public views on the longrun 
future of cultivation in the Plains. 
180 
Table 12. 2. Prices received by farmers, projection~ un.der no controls and under 
two land retirement programs, with comparisons 
59 million 48 million 
Commodity Unit Average, iNo pro- acres retired acres retired 
1955-57 1959 duction land concen- land di strib-
control trated in uted among 
programs wheat and all grain and 
cotton areas cotton areas 
J..l ves1:ocK~ 
Cattle------ Hundredweight - $15.90 $22.51 $17.08 $18.30 $19.22 
Calves ----- --do--------- -------- 27.10 18.39 19.61 20.53 
Hogs 
------
--do--------- 15.70 14.20 10.95 13.85 16.44 
Sheep and 
lambs----- --do---------
--------
17.94 16.78 18.02 18.97 
Milk, 
wholesale- --do--------- 4.12 4,16 3.67 4.10 4.32 
Eggs------- Dozen -------- • 38 • 31 .26 . 32 .37 
Broilers ---- Pound--------- .21 ------ .15 .18 .21 
Turkeys ---- --do--------- -------- .24 .19 .23 .27 
Crops: 
Corn------- Bushel-------- 1. 25 1. 07 .77 1. 00 1. 23 
Oats ------- do --------- • 66 • 62 .41 .53 .65 
Barley------ do--------- .95 .88 • 62 .80 .98 
Sorghum grain Hundredweight - 1. 93 1. 68 1. 21 1. 57 1. 9 3 
Wheat------ Bushel-------- 1. 96 1. 75 . 87 1. 75 1. 35 
Rice ------- Hundredweight - 4.93 4.79 3.49 4.42 4.42 
Cotton ----- Pound -------- • 31 .32 .21 .28 .28 
Soybeans--- Bushel-------- 2.16 2.02 1. 35 2.23 2.36 
Peanuts ---- Pound--------- .11 ------ ----- .10 .10 
Cottonseed - Ton----------- 49.70 ---·--- 28.29 55.33 59.54 
Farm program history, however, points away from a refinement such as retiring 
acreages (or allotting them) by classes of wheat. The Great Plains would be seriously 
affected by the concentration of idled land shown in appendix B, table D. With 23 
percent of North Dakota cropland idled, for example, many counties with large wheat 
acreages would have more than one-third of all cropland idle. The 8 million acres 
(about 160 million bushels) to be retired u were distributed among states according to 
shares of production in 1950-59, weighted by average yields. 
Cotton. --The land use problem for cotton is similar to that for wheat. Twenty-
four million acres were harvested in 1953. But it is estimated that only 20 million 
acres would be harvested in the 1960 1 S at prices assumed here, and without acreage 
allotments. Only five million acres of eight or nine million diverted from cotton since 
1953 need be retired in a program supplementary to the conservation reserve, therefore, 
to assure a harvest geared to demand at 1959 prices. This diversion, based on 1950-59 
production and yield history, falls heavily on the southern Plains and the Southeast. 
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Since the trend in cotton production is westward, table D may show acreages 
which would be retired in the Southeast to be larger than the increase which could be 
expected in cotton acreage if allotments were ended with prices as in table 12. 2. Sim-
ilarly, acreages to be retired in the West might need to be larger than shown, if cotton 
production is to be held between 14 and 15 million bales (acres) in the 1960's. 
Total land retirement by states and the percentages retired of all cropland used 
for crops in this program, including the 1956-60 conservation reserve, the two wheat 
area diversions, and the cotton area diversion described below are in appendix B 1 
table D. 
Major implications .. 2La.!.sllit retirement program !2_ maintain ~-iQ prices.--
Acreage in the conservation reserve or soil bank would be increased from 28.7 million 
· acres in 1960 to 59. 4 in 1965. The burden of land-use adjustment would fall heavily 
on the northern Plains, with 18 percent, and the southern Plains with 26 percent of 
cropland idled. It would scarcely touch the corn belt, except for wheat-growing areas 
there. Feed grain production would be cut by retiring land diverted to feed grains after 
1953 in the Plains and the Cotton Belt. This pattern of land retirement would be the 
result of trying to maintain wheat and cotton prices near present lev~ls by land retire-
ment alone. 
Failure to concentrate contracted acreages even more heavily in the Hard Red 
Winter wheat belt would leave open the possibility that the composition of wheat pro-
duction would be unchanged from the late 1950's, and that hard winter wheats would 
continue to be in excess supply. Requiring (or attracting) proportional participation 
of wheat producers in Soft Red and White regions would raise the possibility of tempo-
rary shortages of those classes. However, higher market prices for those classes 
might speed the shift from hard to soft wheats in some areas. 
The 13 million ton decrease in feed grain output from 1960 would come from 
idling about nine million acres largely in the Plains which were turned to sorghum 
grain and barley after 1953 o six million acres in the Plains and Northwest which were 
planted to barley after 19 53, some contracting of wheatland diverted to rye, flax, and 
oats after 1953, and from idling five million acres diverted from cotton partly to grains 
in 1954. A small decline in soybean acreage would also be expected. 
Farm product prices to be expected with such a land retirement program are 
shown in table 12. 2, column 4, and cash receipts from marketings and net farm income esti-
mates under the conditions described 1 are shown in table 12. 3. 
Treasury cost. --Cost estimates are based on experience with the conservation 
reserve and on research studies showing that payments per acre to make land retire-
ment attractive may need to be, on the average, about 60 percent of expected gross 
income. 6 These costs would be applicable whether producers were compensated out 
of public funds or by payment "in kind" from commodity stocks. The cost for the 
programs discussed can be estimated under four headings. 
6 Iowa State University Economic Information 157 {revised) o 1960. 
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Table 12. 3. Cash receipts, production expenses and net farm income under 2 land 
retirement programs 
59 million 
acre program 
to maintain 
1959-60 
prices 
(rnilHons) 
48 million 
acre program 
to hold prices 
except wheat 
slightly above 
1959-60 
(millions) 
--------------------------------------------~-------------+----~··----------------
Cash receipts----------------------------- $34, 154 $35 o 275 
Government payments ---------------------- l o 700 2, l 00 
Value horne used product-------------------- l o 250 l, 325 
Rental value dwelling ---------------------- t----~-2~·o_O_l_2+-~-2~o 0_1_2~---
Gross income-------------------------- 39, 116 40 o 712 
Expense: ---------------------------------
Feed ---------------------------------
Livestock-----------------------------' 
Labor---------------------------------
Property tax and interest ----------------
All other ------------------------------
Total---------------------------------
Net income of farm operators from farming--
4,586 4,758 
2,386 2,480 
2,929 2,929 
20600 2,600 
15,200 15,200 
27,701 27,967 
11,415 12,745 
l. Estimated acreages and costs of continuing the 1960 conservation reserve 
under existing contracts: 
Calendar year 
1960---------------------------------------------
1963---------------------------------------------
1965--------------------------------------------
Contracted 
reserve acre-
~ge !(million) 
28.7 
25.2 
14,0 
Rental 
obligation 
(million 
dollars) 
339.5 
301.0 
156.2 
If there were, as expected, a substantial return of contracted acreage to 
cultivation as present contracts expire, the declining cost shown would not materi-
alize. New acreages would have to be contracted to replace expirations if production 
were to be held down, and costs would continue at near $300 million a year. 
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2. Cost of retirement of 17. 5 million average quality acres in wheat regions 
would be based on prospective returns from continued feed-grain production or on ex-
pected returns from wheat. About 13 to 15 million tons of grain production would have 
to be forestalled in either case. At $36 per ton for grain ($1 com), average rental 
would be about $22 per ton or, $19 per acre; about $330 million a year would retire 
the acreage on a short-time basis. If cost were based on the prospect of producing 
wheat at $1.80 per bushel, it would be nearly twice as high. 
3. For eight million (average) acres now in wheat, the cost of land retire-
ment would be about $220 million a year. 
4. An average rental rate of about $80 per acre would be required to avoid 
production of 5 million acres (or bales) of cotton in 196 5, with cotton at $0. 2 8 per 
pound ($140 per bale) • The cotton program would thus cost $400 million per year. 
Total cost for annual rental payments. to idle 59.4 million acres of average 
quality in stated areas plus continuing the 1960 conservation reserve would be: 
Conservation reserve---------------------------------------------
Diverted wheat acres---------------------------------------------
Excess wheat acreage--------------------------------------------
Diverted acres (cotton) -------------------------------------------
Millions 
$300 
330 
220 
400 
Total---------------------------------------------------- 1,250 
Cost might be lower if whole farms were contracted and higher if part farms 
were required. If 60 percent of gross value of output were not attractive enough to 
contract the necessary acreage in stated regions voluntarily, rates and ·costs would 
have to be increased. 
Administration and assistance in establishing permanent cover on retired acres 
would be additional costs. Also. small programs to prevent expansion of rice, tobacco. 
and peanut acreage would be necessary. Total cost might exceed $1.5 billion a year. 
Costs in relation to past program costs. --Presumably no net acquisitions of 
farm commodities would take place in this program. Recently acquisition costs have 
ranged from $2.2 to $3.3 billion a year when prices were somewhat above those assumed 
here. Storage, handling, transportation, and interest have ranged from $800 to $1, 400 
million per year recently. 
Ultimately, most of those costs would be avoided by a land retirement program 
continued long enough to end acquisitions of stocks. At least on the basis of budget 
costs. land retirement appears to be a superior alternative to present programs. But 
its costs would be expected to increase over a period of years. 
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Consumer costs. --Food prices would not rise as a result of such a program, 
since farm prices would not be increased. 
A PROGRAM FOR SLIGHTLY HIGHER AVERAGE PRICES--ALLOWING LOWER 
WHEAT PRICES 
Maintenance of wheat and cotton prices dictated the land retirement pattern 
just discussed. Now a program is outlined with a regional economic impact roughly 
the same as the distribution of production of feed grains, wheat, and cotton. The 
objective would be to maintain the corn price slightly above the 1959 level, with 
other grains at comparable price levels. Cotton would be near present prices. Rice 
and peanut prices could be held near 1959-60 levels by modest land retirement. It 
is assumed that the conservation reserve ended and that most of that acreage returned 
to cultivation. 
Critical questions on which one can only speculate now and experiment later 
are: (a) Would producers cultivate as much land, especially in wheat areas 8 as with 
higher wheat prices? (b) Would other resource use be ~educed significantly when 
producers faced the prospect of selling wheat at feed prices? If the answer to the 
first question were affirmative, land abandonment would supplement land retirement 
in reducing farm output. If the second answer were "Yes," yield projections for 
wheat might be lower than were projections with a higher price. 
Since average prices would be up sliqhtly, it is expected that little land would 
be abandoned. Second, it is assumed that the wheat yield per acre would be only 23 
bushels 8 not 25 as with wheat at $1. 80 per Dushel and a smaller acreage. F'or crops 
like corn, higher yields per acre might be expected, with higher prices and smaller 
acreages. However, yield assumptions were not raised. Land retired is again assumed 
to be of average quality. 
Acreages and production.--Feed grains, wheat, and cotton cover 75 percent of 
all land used for crops excluding hay. These acreages would be cut back proportionally. 
However, with acreage allotments ended, there might be a change from 1959-60 in com-
position of farm output, especially an increase in wheat production. 
In this situation, all grain could be treated about as a single commodity sub-
ject to the restriction that wheat production would need to be at least 1. 1 billion 
bushels or 33 million tons (domestic consumption and export; app. B, table N. With 
that condition met, it would matter little whether wheat replaced feed grains in the 
Plains or not, since whatever the grain, it would sell on the feed-grain market. 
The grain supply which would maintain the corn price near $1.25 per bushel, 
wheat near $1. 35, and average farm prices up a little from 1960 would be: 
Million 
tons 
Feed grains (including wheat) --------------------------------- 140 
Wheat (for food and export) ----------------------------------- 33 
Total--------------.---------------------------------- 17 3 
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Grain production from a projected 209 million acre harvest, if there were no 
acreage limits, might be near 217 million tons o including 50 million tons of wheat 
(table 12. 4) • If 2 0 percent of average quality land were retired as assumed, the re-
maining acreage would provide wheat for food and export, and 140 million tons of 
grain, including nine million tons of wheat, for feed. Total acreages and production 
of major crops are shown in table 12.4. Only grain, and ultimatelyu livestock output 
would differ materially from what was indicated in the previous discussion. 
Table 12. 4. Harvested acreage and production: Projections for 1965, with 
comparisons 
! 
Actual l 
acreage, 1960 
Millions 
Corn--------------- 83.7 
Oats--------------- 27.4 
Barley ------------- 13.9 
Grain sorghum ------ 15.3 
Wheat ------------- --------
Total feed grain 140.3 
Wheat ------------- 53.0 
Cotton------------- 15.5 
Rice--------------- 1.6 
Soybeans----------- 23.6 
Peanuts------------ 1.4 
Tobacco ----------- 1.1 
Flaxseed----------- 3.4 
Hay --------------- 69.6 
Total, 8 crops- 169~2 
Total, 12 crops 309.5 
Other-------------- 12.0 
59 crops------ 321.5 
Soil bank----------- 28.7 
Grand total---- 350.2 
1 
2 
Prices near 1960 levels. 
Average quality land. 
I 
j 
I 
i 
Estimated With 48 million acre land retire-
acreage ment program 2 
without 
controls or 
soil bankl Acreage Production 
Millions Millions Millions 
85.0 68.0 3, 67 2 bushels. 
30.0 24.0 936 bushels. 
12.0 9.6 307 bushels. 
12.0 9.6 336 bushels. 
---------
56.0 1, 288 bushels. 
139.0 167.2 173. 2 tons. 
70.0 -------
18.0 14.4 14.4 bales. 
1.6 1.4 50 hundredweight. 
24.0 24.0 576 bushels. 
1.9 1.4 1, 680 pounds. 
1.2 1.1 1, 900 pounds. 
3. 1 3.1 
72.0 70.0 119 tons. 
191.8 -------
330.8 282.6 
16.0 16.0 
346.8 298.6 
-------- 48.0 
346.8 346.6 
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Smaller total output and a different composition of output of grains are major 
differences between the two programs. Another is that land retired o located heavily 
in the plains and Southwest in the first program, would fall heavily in the Midwest 
in the ~econd (app. Bo table E). One-third of all land idled would be in eight Com 
Belt states compared with 17 percent earlier; 40 percent would be in the northern and 
southern plains compared with 60 percent in the other program. 
Two factors account for the larger harvested acreage o yet lower production 
projected in this program than in the other program. In the first program, half the 
total idled acreage was from the 1960 conservation reserve program, which included 
land of below average quality. Output reduction from that program Wr!.S small--crop 
production was cut less than three percent in 1959 even though seven percent of all 
cropland was idled. Also, the 30 million additional acres to be idlea in the first pro-
gram described were "average quality" land in wheat and cotton areas, where grain 
production per acre is far below one ton. Land retired in the second program is esti-
mated to yield near one ton per acre. 
Program cost. --Cotton production would be at the same level as in the other 
program, and land retirement in cotton regions would be at the same cost. Grain 
output would be reduced by about 27 million tons from 1959 1 and 12 million tons below 
the other program. 
Rental payments each year should be expected to cost about $1. 2 billion for 
grain land and $400 million for cotton acreage 1 or a total of $1,600 million for con-
tract payments alone. Administrative and practice payments would be additional. 
Cost would vary somewhat depending on whether 48 million average quality acres 
were idled as assumed 1 or whether o for example, twice that acreage of much lower 
quality land were contracted. Total costs near $2 billion a year might be expected 
for many years. These would be in lieu of higher present expenditures in loan and 
purchase programs. 
In a longer run context, costs to maintain reduced acreages in either situation 
would rise or decline over time depending on the trend in yields per acre. Yield gains 
as large as recorded in the late 1950's may require larger acreages to be retired after 
19 65 than before o to maintain farm prices. 
If such a situation is expected, serious consideration might be given at the 
start to long-term purchase of certain crop production rights on contracted land I by 
a lump-sum payment at the beginning of the contract period. 
Payment in kind. --This second program would reduce grain production 45 
million tons fromexpected production with full utilization of resources at 1960 prices. 
Producers might be compensated partly with grain from CCC stocks--say 10 million 
tons a year plus cash payments. But this would simply push the feed grain supply 
above 140 million tons u and make it necessary to idle 10 million more acres to hold 
prices at levels indicated in table 12. 2. 
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PRICES AND INCOMES 
Aggregate price and income levels under either program would be near 1959-60 
levels. In the first program, the distribution of income among regions would also be 
similar to the present, since prices would be unchanged, and producers with idle land 
would be compensated. 
In the second program, gross income from wheat would be $400 million less 
than in the former and net income would be down substantially. Producers retiring 
wheat land would be compensated at reduced rates because of the lower wheat pli ce. 
Hence, in the second program, specialized wheat areas would receive a smaller share 
of total farm income than in the former. 
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
If land retirement as a production control and price support device is to be 
useful, yet is to be voluntary, the program must bid against alternative uses of land, 
for genuine commercial farmers as well as for those wanting to retire or work in town. 
Under either situation described here, or any combination between those ex-
tremes, land can be contracted only by making nonuse attractive. Retired acreages 
as large and as concentrated as considered here would require that more than one-fourth 
of all farms in many areas be completely retired, or that 10 to 25 percent of the cul-
tivated land on every farm in many areas be retired. 
The first program, whatever the price level intended, would concentrate re-
tired land partly in the plains and in the subhumid Midwest. In either area, grass 
is the only feasible permanent cover .. Yet grazing land can be cultivated at small 
cost, and so long as prices are maintained 1 even at levels somewhat below prices 
assumed here, this land would return to cultivation in the absence of a continued land 
retirement· program. 
Given an expectation of continued demands for price support and sharply rising 
yields per acre of crops, the most suitable long-run land retirement approach appears 
to be the contract of whole or part-farms for nonuse for a brief period, but to require 
that the acreage so contracted be prohibited from certain uses indefinitely. 
Co .. 1~liance and inspection. --In computing acreages to be idled, it was assumed 
that land contracted would be of average quality. The acreage estimates of tables D 
and E are meaningful only with that qualification 1 and for the stated regional patterns. 
This requirement has not been used widely in any U.S. land retirement program. It 
probably would not be administratively feasible. 
In practice, them, the acreage idled in either situation would have to be much 
greater than shown to achieve the required production decreases. Actual acreage idled 
would depend on the ratio of expected average yields on idled acreages to average 
yields. 
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LAND RETIREMENT IN RETROSPECT 
Extensive retirement of cultivated agricultural land has had three trials in the 
United States. All were designed chiefly as temporary expedients to reduce farm out-
put and raise farm prices. All fell short of expectations. We have not yet had our 
heart in it in the United States. 
In 1933, certain crop acreages were reduced, and for a time, virtually no 
harvesting from contracted acreage was permitted. In 1936 and 1937, payments were 
offered for reduction in soil-depleting acreages, and for increases in soil-conserving 
crops. There were no restrictions on harvesting. 
The acreage reserve of the soil bank {1956-58) was to reduce output temporarily 
while wheat, cotton, and corn stocks were reduced. Lower prices and longer term land 
retirement were to restrain farm output when acreage reserve land was returned to cul-
tivation. Grain stocks were near record levels when the acreage reserve was ended. 
The task of reducing farm output then fell to the conservation reserve, first directed 
at lands most needing conservation measures, not at production control. 
SUMMARY 
To hold farm prices at 1959-60 levels by land retirement alone would require 
concentration of idle land in wheat and cotton regions. Farm incomes there and 
elsewhere could be maintained, but the community impact would be severe. 
Any other land retirement plan not supplemented by acreage limitations would 
fail to hold wheat production low enough to maintain the present wheat-corn price 
differential. Thus, land retirement spread proportionally on all land in major crops 
would have a more serious impact in Corn Belt communities than the first example, 
and less serious in the plains. But income in the plains and other wheat regions would 
be a little less favorable, because of lower wheat prices. 
Either program could cost near $2 billion a year with annual costs increasing 
over time under some administrative arrangements. Each should be less costly than 
present acquisition and storage programs. 
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Chapter 13 
Voluntary Land Retirement of Feed 
Grain Acreages 
Dale E. Hathaway 
Michigan State University 
The program discussed in this section assumes that the first step in improving 
our agricultural policy requires an ending of the continued accumulation of CCC stocks 
of wheat, rice, cotton, tobacco, peanuts, and feed grains. In order to achieve this, 
it is assumed that the output of five basic commodities--cotton, wheat, rice, peanuts, 
and tobacco--would be subject to production or marketing controls which would effect-
ively bring output in line with expected annual disappearance. 
The difficulties of applying similar controls to the feed-livestock economy are 
recognized; and, therefore, three different situations are discussed in conjunction with 
the aforementioned controls for the basic commodities. They are: (1) No production 
controls or direct price supports beyond those for basic r::ommodities; (2) a voluntary 
land retirement program for feed grains sufficient to reduce feed grain output about 10 
percent from 1960 levels (to about 150 million tons); and (3) a voluntary land retirement 
program for feed grains sufficient to reduce feed grain output about 15 percent below 1960 
levels, or to about 140 million tons. 
All of the situations discussed in this section start with the same basic assump-
tions regardingthe programs which would be maintained in conjunction with the price 
support programs. 
First, it is assumed that the current level of price supports will be maintained 
for the five controlled crops and thus that the export subsidy and Public Law 480 pro-
grams would be required at about the present levels for wheat, cotton, rice, peanuts, 
and tobacco. Also, it is assumed that a Public Law 480 program would be continued at 
about present levels for soybean oil and cottonseed oil. 
Second, it is assumed that a conservation reserve of 30 million acres would be 
continued, with the acreage in the program distributed about as at present. 
Third, ;_t is assumed that the present stocks of commodities held by CCC would 
be isolated from commercial markets so that any stock reduction would come via pro-
grams beyond the export programs mentioned above. 
Finally, it is assumed that while CCC might offer price stabilizing loans, the 
program would be operated so that there would be no increase in stocks held by CCC. 
ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION AND EXPORTS OF 
CONTROLLED PRODUCTS 
The amount of wheat, cotton, rice, tobacco, and peanuts that would be needed 
in 1965 under such a program rests partially upon the assumptions relating to the level 
of domestic consumption and of exports of these products. Therefore, it seems pertinent 
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to briefly review these assumptions. It was assumed that the per capita consumption of 
wheat in 1965 would remain at approximately 1959 levels, which would mean an ending 
of the long downtrend in per capita consumption of wheat in the United States. Under 
such conditions, approximately 538 million bushels of wheat would be required for 
domestic food in the United States by 1965. In addition, another 50 million bushels 
of wheat would probably be needed for seed. Also, it was assumed that some wheat 
would be fed on farm where it was raised and used in mixed feed, and that these uses 
would continue at about the present low levels since the price of wheat would be main-
tained high relative to its feed value and to the price of other feed grains. The export 
level for wheat was assumed to be about 450 million bushels, which probably would 
require the continuation of Public Law 480 programs at about the level of recent years. 
Altogether, the assumption is that about l. l billion bushels of wheat would be needed 
in order to meet these expected domestic and export demands. However, in order to 
dispose of this much wheat annually, special export programs and export subsidies 
would still be required for all of the wheat exported from the United States. 
The 1965 per capita consumption of cotton was projected at 24 pounds per person. 
This also is about the 1959 consumption level and represents an end to the recent down-
trend in domestic cotton consumption. Taking into account the projected population 
growth, this means that slightly more than 9 million bales of cotton would be consumed 
in the domestic market. In addition, it was projected that net exports of cotton would 
amount to 5 million bales annually. Since this figure exceeds expected commercial 
exports, it is assumed that some kind of subsidized export program and/or a Public Law 
480 program would be continued in order to maintain this level of net exports for cottono 
The per capita consumption of rice was also projected at about the 1959 level. 
This, taking into account the projected population growth, would mean that the total 
domestic consumption of rice would approximate 30 million hundredweight in 1965 0 The 
export of rice was projected at 20 million hundredweight, which is approximately at 
the average level of recent years and would require the continuation of the special pro-
grams that have been necessary in order to achieve these exports. 
In general, the assumptions relating to domestic consumption of the price-
supported products tend to be on the optimistic side. For most of these products, do-
mestic per capita consumption is projected at about 1959 levels, whereas there has been 
a moderate downtrend in the consumption of several of these products over the past 
decade. Turning to exports, in general it has been assumed that the exports will con-
tinue at the high levels that have been achieved under special programs in recent years. 
This, of course, assumes that some kind of special export programs for wheat, cotton, 
rice, tobacco, and peanuts will be maintained. 
It was assumed that the stocks now held by CCC would either move out under 
special export programs in excess of the export levels mentioned above, or that the 
stocks would be used to provide a special defense stockpile of food. Looking ahead, 
it seems improbable to assume that we will achieve farm income levels high enough so 
that it will be feasible to return the stocks now held by CCC to the commercial market 
in the near future. Therefore, the price and income estimates for this program were made 
assuming that these stocks would be isolated from the present markets but that no fur-
ther stocks would be accumulated. 
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THE IMPACT OF A PRICE-SUPPORT AND PRODUCTION -CONTROL PROGRAM 
LIMITED TO FIVE BASIC CROPS 
In order to reduce the production of wheat, cotton, rice, tobacco, and peanuts 
to the levels which would bring their output in line with annual disappearance, it is 
assumed that some kind of quantity production controls would be placed upon these 
commodities. These would consist of bushel quotas for the grains and poundage 
quotas for the other controlled crops. These quotas are assumed to be allocated to 
states, counties, and farms in approximately the same manner as are the present 
marketing quotas for these crops; i.e. , using historical acreage as a base. The differ-
ence, however, would be that the farmer would· be allocated a maximum sales quota 
rather than an acreage allotment. 
The allocation of sales quotas on the basis of historical acreage allotments 
would create some problems, particularly in wheat. The present stocks of surplus 
wheat are not distributed equally among classes of wheat since most of the current ex-
cess production is of Hard Red Winter wheat. Also, the 15-acre exemption has allowed 
wheat producers in the humid regions to maintain output of certain types of wheat by 
planting in excess of their acreage allotments. The application of across-the-board 
cuts from acreage allotments thus will create many problems of equity between regions. 
Any decision as to how to apply quantity quotas ultimately must be a political deci-
sion. Since the way in which the reductions are achieved would have relatively little 
effect upon total U.S. agricultural income and prices, a flat percentage reduction from 
present acreage planted was assumed. 
Under a program which applied quantity controls to wheat, cotton, rice, tobacco, 
and peanuts, farmers probably would reduce the acreage planted to those controlled 
commodities to levels which would approximately produce the output to fill their market-
ing quota. A storage program would be required for controlled commodities to allow 
farmers to store excess production arising from unexpected variations in yield. Excess 
production in one year could then be counted against their crop production quotas in a 
future year. Thus, over 2 or more years production and disappearance would be approxi-
mately in balance, and there would undoubtedly be a reduction in the average acreage 
planted to the controlled and price-supported commodities. 
In the first situation, it is assumed that the price supports for all other commodi-
ties would be ended and that crop acreage could be used as farm producers saw fit. The 
rationale for such a program runs as follows: the commodities having quantity controls--
wheat, cotton, rice, peanuts, and tobacco--are commodities for which the domestic 
demand for human consumption is highly inelastic and which depend partially upon export 
markets. Excessive production of these commodities drives prices very low in the ab-
sence of price-support programs. However, price-support programs without quantity 
quotas have allowed continued stock buildups by CCC despite extensive foreign dis-
posal programs. 
Therefore, in order to reduce excessive program costs and prevent stock accumu-
lations, quantity quotas would be used to bring the annual production of wheat, cotton, 
rice, and peanuts in line with the expected annual disappearance. The rest of the farm 
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production plant presumably would then be used to produce commodities which are large-
ly consumed in the United States and for which the elasticity of demand in the domestic 
market is somewhat higher. 
Under such a program, most of the land taken from the controlled crops would 
be diverted to the production of feed grains and soybeans. This is because the anti-
cipated reduction in acreage under such a program would be largely acreage that is now 
planted to wheat. Over the area where most of the wheat is grown, the best alternative 
for wheat is either feed grains or soybeans. 
With a program where production controls and price supports were applied only 
to the basic crops, it is anticipated that the land-use patterns would be approximately 
those shown in table 13 .1. It can be seen in table 13.1 that the diversion of land from 
wheat is assumed to go primarily to the production of feed grains. The diversion of 
wheatland in the Com Belt was assumed to be about equally divided between additional 
acreage in com and in soybeans. The acreage diverted from the production of rice, 
cotton, and peanuts was assumed to be diverted to the production of feed grains and 
to minor specialty crops. It was also assumed that some of this land might be retired 
from agricultural production. 
Table 13.1. Acreage planted and harvested: Projected acreage in 1965 with price supports 
and controls on only the five basic crops compared with 1959 and 1960 
Un million acres} 
Actual Projected 1965 
Crops 1959 1960 
Planted Harvested 
Planted Harvested Planted Harvested 
Com------------------ 85.5 84.6 84.8 83.7 85.5 83.9 
Oats------------------ 36.1 28.5 33.1 27.4 33.0 26.9 
Barley----------------- 17.0 15.1 15.8 13.9 17.5 15.2 
Grain sorghums--------- 19.9 15.6 18.7 15.3 22.0 14.9 
Total, feed grains-- 158 5 143 8 152 4 140 3 158.0 140 9 
Wheat----------------- 58.0 53.0 56.6 53.0 49.3 43.9 
Rice ------------------ 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1 1.4 1.4 
Cotton ---------------- 15.8 15. 1 16.3 15.5 15.0 14.4 
Soybeans-------------- 1 22.4 22.4 1 23.6 23.6 1 25.0 25.0 
Peanut~--------------- 1 1.5 1.5 1 1.4 1.4 l 1.4 1.4 
Tobacco--------------- 1 1.2 1.2 1 1.1 1.1 l 1.2 1.2 
Hay--~---------------- 1 69.4 69.4 1 69.6 69.6 l 69.8 1 69.8 
Total------------- 169.9 164.5 170.2 165.8 163.1 162.5 
Other ----------------- 9.2 ----- 9.0 ----- 9.0 -----
Total, 59 crops--------- 337.6 
----- 331.6 ----- 330.0 -----
Soil bank-------------- 22.4 ----- 28.6 ----- 30.0 -----
Total acreage------ 360.0 ----- 360.2 ----- 360.0 -----
1 Acreage harvested. 
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The continuation of a 30 million acre soil bank is assumed throughout the life 
of such a program. Therefore 1 the total harvested crop acreage would be expected to 
be slightly below that of 1960 and the total acreage planted to crops plus soil bank 
would remain at approximately the 1960 acreage actually used for these purposes. 
The estimated crop yields and production under such a program are shown in 
tables 13. 2 and 13. 3. The production of wheat would be reduced to about 1. 1 million 
bushels in order to bring output in line with expected disappearance. The production 
of rice would be reduced to approximately 50 million hundredweight. It is estimated 
that the annual production of cotton would be required to be reduced to about 14. 4 
million bales, slightly below the 1960 crop output. The production of peanuts would 
be reduced to slightly below the 1960 crop output level also 1 while that of tobacco 
would be expected to be some 10 percent higher than the output in 1960 1 even though 
the acreage used probably would be about the same. 
Table 13. 2. Projected yields per harvested acre I 1965 compared with actual yields in 
1959 and 1960 
Actual Projected2 
Crops 1965 
1959 19601 
Corn---------------------- bushels-- 51.5 52.3 53.0 
Oats---------------------- do----- 37.7 43.0 39.0 
Barley -------------------- do----- 27.9 30.0 32.0 
Grain sorghum ------------- do----- 37. 2 40.4 35.0 
Wheat -------------------- do ---- 21.3 25.8 25.0 
Rice----------------- hundredweight- 31349.0 31399.0 31570.0 
Cotton pounds-- 462.0 442.0 500.0 
Soybeans bushels - 24.0 23.7 24.0 
Peanuts pounds-- 11096.0 11263.0 11200.0 
Tobacco do ---- 11563.0 11701.0 11725.0 
Hay tons--- l. 62 l. 71 l. 70 
1 Based on Nov. 1, 1960 I crop report. 
2 Projected on the basis of the type of program being discussed in this section. 
The major changes in crop production that would be anticipated under such a 
program would arise in feed grain production. Corn production probably would exceed 
the record 1960 level and amount to 4. 4 billion bushels. Oats production could be ex-
pected to be slightly below 19 59 and 19 60 levels. Barley production might be expected 
to increase from the levels of the past two crop years. A continuation of the high level 
of grain sorghum output also would be expected. As a result, feed grain production might 
total 168 million tons 1 compared with the record high of 168. 7 million tons in 1960. 
Such an output level for feed grains seems likely even in the absence of price 
supports for feed grains. The projected yields of feed grains for 1965 have been equaled 
or exceeded in the past two years. Moreover I the projected yields for feed grains in 
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this situation are lower than those projected with programs that would maintain feed 
prices. Also, the abandonment projected in this situation for 1965 is higher than at 
present, so that harvested acreage of feed grains is above that of 1960 only modestly 
despite a significant increase in projected planted acreage. Thus, in light of recent 
experience the projected output may be conservative rather than excessive. 
Farm prices and income under such a program. Estimated farm prices and in-
comes under such a program are shown as in tables 13. 4 and 13. 5, together with 
estimated free prices using the same statistical model and the same assumptions 
regarding Public Law 480 programs and nonfarm costs. 
Table 13. 4. Estimated farm prices of major farm commodities in 1965 under 
different situations 
~heat---------------------------bushels-­
Cotton---------------------------pounds --
Rice ---------------------hundredweiqht--
Peanuts--------------------------pounds --
Cattle --------------------hundredweight--
Calves ------------------------.:.---do ----
Milk, wholesale --------------------do ----
Hogs ----------------------------do ----
Sheep and lambs --------------------do ----
Broil~rs--------------------------pounds --
Turkeys----------------------------do ----
Eggs ----------------------------dozens --
Corn ----------------------------bushels--
Oats ------------------------------do ----
Barley -----------------------------do ----
Sorghum -------------------hundredweight--
Cottonseed-------------------------tons---
·Soybeans ------------------------bushels--
1 Assumed support prices. 
No price 
support or 
control pro-
gram 
$0.87 
.21 
3.49 
--------
17.08 
18.39 
3.6/ 
10.95 
16.78 
.15 
.19 
.26 
.77 
.41 
.62 
1. 21 
28.29 
l. 35 
Price 
supports and 
control for 
5 basic crops 
1 $1.75 
1 
.28 
4.42 
1 
.10 
16.77 
18.06 
3.70 
10.23 
16.44 
.14 
.18 
.25 
.71 
.38 
.57 
L 12 
40.03 
L 70 
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Table 13. 5. Estimated cash receipts 1 production expenses and net farm income 
in 1965 under different situations 
(In millions of dollars) 
Cash receipts: 
~heat-----------------------------­
Rice--------------------------------
Cotton------------------------------
Tobacco ----------------------------
Cattle and calves--------------------
Hogs ------------------------------
Dairy products-----------------------
Sheep and lambs---------------------
All chickens-------------------------
Turkeys-----------------------------
Eggs -------------------------------
Com -------------------------------
Other feed grains --------------------
Soybeans ---------------------------
Fruit ----------------------~-----~--
Vegetables 1 potatoes, beans 1 peas 1 etc -
All other-----------------·-----------
Total ----------------------------
Government payments-----------------
Value of home used products-----------
Rental value of dwellings -------------
Gross income--------------------~-
Expenses: 
Feed -------------------------------
Livestock---------------------------
Labor-------------------------------
Property tax and interest--------------
All other----------------------------
Total ----------------------------
Net income of farm operators from farming---
No price sup-
ports or con-
trol programs 
11093 
195 
21212 
11149 
7,044 
21504 
41965 
268 
11096 
317 
11420 
11002 
381 
818 
11596 
21697 
21100 
301857 
662 
11063 
21012 
341594 
41403 
21260 
21929 
216,00 
151200 
271392 
7,202 
Price sup-
ports and con-
t rols for 5 
basic crops 
11768 
217 
21244 
11149 
61944 
21400 
51035 
263 
11061 
308 
11357 
984 
492 
985 
11592 
2,691 
21100 
311590 
662 
11119 
2,012 
351383 
41396 
2,228 
21929 
21600 
151200 
271353 
81030 
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Prices received by farmers would average about 17 percent below the 1959 
level, with livestock and livestock product prices down about one-fifth and crop 
prices down 11 percent. The average decline in crop prices would be less because 
the basic crops are supported and controlled. 
Cash receipts from farm marketings would be about five percent below 1959 
levels. This, plus the higher expenses projected for 1965, would result in net farm 
income of about one-fourth lower than in 1959. However, the program for basic crops 
would result in a net farm income about 11 percent higher than might be obtained if 
all support and control programs were dropped. 
The distribution of farm income under such a program would be different from 
the distribution of income that might be expected if all price supports and production 
controls were removed. The income of the producers of controlled crops would de-
cline somewhat from 1959 levels, because output would be the same or lower and 
prices would be no higher. However, the greatest relative decline would be in the 
income of feed grain and livestock producers. Probably the greatest income decline 
would be experienced by pork producers, with the producers of beef, poultry, and 
eggs experiencing somewhat lesser declines. The producers of soybeans, cash corn, 
and other cash feed grains also might expect sharply lower prices and incomes. 
The adoption of a program of tighter controls for wheat, cotton, rice, tobacco, 
and peanuts and the removal of all other price supports probably would increase the 
pressure for adjustment in agriculture rather than diminish it. The low prices and 
incomes expected to result, especially for livestock producers, would probably re-
tard investment in agriculture. Such a reduction in prices would also impose large 
capital losses on the owners of livestock breeding herds, and upon the owners of 
farmland devoted to the production of feed grains and forage crops. Over time, it 
is probable that the lower prices and incomes would result in somewhat lower yields 
of unsupported crops using heavy inputs of commercial fertilizer. It also is likely 
that marginal land would be retired from the production of unsupported crops. It is 
unlikely that the rate of decline in yields or retirement of land would be rapid enough, 
however, to appreciably improve the income po$ition of farm people in the short run. 
Given the expected rise in nonfarm incomes, together with the projected lower 
farm incomes, the .greatest pressure under such a program would be for farmers who 
could find alternative employment to leave agriculture. This pressure would be es-
pecially great upon younger farmers and those with better educational background, 
whereas for older farmers and those who are less well educated, the off-farm oppor-
tunities would, be limited and they generally would remain in agriculture despite their 
adverse income positions. 
Finally, such a program would not mean an end to federal expenditures for 
price support programs. The present export subsidy programs for wheat and cotton 
would have to be continued if the income of producers of these crops were to be 
maintained even close to recent levels. The projected Public Law 480 program would 
have to be maintained at about present levels and the present soil bank expenditures 
would be required. The major gains would be the reduction of losses on the feed grain 
price support program and the reduction of storage costs as inventory accumulation 
was ended. 
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Consumer prices ..2!!£ consumption patterns. In general, the output pattern 
achieved in the situation under discussion would appear to be highly desirable to 
consumers. It would alter agricultural production heavily toward increased output 
of livestock and livestock products a with relatively lower meat prices as one of 
its results. 
The situation under discussion would result in per capita consumption of 
red meat and poultry well above any previous level on record. Red meat consumption 
would exceed 1959 levels by one-fifth and record 1956 levels by 16 percent. Poultry 
consumption would exceed the record 1959 levels by 15 percent. The consumption of 
dairy products and eggs would also be well above recent levels. 
Assuming that marketing margins for these products did not increase and 
offset the lower farm prices, retail food prices slightly lower than 1960 could be 
expected. However, since the farm price makes up only a portion of the retail price, 
even the sharply lower livestock prices.would mean only moderately lower retail 
prices. The projected decline in food prices would probably mean a modest but per-
ceptible lowering of the retail price index assuming other prices constant. 
Since livestock products make up an important portion of the U. S. consumer 
food budgeto such a program would provide a diet very heavy in livestock products 
at a lower price to consumers. 
MAINTAINING FARM INCOME LEVELS 
Although the income levels implied in the program just discussed are not likely 
to be appealing to most farmers, the illustration serves a useful purpose. It suggests 
that in order to maintain farm income at anything approaching recent levels, a program 
must do more than provide protection for the producers of wheat o cotton, rice, tobacco, 
and peanuts. The inherent dangers of overcapacity in our feed-livestock economy 
have not been adequately recognized in most discussions of the farm problem, and to 
date the accumulation of feed grain stocks has prevented a major prolonged deterioration 
of prices and incomes in the livestock sector of the farm economy. Potentially, how-
ever, this danger must be faced and dealt with unless we are willing to continue to 
accumulate stocks of feed grains for which there are no observable outlets that will 
not increase domestic livestock output. 
Therefore, assuming that there is general agreement that feed grain stocks 
cannot be accumulated indefinitely, attention must be given to other methods of main-
taining the price and income levels in the feed-livestock sector of the farm economy. 
Moreover, the possibilities of using foreign disposal programs as an outlet for ex-
cessive feed grain production appear limited. Therefore, the problem must be solved 
largely within the context of the U. S. economy. 
Without resorting to attempting production controls on livestocku there would 
appear to be two ways to maintain the income of livestock producers in the face of 
the potential feed-grain livestock output in the years ahead. These are (a) a direct 
income compensation program, and (b) a pro9ram which achieves a reduction in the 
output of feed grains. 
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DIRECT INCOME SUPPLEMENTS FOR LIVESTOCK 
There are a variety of ways in which a direct income supplement to livestock 
producers could be operated. One would be merely to announce a price level for 
each livestock product and then to supplement each livestock producer's income by 
the difference between the average market price and the desired price. Such a pro-
gram might encourage even higher production of feed grains and livestock than the 
already excessive supplies which are anticipated. However 1 this problem might be 
handled by limiting the payments to a specified quantity of livestock so that further 
expansion would be limited by the profitability of production at the unsupplemented 
market price. 
If the target price for livestock were set at $14 per hundredweight for hogs 
and $20 per hundredweight for beef cattle, the payments required would probably 
amount to, $1 billion for cattle and calves and about as much for hogs. As much as 
$1 billion more might be required to maintain comparable price levels on the other 
livestock products. It should be recognized, however, that payments on this basis 
would result in a higher net income than in 1959 for livestock producers, since they 
would be receiving about the same prices as in 19 59 on a greater volume of production. 
Therefore 1 about $2 billion in direct income supplements, distributed to feed grain and 
livestock producers upon some portion of their total output would probably maintain 
net farm income for this group at about 1959 levels. 
It should be noted that the maintenance of farm income through a combination 
of quantity controls on basic crops and direct payments for livestock products would 
result in significantly lower treasury costs than are estimated by Brandow for a program 
using direct payments for all commodities. Moreover 1 a given expenditure for such 
programs I say $2 billion 1 would more nearly maintain farm income levels in a com-
bination program than if payments alone were used. 
Finally 1 it should be recognized that merely adding some kind of cross-com-
pliance to a quantity control program would not provide a sol uti on to the farm income 
problem. Such a requirement would prevent further diversion of wheat and cotton 
acreage to the production of feed grains 1 but it would not be sufficient to maintain 
farm income at anywhere near 1959 levels. The effect would be to increase net farm 
income no more than five percent above the level expected in the absence of such a 
requirement, but prices and incomes would be well below 1959 levels. 
REDUCING FEED GRAIN OUTPUT 
Another method of maintaining farm income in the absence of CCC accumula-
tion of feed-grain stocks, is to induce lower feed grain output. This might be accom-
plished either by a voluntary program restricting resource inputs or by marketing 
controls. 
Voluntary reduction of feed grain acreage could be achieved by either general 
land retirement of the type discussed by Schnittker in Chapter 12 or by land retirement 
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directed specifically at feed grain acreage. General land retirement has many facets, 
as discussed earlier, but for the purposes of this discussion, only a few need re-
stating. First, general land retirement will require that a good deal of marginal land 
and land not used to produce feed grains will be removed before any appreciable re-
duction in feed grain acreage and production are achieved. However, the retirement 
of much marginal land might be economically desirable in many areas. 
Second, general land retirement, especially of whole farms, often induces 
the retirement of other agricultural resources with it. Many older farmers have used 
the soil bank program as an opportunity to cease active farming, thus reducing the 
agricultural labor force and idling some capital equipment. Thus, the substitution 
of other inputs for land is less likely. 
Third, the general land retirement is relatively easy to administer, especially 
where entire farms are involved. 
A program dealing specifically with the income problems of the feed livestock 
economy is not simple to devise. The outlet for feed grains other than for use as feed 
for domestic livestock is limited. Since much of the feed is used on farms where it 
is produced, the problems of enforcing an effective production control program are 
great. Moreover, a price support program which diverts feed grains to CCC and im-
proves the market prices of feed and livestock, reduces the incentive for compliance, 
as was illustrated by the corn acreage allotment program a few years ago. 
Thus, the problem becomes one of inducing feed grain producers to reduce 
output voluntarily by some method which will reward those who cooperate more than 
those who fail to cooperate. A price-support program of the type presently operated 
will not do this. 
One possible way of inducing a reduction in feed grain output would be to 
offer adjustment payments to farmers who voluntarily reduced feed grain acreage by 
some predetermined percentage or more. Such a program would require the following 
features: 
(a) Each farm would be allotted a base acreage of feed grains. based upon 
recent production history. This base would not be merely in terms of total 
acreage, since an acre of corn usually produces more feed than does an acre 
of other feed grains. 
(b) Farmers who voluntarily reduce the acreage planted to feed grains by 
some predetermined percentage of their feed grain base or more, would re-
ceive adjustment payments to compensate them for their adjustment. This 
would be paid to all compliers whether they sold or fed the feed grains on 
their farms. 
(c) Farmers who chose not to comply with the voluntary acreage reductions 
could raise all of the feed grains and livestock they chose. However, since 
they were not participating in the needed adjustment program, they would re-
ceive no price supports or adjustment payments. 
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Such a program would have several advantages over price support and land 
retirement programs of recent years. First, no price supports, storage costs, or 
export subsidies would be required for feed grains. Second, it would recognize 
that merely retiring land from one crop is not equivalent to the same amount of land 
retired from another crop. 
To illustrate this latter point, in 1959, .the average acre of com grown in 
the United States produced 1. 44 tons of feed grain, whereas the average acre of oats 
and barley produced about two-thirds. of a ton and the average acre of grain sorghum 
about 1 ton. Thus, a program which induces a farmer to reduce oats acreage without 
affecting corn acreage has much less effect on reducing total feed grain production. 
Third, the program would allow farmers to participate or not as they saw fit. 
More important, it would allow participating_ farmers to adjust their individual crop 
rotations. to meet their individual needs without imposing internal restrictions upon 
their managerial choices. 
The program has some obvious problems, also. It probably would encourage 
complying farmers to boost yields on their reduced acreage o but there are limits 
beyond which this would not be economical. Anywayo nothing short of quantity con-
trols will completely remove this incentive. 
A second disadvantage is that the incentive for compliance would depend 
largely upon the size of the adjustment payment, since all feed grain producers would 
sh"'re in the benefits of higher feed grain and livestock prices. Therefore, these ad-
justinent payments would have to be high enough to provide ample incentive for 
participation. 
Third, the program would require the establishment of feed grain base acreages 
and measurement to verify compliance for farmers participating in the program. Alsoo 
it probably would be necessary to allow the land to be pasturedu which would offset 
in part the reduction in the output of feed grains. 
A program which attempts to maintain farm prices and incomes by reducing 
feed grain output will have the greatest impact upon improving that sector of agricul-
ture which produces feed grains or feed grains and livestock on the same farms. It 
will do relatively little to increase income on farms or in areas primarily dependent 
upon _purchased feeds. 
The reduction of feed grain output would restrict livestock output by reducing 
profit margins in livestock production to the extent that marginal production would be 
dropped. Most of the initial pressures would be on producers and production areas 
where most feed is purchased. 
Farm price and income levels that might be achieved adjusting feed grain output. 
An idea of the magnitude of the adjustment required in the feed-livestock economy 
' . 
can be obtained by observing the price and income levels that might be expected in 
agriculture if feed grain production could be reduced to about 150 million tons in 1965. 
This is shown in tables 13. 6 and 13. 7. 
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Table 13. 6. Estimated farm prices of major farm commodities in 1965 with 2 
levels of feed grain production 
Farm price 
VVheat----------------------------------bushels--
Cotton ---------------------------------pounds --
Rice -----------------------------hundredweight--
Peanuts --------------------------------pounds --
Cattle ---------------------------hundredweight--
Calves------------------------------------do---
Milk, wholesale ---------------------------do ---
Hogs--------------------------------------do ---
Sheep and lambs----------------------------do ---
Broilers --------------------------------pounds --
Turkeys -----------------------------------do ---
Eggs-----------------------------------dozen---
Corn-----------------------------------bushels--
Oats--------------------------------------do---
Barley ------------------------------------do ---
Sorghum --------------------------hundredweight--
Cottonseed --------------------------------tons--
Soybeans-------------------------------bushels--
1 Assumed support prices. 
Feed grain 
production 
,held to 150;-
000, 000 tons 
1 $ l. 75 
1 
.28 
I 4. 42 
1 . 10 
18.30 
19.61 
4.10 
13.85 
18.02 
.18 
.23 
. 32 
l. 00 
.53 
.80 
l. 57 
55.33 
2.23 
Feed grain 
production 
held to 140,-
000, 000 tons 
1 $1.75 
1 • 28 
i 4.42 
1 . 10 
19.22 
20.53 
4.32 
16.44 
18. 97 
.21 
.27 
• 37 
l. 23 
.65 
.98 
l. 93 
59.54 
2.36 
Assuming that feeding rates returned to about their long-time average the 
prices received by farmers under such a situation would still average about six 
percent below their 1959 level. However, with the projected increased output off-
setting the lower prices, total cash receipts from farm marketings are projected at 
just slightly above 1959 levels. Assuming that government payments would increase 
to slightly over $1 billion to compensate farmers for a voluntary reduction in feed 
grain acreage, and the same increase in costs used earlier, net farm income would 
be about five percent below 1959. Thus, even this significant reduction in feed 
grain output would not quite maintain farm income. 
The magnitude of the problem of merely maintaining farm income should not 
be underestimated. Feed grain output would ·have to be reduced by about 10 percent 
from 1959 and 1960 levels and even more from the levels projected for 1965. While 
the income and price levels are not high enough to induce a rapid rate of new in-
vestment in agriculture or a rise in the rate of adoption of new technology, neither 
are they low enough to really retard the continuation of present rates. Any program 
which maintains prices and improves certainty will tend to encourage individual 
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Table 13. 7. Estimated cash receipts 1 production expenses and net farm income 
in 1965 with 2 levels of feed grain production 
(Millions of dollars) 
Cash receipts 
VVheat----------------------------------------
Rice -----------------------------------------
Cotton ---------------------------------------
Cattle and calves------------------------------
Hogs-----------------------------------------
Dairy products --------------------------------
Sheep and lambs-----------------------------~-
All chickens ----------------------------------
Turkeys --------------------------------------
Eggs---------------~~------------------------
Corn-----------------------------------------
Other feed grains------------------------------
Soybeans-------------------------------------
Fruit-----------------------------------------
Vegetables u potatoes 1 beans, peas I etc----------
All other -------------------------------------
Total ------------------------------------
Government payments --------------------------
Value of home used production-------------------
Rental value of dwellings-----------------------
Gross income-----------------------------
Expenses: 
Feed---------------------------------------
Livestock-----------------------------------
Labor --------------------------------------
Property tax and interest---------------------~ 
All other -----------------------------------
Total ------------------------------------
Net income of farm operators from farming---------
Feed grain 
production 
held to 150 1-
000 I 000 tons 
11768 
217 
2,331 
71438 
2,902 
5,423 
288 
1,227 
351 
1,664 
1,220 
525 
1,219 
1,613 
2,719 
31249 
34,154 
11040 
11250 
21012 
381456 
41586 
21386 
21929 
21600 
151200 
271701 
101755 
Feed grain 
production 
held to 140 u-
000 1 000 tons 
1,768 
217 
2,355 
7,730 
3,233 
5,623 
303 
1,331 
376 
1,869 
1 0 355 
617 
1,290 
1,625 
2 0 734 
3,249 
35,675 
1,390 
11325 
2,012 
401402 
41758 
21480 
2,929 
21600 
15 0 200 
271967 
121435 
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farmers to increase output. As long as the program is voluntary o significantly higher 
prices will lower participation and tend to be self-defeating. 
The difficulty of using such a program to increase farm prices and incomes 
appreciably above present levels is illustrated by the example of what might be 
expected by using the same approach to reduce feed grain output to 140 million tons. 
The projected prices and incomes that would result also are shown in tables 13. 6 
and 13.7. 
Again assuming a return to average feeding rates, a reduction of feed grain 
output to 140 million tons would maintain the average price received by farmers at 
just about the same average price level received in 1959. These prices would mean 
that cash receipts would be about eight percent above the 1959 level. Higher cash 
receipts, together with higher government payments required to achieve the acreage 
reduction, would result in a net income about 10 percent above 1959 levels. 
Achieving higher prices and incomes via this type of voluntary program is 
not easy. First o payment rates would certain! y have to be increased in order to 
achieve the necessary participation by feed grain producers. There would be addi-
tional incentive to increase yields on acreage remaining in feed grains. Moreover, 
there would be a tendency to substitute hay and pasture for feed grains in the pro-
duction of those classes of livestock where substitution is possible. The projected 
higher soybean prices and reduction of feed grains would encourage increased out-
put of these products o and there probably would be some substitution of protein feeds 
for other feed grains. 
Thus, it does not appear feasible to expect to use a voluntary program of 
reduction of feed grain acreage to achieve a farm price level significantly above 
present price levels. Higher prices will (1) reduce participation, and (2) increase 
the incentive to increase output on the reduced feed grain acreage o and (3) encourage 
the substitution of forage and protein for feed grains in livestock production. 
In general, it appears that a program of some type which will retire acreage 
from feed grain production is needed to avoid disastrous declines in the income of 
livestock producers if the present feed grain support programs were ended. A pro-
gram that would absorb the present excessive feed grain production now going to CCC 
would appear manageable, and the costs should not be in excess of the present pro-
gram costs. However, it appears difficult to use such a program to achieve farm 
prices and incomes appreciably above present levels. If significantly higher prices 
and incomes are the goal, it is likely that direct income payments on livestock 
products or some type of nonvoluntary production or marketing controls will be re-
quired to achieve these goals for the feed-livestock sector of the agricultural economy. 
Consumer prices and consumption levels. A reduction of feed grain output 
to either of the two levels just discussed does not imply a reduction in food supplies 
available to consumers or higher consumer prices. On the contrary, the consumer 
supply of meat would be higher than at present and prices about the same. 
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The output of meat animals implied with a feed grain output of 140 million 
tons would amount to about 10 percent more red meat per capita than was consumed 
in 1959 and would exceed slightly the record high meat consumption of 1956. The 
red meat output implied in the example reducing feed grain output to 150 million 
tons is even higher. The projected per capita consumption in that case would be 
13 percent above 1959 levels. 
If marketing costs did not rise, consumer prices for food would average 
about the same as in 1959 if feed grain output were reduced to 140 million tons. 
The higher output projected with the lesser reduction would result in slightly lower 
prices for livestock and livestock products at the farm than in 1959. 
Thus, even a program that succeeded in maintaining or slightly improving 
farm income in the years ahead would not have to reduce food supplies per capita 
or result in significant increases in consumer prices. Actually, the problem is 
restraining the rate of increase in the output of food so as to avoid serious farm 
price declines or further stock accumulations by the government. 
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APPENDIX A 
Procedure for Estimating Farm Prices and 
Income in 1965 
George E. Brandow 
Pennsylvania State University 
The general procedure for making projections of prices and incomes consisted 
of three main parts: (a) Projection of acreage and normal-weather yields of crops in 
1965, (b) estimation of livestock production and of crop and livestock prices consistent 
with the expected crop production 1 and (c) computation of gross and net income from 
the estimates of production and prices. 
Acreage and yields. Estimates of acreage of leading crops and of normal-
weather crop yields in 1965 were made for each of the alternative farm programs. Pro-
jected yields for 1965 with no controls and low prices were the same as those used 
by the U. S. Department of Agriculture in Senate Document No. 77 1 in the case of 
oats, barley 1 and soybeans 1 but were moderately higher for wheat u com, grain sor-
ghums 1 cotton, and rice. The use of higher yields seemed justified by crop production 
in the late 1950's and in 1960 and by other considerations. Acreage and yields assumed 
for the various programs are given elsewhere in this publication. 
Prices .s.!1£! livestock production. A set of equations was developed to allocate 
the supply of feed concentrates between the expe>rt and domestic markets and among 
the various classes of livestock. The equations also yielded crop and .livestock prices 
that were consistent with quantities marketed and preserved normal liv~stock-feed 
price relationships. These equations were adapted from a demand model constructed 
as part of the research of a group of agricultural experiment stations under interregional 
project IRM-1, entitled "Impacts of Pres~nt and Proposed Agricultural Price and Income 
Programs. " 2 
The demand elasticities and trends for livestock products in the basic model 
are given in appendix table 1. Demand for feed concentrates was derived from demand 
for livestock products by the use of equilibrium relationships between feed and live-
stock prices and normal rates of feeding concentrates to livestock. The number of cattle 
slaughtered in 1965 was projected to be 31.85 million head, but the weight added in 
cattle feeding operations was considered to be a function of the price of feed concen-
trates. Production of farm chickens was taken to be a byproduct of egg production. 
1 Report from the U. S. Department of Agriculture and a Statement From the Land-
Grant Colleges IRM-1 Advisory Committee on Farm Price and Income Projections, 
1960-65, S. Doc. No. 77, 86th Gong., 2d sess., Jan. 20, 1960. 
2 The demand model was developed under the Pennsylvania contributing project to 
IRM -1 and will be published in 19 61. 
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The quantities of feed concentrates required to produce one unit of livestock 
product were assumed to be: 
Hogs, perpound------------------------------------------------------
Broilers 9 per pound ---------------------------------------------------
Turkeys, per pound---------------------------------------------------
Eggs, perdozen------------------------------------------------------
Milk, per hundredweight-----------------------------------------------
Weight added in feeding cattle, per pound -------------------------------
5.40 
3.35 
5.70 
8.00 
35.52 
8.76 
These rates include concentrates for breeding and young stock, except for 
beef cattle. In addition, other livestock on farms on January 1 require the following 
amounts of feed concentrates: 
Tons per 
head 
Cattle other than dairy cattle and beef cattle on feed---------------------- 0. 1779 
All sheep and lambs -------------------------------------------------- . 03 
All horses and mules-------------------------------------------------- . 9 
The rates of feeding used in the model account for the total tonnage of concen-
trates fed over the period 1947-59 9 and no trend in the apparent rate of feeding is 
observable over the period. In the 1958 and 1959 feeding years 9 however, the actual 
rate of feeding was approximately 10 percent above normal as defined by these stan-
dards. The actual rate was even more above normal in terms of the U. S. Department 
of Agriculture's usual measures 9 grain consuming animal units and livestock production 
units. The model assumes a return to usual feeding rates by 1965 9 as did Senate Docu-
ment No. 77. 
A 1 percent change in the farm price of cotton during the early 1960's was 
assumed to cause a change of 1. 85 percent in the quantity of cotton demanded for 
commercial purposes in 1965. This estimate of demand elasticity was combined with 
a projection of a slow decline in domestic consumption of cotton in the absence of 
price change. The demand elasticity used for rice was -0. 5. Soybean and cottonseed 
prices were computed from the expected value of oils and high protein feeds, less fixed 
processing costs per unit. 
Prices of milk for different uses were assumed to maintain a fixed relation to 
each other, but utilization of milk for different purposes varied with prices and with 
consumption trends. Competition among butter and other edible fats and oils accounts 
for the cross-elasticities of milk with fats and oils given in appendix table 1. 
All equations were linear in logarithms. Such equations give higher estimates 
of prices when market supplies are large than do equations linear in natural units. 
Income estimates. Cash receipts were estimated from production and prices 
by use of average relationships between output and sales and by projection of trends 
in on-farm use of farm products. Unless otherwise indicated, government payments 
to farmers under programs .in effect in 1960 were assumed to continue at about the same 
level in 1965. The value of farm products consumed in the home was adjusted to reflect 
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both a declining trend and changes in prices of farm products. Rental value of farm 
dwellings was held at the 1959 level. 
Farmers • expenditures for feed were estimated from the total tonnage of con-
centrates fed, farm prices of grains, and the usual relation of prices paid by farmers 
for feed to farm prices of grains. A slow rise in the proportion of feed purchased 
rather than fed on the same farm was also projected. Changes in livestock expendi-
tures after 1959 were based on expected slaughter and prices of cattle and calves. 
Expenditures for hired labor were held at the 1959 level on the expectation that a 
further decline in the hired labor force would offset higher wage rates. 
Expenditures for property taxes and mortgage interest after 1959 were pro-
jected to rise at the rate of recent years. All other expenditures, comprising more 
than half of total expenditures, were put at a higher level in 1965 than in 1959 to 
reflect changes in physical quantities and prices. The annual rate of increase in 
physical quantities after 1959 was assumed to be half the average rate from 1940 to 
1959. Prices paid by farmers for the items involved were assumed to rise 0. 5 percent 
per year, a considerably slower rate than in the latter years of the 1950's. 
Comparability !!!!h. Senate Document 1':!2..· J.l. If the assumptions of Senate 
Document No. 77 concerning crop production and stock liquidation in 1965 are used 
in the estimating equations developed for the present study, generally good agree-
ment is obtained with the prices and cash receipts given in that publication. 3 A 
comparison of representative prices is given below. 
S. Doc. 77 Method of S. Doc. 77 Method of 
this study his study 
Cattle, cwt--------- $15.00 $17.06 Corn, bu $0.80 $0.77 
Hogs, cwt---------- 11.20 10.88 Wheat, bu .90 .86 
Broilers, lb--------- .15 .14 Soybeans, bt: 1. 60 1. 24 
Eggs, doz ---------- .29 .26 Cotton, lb .25 .22 
Milk, wholesale, cwt. 3.60 3.64 
The estimates of total cash receipts from sales of farm products are almost 
identical--$30, 590 million in Senate Document No. 77 and $30,602 million by the 
method of this study. The associated estimates of net income are $7 billion and 
$6.9 billion, respectively. 
The projections of prices and income for 1965 given on pages 171 and 172 
of this publication are in generally close agreement with those of Senate Document 
No. 77. The current study assumes higher crop yields in 1965, but the assumptions 
of the earlier study regarding stock liquidation and {apparently) Public Law 480 ship-
ments approximately compensate for the difference in yields. 
Projections of production, prices, and incomes in 1965 are necessarily rough 
approximations. More significant digits are carried in the tables than the precision 
of the estimates warrants becq.use drastic rounding off creates inconsistencies within 
and among sets of projections. 
3 It is also necessary to make specific assumptions about Public Law 480 shipments 
that are only implied in S. Doc. No. 7 7. 
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APPENDIX B 
Tables Supplementary to Chapter 12 
John· A. Schnittker 
Kansas State University 
TABLE A.--Assumptions, wheat sector, 1965, Part I I 
Domestic use: 
Per capita consumption; food; United States, 1965--------pounds-- 165 
Population------------------------------------------millions- 195. 7 
Total consumption as food --------------------million bushels --
Seed-------------------------------------------------do----
Feed (1960 wheat price) --------------------------------do----
Total domestic consumption---------------------------do----
Exports: 
Cash with export subsidy of about 60 cents per bushel -----do----
Public Law 480----------------------------------------do----
Total exports ---------------------------------------do----
Total disappearance ---------------------------------do----
Production: 
Yield per harvested acre (limited acreage) --------------bushels-
Harvested acreage required for 1965--------------------millions 
Planted acreage required for 1965 ------------------------do----
Harvested acreage, 1960 -------------------------------do----
Planted acreage, 1960---------------:--------------------do----
TABLE B. --Assumptions, cotton, 1965, with comparisons 
Domestic use: 
Per capita consumption (1959 level) --------------------pounds--
Population-----------------------------------------millions--
Domestic consumption --------------------------million bales -
Exports: 
Cash with export subsidy------------------------million bales -
Public Law 480, Export-Import Bank, mutual security-------do----
Total exports ---------------------------------------do----
Total disappearance ---------------------------------do----
Production: 
Yield per harvested acre (limited acreage) --------------pounds--
Yield per planted acre----------------------------------do----
Harvested acreage required --------------------------millions--
Planted acreage required -------------------------------do----
538 
50 
60 
648 
175 
275 
450 
1,098 
25 
44.0 
49.0 
53.0 
56.6 
24.0 
195.7 
9.4 
3.5 
1.5 
5.0 
14.4 
500 
464 
14.4 
15.0 
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TABLE C.--Assumptions, rice and soybeans, 1965, with comparisons 
Rice: 
Food, beverage, and seed use per capita (rough basis, including 
shipments to territories) -------------million hundredweight--- 14. 8 
Total----------------------------- mJ.llion hundredweight--- 26.6 
Exports---------------~-------------------------~--do ---- 23.5 
Total disappearance--------------------------------do---- 50.0 
Harvested acreage required, 1965 ------------------million --- 1. 4 
Harvested acreage, 1959 -----------------------------do ---- 1. 6 
Soybeans: 
Crushings----------------------------------million bushels- 400 
Exports--------------------------------------------do---- 130 
Other ---------------------------------------------do ---- 20 
Total --------------------------------------------do ---- 550 
Harvested acreage required at 24 bushels per harvested acre 
million --- 23. 0 
Harvested acreage, 1960 -----------------------------do ---- 22.4 
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TABLE D.-Lan4 retirement by States and regions to maintain 1959-60 prices, 
Part II 
[Acres in thousands] 
Wheat area 
Conserva- l----...,-----
tion 
reserve, 
1960 
Distribu-
tion of 17.5 
million 
acres I 
Distribu-
tion of 8 
million 
acres 2 
Cotton-
Distribu-
tion of 5 
million 
acres a 
Total 
acreage 
retired 
Acreage 
retired as 
percent of 
cropland 
used for 
crops 
Delaware..................... 18 12 6 ·······----- 36 8 
Maryland. __ ----------------- 85 60 28 ------------ 174 11 
New JerseY------------------- 50 25 9 ------------ 84 10 
New York.·----------········ 508 107 51 ···-·-······ 665 12 
Pennsylvania_________________ 373 196 101 ------------ 670 12 
I--------I--------I--------·I--------1--------I-------
Eastern States__________ 1, 035 399 196 ------------ 1, 630 12 1======1======1======,1======,1======,1===== 
Illinois------------------------ 440 481 248 ------------ l, 169 6 
Indiana----------------------- 494 370 199 ------------ 1, 062 9 
Iowa-------------------------- 663 33 22 ------------ 718 3 Michigan_____________________ 721 338 168 ------------ 1, 227 16 
Minnesota____________________ 1, 944 234 128 ------------ 2, 306 12 
Missouri---------------------- 832 378 208 115 1, 533 11 
OhiO-------------------------· 525 536 258 ------------ 1, 319 12 Wisconsin____________________ 763 16 10 ------------ 789 8 
I--------I--------·I---------I-------·I--------1-------Corn Belt_______________ 6, 384 2, 385 1, 238 115 10, 122 9 
1======1=======11=======1=======1=======1====== 
Montana._------------------- fi30 1, 374 725 ------------ 2, 729 19 
Nebraska_____________________ 880 992 524 ------------ 2, 397 11 
North Dakota.--------------- 2, 705 2, 294 1, 164 ------------ 6, 164 23 
South Dakota. __ ------------- 1, 808 849 405 ------------ 3, 062 16 
Wyoming_____________________ 125 105 47 ------------ 277 14 
I--------I--------I--------·I--------1--------I-------
Northern Plains_________ 6, 147 5, 614 2, 865 ------------ 14, 629 18 
1=======1======1======1======1======1======= Colorado______________________ 1, 296 889 324 ------------ 2, 509 25 
Kansas._--------------------- 1, 447 3, 180 1, 490 ------------ 6,117 22 New Mexico__________________ 867 140 24 60 1, 091 58 
Oklahoma_------------------- 1, 491 1, 547 651 215 3, 904 32 Texas_________________________ 3, 667 1, 208 372 1, 960 7, 207 25 
I--------1--------I--------·I--------I--------I-------
Southern Plains.________ 8, 768 6, 963 2, 861 2, 235 20,828 26 
============11======11======1=======1,======= 
Alabama. ___ ----------------- 410 5 7 330 752 15 Arkansas_____________________ 604 26 12 435 1, 077 18 
Georgia_______________________ 1, 062 38 15 280 1, 396 21 
Louisiana_____________________ 218 ------------ 7 180 405 13 
Kentucky ___ ----------------- 387 93 31 -----------· 511 11 
Mississippi._----------------- 335 14 7 505 861 15 North Carolina_______________ 271 100 53 140 564 10 
South Carolina. __ ------------ 638 47 23 230 939 25 
Tennessee. __ ----------------- 499 79 30 185 793 16 
Virginia. __ ------------------- 117 88 43 ------------ 248 8 West Virginia_________________ 59 16 6 ---------·-- 81 7 
Florida_______________________ 229 ------------ ------------ ------------ 229 11 
I--------I--------I--------·I---------I-------·1-------
South and Southeast____ 4, 831 506 234 2, 285 7, 856 15 
Arizona_______________________ 8 5 7 125 145 12 
California_____________________ 205 138 70 255 668 7 
IdahO------------------------- 294 408 196 ------------ 898 18 Nevada _______________________ ------------ 4 2 ------------ 6 2 
Oregon. __ -------------------- 236 282 136 ------------ 654 15 
Utah. __ ---------------------- 23R 103 51 ------------ 393 24 
Washington. __ --------------- 340 690 342 ------------ 1, 371 20 
I--------I--------I--------I---------I---------1-------
Western States_________ 1,320 1,629 803 380 4,132 14 
1===~==1==~==1======1======,1==~==,1======= 
Connecticut._.--------------- 5 ------------ ------------ ------------ 5 2 
Maine________________________ 123 ------------ ------------ ------------ 123 15 
Massachusetts________________ 3 ------------ ------------ ------------ 3 1 
New Hampshire______________ 12 ------------ ------------ ------------ 12 5 
Rhode Island _________________ ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vermont______________________ 33 ------------ ------------ ------------ 33 4 
Northeast States________ 176 ------------ ------------ ------------ 176 7 1======1======1======1======,1======,1======= 
Total, United States.... 28,660 17,497 8,199 5, 015 59,371 16 
1 Diverted to other crops after 1953. 
• Currently producing wheat for stocks. 
a Part of land diverted from cotton after 1953. 
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Chapter 14 
Recent Canadian Experience with Farm Price Supports 
S. J. Chagnon 
Assistant Deputy Minister 
Canada Department of Agriculture 
In dealing with farm price supports in my country, I shall be dealing mainly 
with operations •mder the Agricultural Stabilization Act and to some extent the Act 
which it superseded in 1958, the Agricultural Prices Support Act of 1944. I shall thus 
be leaving aside government activities in research, experimentation o provision of 
production aids and bonuses, encouragement of marketing institutions and agencies, 
provision of grade standards, and a myriad of federal and provincial policies of long 
standing in our pountry t>ut not directly related to prices of specific farm products. 
As you will note, price support as such is a post-World War I I program, 
which was provided largely in justice to the farmers, who had been subject to price 
ceilings during the conflict. The transition period from war to peace might be an 
uncertain and trying time for primary producers , and the government was prepared 
to assist along the way. 1 Under this Act, a net cost to the Treasury of $100 million 
was incurred in 12 years until 1958, mostly in loss on resale of purchased products 
for which programs were devised. These were hogs, cattle, butter, apples, pota-
toes, shell eggs, and five other commodities. Net farm income in the period averaged 
well over $1 billion per year. 
The Agricultural Stabilization Acto passed in 1958, provides a formula approach 
to price support and assured an automatic support for nine 11named commodities ... 
The predecessor act, on the other hando had left the details of the program, both as 
to commodities and support levels, to the government, advised by the Board set up 
to administer the Act. 
The present Agricultural Stabilization Board must prescribe the support price 
for any of the named commodities at no less than 80 percent of the .. average price at 
representative markets as determined by the Board for the 10 years immediately pre-
ceding the year in which the base price is established 11 .2 The 11named commodities .. 
are cattle, hogs, and sheep; butter, cheese and eggs; and wheat, oats and barley 
produced outside the three Prairie Provinces. The Canadian Wheat Board is the 
Government•s instrument for marketing these three grains from the Prairies, though 
in the ordinary course of events no subsidy is involved. 
When the Agricultural Stabilization Board designates (with the approval of the 
government) any other natural or processed product of agriculture for stabilization, 
it must prescribe the support price in percentage terms of the 10-year average or 11base .. 
1 Fishermen got similar legislation. 
2 Section 8 of the Agricultural Stabilization Act. 
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price determined in the same way as for a "named commodity". However o the 
percentage may be above or below 80 percento as the Board.'may recommend and 
the government may approve. A dozen or more commodities have been so designated 
for one or more of the years since 1958. Both for a "named commodity" and for any 
other agricultural product for which price stabilization may be provided 1 the Board • s 
action shall be taken "in relation to such grade 1 quality 1 variety 1 class 1 type or 
form thereof I and with reference to such place or places 1 as the Board considers 
appropriate". 3 
The cost of all programs under the Act for the year ended March 31 1 1959 was 
$151124 1100 1 divided amongst four "named" and nine "designated" commodities. Dry 
skimmilko eggs 1 and wool accounted for nearly 80 percent of the total. 
In the following year c ended March 31 1 1960 I stabilization of 15 commodities 
cost $60c2181758. Again several "named commodities" (cattleo wheat, oats and 
barley} required no payments. Big items were hoy s, milk for processing, dry skim-
milk I shell eggs, creamery butter, sugar beets, .:;oybeans, and wool 1 each requiring 
payments of more than $1 million and together accounting for more than 95 percent of 
the cost. 
The Board has power with government approval to purchase in the market, 
make deficiency payments to close the gap between realized price in the market and 
the prescribed price, or announced payments per unit of output o or on any other basis 
"for the purpose of stabilizing the pr.i.ce of an agricultural commodity at the prescribed 
price". The above su:nmaries of annual costs of programs are made up of trading losses· 
and payments. 
Reconsideration of the programs concerning such widely produced items as 
hogs and shell eqqs was made in the last year or two. Purchase programs had been 
applicable t-G both, and by the end of 1959 1 ~30 million pounds of pork had been pur-
chased. There were various programs of disposal within and without Canada, all 
costing $27,861 1833 until March 31, 1960. At the same time or date 125 million pounds 
of pork were still on hand. The accumulation had been made at purchase levels equiva-
lent to $25 per hundredweight, warm dressed weight from Grade A carcasses at Toronto 4 
until September 30 1 1959 1 and on the basis of $23. 65 per hundredweight from October 1. 
These were evidently incentive prices, though at the $2 3. 65 level,precisely the manda-
tory 80 percent of the 10-year average. 
Reconsideration led to a change from offer to purchase to a basi_s of limited 
deficiency payments. In place of the Toronto price for purchase 1 with differentials 
for other markets, a national average price was calculated and adopted. It was de-
termined by the Board that a national price of $22. 65 per hundredweight for Grade A 
carcasses was equivalent to the $23.65 support price at To:conto. Even more important 
in the changed method of support was the limiting of payments to producers who would 
register, and to an annual rate of deliveries by each producer of up to 100 Grade A and 
Grade B hogs. Under deficiency payments, each producer in any part of Canada re-
ceives the same payment if any per unit, the payment being in relation to the realized 
3 Section 7 (2) of the Agricultural Stabilization Act. 
4 With appropriate differentials for other markets. 
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national average price for the calculation of which prices in each province or area 
of Canada are used. Thus geographical differentials are undisturbed by the program, 
and each producer has the incentive to sell to his very best advantage. 
The limitation of output per producer that would be eligible for payment allows 
a free market price to determine the encouragement to production beyond the protected 
minimum. As long as the protected minimum is well within demand limit, then normal 
economic forces will determine the total supplies available. 
The stabilization program for eg;gs was also reconsidered in 1959 u and sim-
ilarly changed from one of purchase in the market to one of limited deficiency pay-
ments. The change was effective in October 1959 for eggs. The prescribed price had 
been 44 cents per dozen Grade A Large and Extra Large eggs, graded and packed, 
Montreal, with appropriate differentials for other markets. As in the case of hogs, a 
national weighted average price to producers was calculated equivalent to the former 
Montreal price, the result being 33 cents per dozen. Results in the market have been 
calculated to have averaged 30. 6 cents, so that a payment of 2. 4 cents per dozen will 
be made. 
Limitation of eligible production per farm was announced, for reasons similar 
to those applying to hogs. The maximum is 4, 000 dozen Grade A Large or ,Extra Large 
per registered farm per year, the production of a flock of about 500 layers. The max-
imum payment per producer for this past year is $96. 
For eggs there has been an interim payment. This was based on results in the 
second quarter u January-March 1960. It had been anticipated that seasonal supply 
might take the market price down appreciably below the prescribed 33-cent annual 
support price in the first quarter from October to the end of 1959. In this event it was 
intimated that an interim payment might be made. Serious price decline - to less than 
20 cents per dozen - came, however I only in the following or second quarter, and a 
payment on up to 1000 dozen, or one-fourth of the annual eligible sales per farm, was 
arranged. The average price to producers in the period was well below the prescribed 
price, and a payment of eight cents per dozen was made, This was to be on account 
of any annual payment, though no restitution of any overpayment was to be required. 
As it has turned out 1 the payment is equivalent to two cents per dozen on the full year's 
quota of sales u so that a producer with eligible output of at least 1000 dozen in the 
quarter and 4000 dozen in the year would have received $80 after March and a further 
$16 after October. 
There is still some producer opinion that the egg program should be on a quarter-
ly basis, but u if any move were to be made toward such a change u it would most likely 
be based on the results of the previous 12 months at the end of each quarter. Apart 
from any increase in percentage of support in relation to the 10-year average price or 
of an increase in output per farm eligible for support - both of which have been mooted 
by producer spokesmen at times - this 12 months quarterly basis is the main possible 
variation from present arrangements for shell eggs. 
Dairy Products. Seventeen percent of Canadian gross farm income derives 
from dairy products, which are produced in every province and mostly sold within 
Canada. In 1948 the government decided to support creamery butter as the basic 
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national support of the dairy industry. The level of support o maintained by an offer 
to purchase, was 58 cents per pound for most of the time untill958. The program 
was mostly one of seasonal stabilization during the period, and generally the summer's 
purchases were worked off at little or no loss in the winter. Occasional exports 
during the period aggregated more than 20 million pounds, and occasional imports 
at other times during the period aggregated more than 40 million pounds 1 part arriving 
as recently as 1957. Consumption grew with population, and has been at a per capita 
level much above that of the United States. 
At May 1, 1958 the support level was increased to 64 cents a pound, 107 per-
cent of the base price of 60 cents. The market had gone up to 63 cents at this time. 
With the increase in price, and even with some export sales, stocks have accumulated. 
Besides butter, cheddar cheese is stabilized at levels which have required 
only small purchases in recent years. Dry skimmilk has been subject to purchase pro-
grams until the current year. Whole milk for processing, emanating from producers 
who do not sell to fluid markets, is stabilized by the payment of 25 cents per hundred-
weight. The quantity was 3. 9 billion pounds in the year ended March 31, 1960, that 
being about 21 percent of total milk production. Thus butter and cheese are to a large 
extent stabilized by two programs, and other concentrated milk gets some help. 
Of the several products I have not yet mentioned, offer to purchase covers 
lambs and turkeys. Deficiency payments apply to wool, sugar beets, soybeans, sun-
flower seed, and honey. 
Wheat. Wheat is th~ most important co~mercial agricultural product in Canada, 
providing between a fifth and a quarter of cash income. As I have mentioned, its 
marketing is performed by and through the Canadian Wheat Board, and I also state,d 
that there is no subsidy in the ordinary course of events 1 the producers getting the 
proceeds, on a pooled basis, of sales in export and domestic markets. Export sales 
are two-thirds of total sales. 
There is no production or acreage control 1 but nevertheless a marketing quota 
system, for equitable allocation of elevator space. Western wheat acreage has, under 
this program, been voluntarily reduced from 27 million a decade ago to 23 million in 
1959 and 1960. 
In offset of forced slow deliveries by producers due to limited facilities and 
the consequent marketing quotas, a 1957 statute, the Prairie Grain Advance Payments 
Act, provides for interest-free refundable cash advances on farm-stored grain under 
certain conditions and limits. About $35 million annually has been advanced under 
this Act. The government has paid since 1956 certain storage charges on stocks held 
by the Wheat Board. Payments into the wheat pool un'der these provisions have 
amounted to approximately $150 million. 
• 
For some time now Prairie grain farmers have been agitating for deficiency 
payments on the wheat and grain crops marketed in western Canada since the crop 
year of 1955. In 1958 the government provided, for one year only, an acreage pay-
ment to farmers in western Canada based on $1 per cultivated acre up to 200 acres. 
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The cost to the government for this payment has been approximately $41 million com-
pared to about $300 million requested as deficiency payments. A similar one-year 
arrangement of a similar size 1 kind 1 and cost was made earlier this year. 
Conclusion. The objectives ·of government price support operations in Canada 
are stated in the Agricultural Stabilization Act to be "stabilizing the prices of agri-
cultural commodities in order to assist the industry of agriculture to realize fair re-
turns for its labor and investment 1 and, to maintain a fair relationship between prices 
received by farmers and the costs of the goods and services that they buy 1 thus to 
provide farmers with a fair share of the national income". 5 
It is further provided that "in prescribing a percentage of the base price of 
an agricultural commodity ..... the Governor in Council shall be guided by the esti-
mated average cost of production of the commodity .... " 6 
It will be seen that the rigidities of the legislation are not too stringent. 
Only the prescribed prices of oats I barley, cattle, lamb I and hogs have been held 
to the 80 percent level. Milk I butter o cheese I wool, honey, and sugar beets have 
been supported at 100 percent or higher. Eggs o soybeans o and sunflower seeds have 
been stabilized at percentages between 80 and 100. Turkey stabilization is at less 
than 8 0 percent. 
Recent farm legislation in Canada, part of the total program of which stabil-
ization of prices is a part, includes new long term credit and crop insurance measures. 
The question of conservation of renewable resources is receiving detailed study and 
attention. The United States rural development programs have been studied carefully 
in the last year or so I and 1 in relation to Canadian needs 1 action along this line 
will be taken in the near future. 
A very recent action has been the transfer of responsibility for the Canadian 
Wheat Board from the Minister of Trade and Commerce to the Minister of Agriculture. 
Just what policy changes·this may presage is not indicated yet. 
Agricultural problems in the price field in Canada are being met by policies 
to maintain an expanding demand in domestic and export markets. Self-help by 
farmers and marketers of farm products is encouraged for attainment of the greatest 
production and marketing efficiency. Hurdles over difficulties of temporary marketing 
problems are provided 1 and a general program of agricultural betterment goes on. 
5 Preamble of the Act. 
6 Sect. 2 (2) of the Act. 
